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Preface
Many-valued logic is not much younger than the whole field of symbolic logic. It
was introduced in the early twenties of this century by  Lukasiewicz [1920] and
Post [1921] and has since developed into a very large area of research. Most of the
early work done has concentrated on problems of axiomatizability on the one hand,
and algebraical/model theoretic investigations on the other. The proof theory of
many-valued systems has not been investigated to any comparable extent. Proof
theory requires appropriate formalisms, such as sequent calculus, natural deduction,
and tableaux for classical (and intuitionistic) logic. Several people have, since the
1950’s, proposed ways to generalize such formalisms from the classical to the many-
valued case. One particular method for systematically obtaining calculi for all
finite-valued logics was invented independently by several researchers, with slight
variations in design and presentation. (Section 3.1 contains a short overview of
work done in this area). The main aim of this report is to develop the proof theory
of finite-valued first order logics in a general way, and to present some of the more
important results in this area. This report is actually a template, from which all
results can be specialized to particular logics. This idea has also found its way
into the notation: Throughout this report, we use V as denoting a set of m truth
values, and 2 and Q as dummies representing n-ary connectives and quantifiers,
respectively. Replace V by the set of values true and false, and 2 and Q by the
usual logical connectives and quantifiers, and you have a treatise on proof theoretic
systems for classical logic.
Some of the material presented here has appeared in different forms elsewhere;
The main innovations of this report are: the use of signed formula expressions and
partial normal forms to provide a unifying framework in which clause translation
calculi (Chapter 2), sequent calculi (Chapter 3), natural deduction (Chapter 4) and
also tableaux can be represented; the recognition of a duality between two types—
“negative” and “positive”—of resolution, sequents and tableaux (see also Baaz et
al. [1993b]); bounds for partial normal forms for general (Section 1.6) and induced
quantifiers (Section 1.7); and negative resolution (Section 2.6). The cut-elimination
theorems extend previous results, the midsequent theorem is new, and Chapters
4 and 5 are entirely new. Material on refinements for resolution or on tableaux sys-
tems have purposely not been included. For that, see Baaz and Fermu¨ller [1993]
and Ha¨hnle [1993a], respectively.
I will refrain from trying to give a thorough motivation for many-valued logic in
general, or even an answer to the question of Scott [1976], “Does many-valued logic
have any use?” The interested reader will find ample material in introductory texts
to the topic, e.g., Rescher [1969], Urquhart [1986], Gottwald [1989], or Bolc
and Borowik [1992]. I would, however, like to remark that in recent years many-
valued logic has enjoyed a growth in interest from computer science, in such areas
as Artificial Intelligence (see, e.g., Ginsberg [1988]) and circuit verification (see
Ha¨hnle and Kernig [1993]). The last chapter, on approximations, also tries to
make a step in the direction of using many-valued logic—and the whole machinery of
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proof theoretic calculi and theorem proving systems—to approximate other logics,
such as those originally devised for resoning applications.
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Chapter 1
Basic Concepts
1.1 Languages and Formulas
In mathematical logic—and especially in proof theory—the syntactic level is very
important. The way in which something is formalized may have many consequences,
particularly for the statement of theorems and the technicalities of proofs. Some-
times even the validity of a proof theoretic argument depends essentially on the
underlying language. One important point in our notion of (first order) logical
syntax is the syntactical distinction between free and bound variables. In this, we
follow Takeuti [1987] and, ultimately, Gentzen [1934].
1.1.1. Definition A first-order logical language L consists of the following sym-
bols:
(1) Variables:
(a) Free variables: a0, a1, a2, . . . , aj , . . . (j ∈ ω)
(b) Bound variables: x0, x1, x2, . . . , aj , . . . (j ∈ ω)
(2) Constants:
(a) Function symbols of arity i (i ∈ ω): f i0, f i1, f i2, . . . , f ij , . . . (j ∈ ω).
Nullary function symbols are called constants.
(b) Predicate symbols of arity i (i ∈ ω): P i0, P i1, P i2, . . . , P ij , . . . (j ∈ ω)
(3) Logical symbols:
(a) Propositional connectives of arity nj : 2n00 , 2
n1
1 , . . . , 2
nr
r
(b) Quantifiers: Q0, Q1, . . . , Qq
(4) Auxiliary symbols: (, ), and , (comma).
1.1.2. Definition Terms and semi-terms are inductively defined as follows:
(1) Every individual constant is a term (semi-term).
(2) Every free variable (and every bound variable) is a term (semi-term).
(3) If fn is a function symbol of arity n, and t1, . . . , tn are terms (semi-terms),
then fn(t1, . . . , tn) is a term (semi-term).
1.1.3. Definition Formulas, semi-formulas, and outermost logical symbols are in-
ductively defined as follows:
(1) If Pn is a predicate symbol of arity n, and t1, . . . , tn are terms (semi-terms),
then Pn(t1, . . . , tn) is a formula (semi-formula). It is called atomic or an atom.
It has no outermost logical symbol.
1
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(2) If A1, A2, . . . , An are formulas (semi-formulas) and 2n is a propositional
connective of arity n, then 2n(A1, A2, . . . , An) is a formula (semi-formula)
with outermost logical symbol 2n.
(3) If A is a formula (semi-formula) not containing the bound variable x, a is a free
variable and Q is a quantifier, then (Qx)A(x), where A(x) is obtained from A
by replacing a by x at every occurrence of a in A, is a formula (semi-formula).
Its outermost logical symbol is Q.
A formula is called open, if it contains free variables, and closed otherwise. A
formula without quantifiers is called quantifier-free. We denote the set of formulas
of a language L by Frm(L).
Of course, in defining specific logics, we shall introduce specific symbols for the
propositional connectives and for the quantifiers.
1.1.4. Example The language L normally used for classical 2-valued logic and also
for other m-valued logics contains the following propositional connectives: ¬ (not),
∧ (and), ∨ (or), ⊃ (implies), ≡ (equivalent) (of which ¬ is unary and all others
binary), and the following two quantifiers: ∀ (for all) and ∃ (there exists).
1.1.5. Definition The complexity of a formula F , or its degree deg(F ), is induc-
tively defined as follows:
(1) If F is atomic, then deg(F ) = 1.
(2) If F is of the form 2n(A1, . . . , An), then deg(F ) = 1 +
∑n
i=1 deg(Ai).
(3) If F is of the form (Qx)A(x), then deg(F ) = 1 + deg
(
A(x)
)
.
In the ensuing chapters, we will talk about the object-level constructs, e.g.,
formulas, and later also sequences and sets of those, on a meta-level. For instance,
a calculus may be given by a set of axiom and rule schemata, and every instance
of such a schema is an axiom and an inference, respectively. Hence, we shall need
meta-variables for the symbols of a language L: As a notational convention we
use lowercase letters from the beginning of the alphabet (a, b, c, . . .) to denote
free variables, letters from the middle of the alphabet (f , g, h, . . .) for function
symbols and constants, letters from the end of the alphabet (x, y, z, . . .) for bound
variables, symbols like 2 for connectives, and Q to denote quantifiers, all possibly
indexed by subscripts. Furthermore, A, B, C, . . . will stand for formulas; Γ , ∆,
Λ, . . . for sequences and sets of formulas, t and s for terms or semi-terms. We
will write A(x) for a semi-formula possibly containing the bound variable x, and
A(a) resp. A(t) for the formula obtained from A by replacing every occurrence
of the variable x by the free variable a resp. the term t. Sometimes it will be
convenient to handle this meta-notation more explicitly, particularly in defining
and working with inference rules. Then we use α as a variable for free variables
(an eigenvariable), and τ as a variable for terms (a term variable). A formula
consisting of some formula variables, eigenvariables and term variables is called a
schema. By a pre-instance A′ of a schema A we mean an actual formula from Frm(L)
which contains occurrences of the eigenvariables and term variables of A. By an
instance A′′ of A we mean a pre-instance A′ of A where the eigen- and term variables
have been replaced by free variables not occurring in A′, and terms, respectively.
For instance, consider the schema A(α, τ) where α is an eigenvariable, and τ is
a term variable. P 21 (α, a1) ∧ P 12 (τ) ⊃ P 21 (τ, α) is a pre-instance of A(α, τ), and
P 21 (a0, a1) ∧ P 12 (f0(a1)) ⊃ P 21 (f0(a1), a0) is an instance.
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1.2 Substitutions and Unification
Substitutions are of great importance in proof theory and automated theorem prov-
ing. The resolution calculus is based on substitutions and the so-called unification
computation. Unification means finding a substitution, such that two expressions
become equal after the substitution has been applied. In this section, and when
we refer to these concepts later on, we will use variable, term, and expression more
loosely than defined previously: a variable may be free or bound, a term can refer
to a term or a semi-term, and an expression can refer to (semi-)terms, formulas,
tuples, sequences and sets of formulas, and similar constructs.
1.2.1. Definition A substitution is a mapping of variables to terms with finite
domain. Substitutions are denoted by lowercase greek letters and are written as
sets of expressions of the form t/x, where t is a (semi-)term and x is a variable.
The application of a substitution σ to an expression E is denoted by juxtaposi-
tion. Eσ denotes the expression obtained from E by simultaneously replacing every
occurrence of a variable x ∈ dom(σ) in E by its image σ(x).
The composition σϑ of two substitutions σ and ϑ is defined as follows: σϑ(x) =(
σ(x)
)
ϑ for every variable x.
1.2.2. Definition A substitution σ is called a unifier of a set A of expressions, if
Aσ is a singleton set. The substitution σ is called a most general unifier of A, if
every unifier ϑ of A is an extension of σ, i.e., there is a substitution λ such that
ϑ = σλ.
For finite sets of expressions A, the problem of whether there exists a unifier
for A is decidable. The unification algorithm (see Chang and Lee [1973]) calculates
the most general unifier if it exists.
1.3 Semantics of First Order Logics
The motivation to study many-valued logic does originally arise from semantical
analysis of logical statements: One rejects the assumption that a statement must
be either true or false: it may have some other “truth value”. Different contexts have
led to different interpretations for a third truth value, finitely or even infinitely many
many truth values. This makes it necessary to introduce a basic set of semantic
notations, although we shall almost exclusively deal with syntactical properties of
finite-valued logics, and not with their model theories. We refer the interested reader
to Rescher [1969] and Zinov’ev [1963] for more philosophical investigations into
many-valued logic. A treatise on the model theory of many-valued logic can be
found in Rasiowa [1974].
1.3.1. Definition A matrix L for a language L is given by:
(1) a nonempty set of truth values V of cardinality m,
(2) a subset V + ⊆ V of designated truth values,
(3) an algebra V with domain V of appropriate type: For every n-place connec-
tive 2 of L there is an associated truth function 2˜:V n → V , and
(4) for every quantifier Q, an associated truth function Q˜:℘(V ) \ {∅} → V
The set of truth values of the logics considered here will always be finite, i.e.,
m is a finite number. The constructions given for calculi for many-valued logics can
be extended to logics with an infinite set of truth values, although the constructions
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will then, in general, not be effective. For special cases, a meaningful proof theory
can still be developed.
Throughout this work we will give definitions and theorems relative to some
given logic, and we will implicitly refer to this logic’s language and matrix. In
particular, V will always denote the set of truth values of the given logic, and m its
cardinality. We shall also assume that V is equipped with a linear order, and write
V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm} for the truth values in their given order. It is this order which
we will refer to when we give the definition of a sequent.
The semantical structure of a logic is effectively determined by its matrix; we
use boldface type to denote a logic (with its associated language) and its matrix.
For instance, we use CL to refer to classical two-valued first order logic and  Lm to
refer to m-valued quantificational  Lukasiewicz logic.
The intended meaning of a truth function for a propositional connective is analo-
gous to the two-valued case: Given formulas A1, . . . , An, which take the truth values
w1, . . . , wn, respectively, the truth value of 2(A1, . . . , An) is given by 2˜(w1, . . . , wn).
A truth function for quantifiers is a mapping from nonempty sets of truth values
to truth values: Given a quantified formula (Qx)F (x), such a set of truth values de-
scribes the situation where the ground instances of F take exactly the truth values
in this set as values under a given interpretation. In other words, for a non-empty
set M ⊆ V , (Qx)F (x) takes the truth value Q˜(M) if, for every truth value v ∈ V , it
holds that v ∈M iff there is a domain element d such that the truth value of F (d)
is v (all relative to some interpretation). The set M is called the distribution of F .
This generalization of quantifiers dates back at least to Mostowski [1963]. Quan-
tifiers of this type have been dubbed distribution quantifiers by Carnielli [1987b].
In Carnielli [1987a], he has also investigated the problem of quantificational com-
pleteness, i.e., the problem of which sets of quantifiers can, together with a set of
propositional connectives, express any distribution quantifier.
1.3.2. Example The matrix for classical two-valued logic CL is as follows:
(1) The set of truth values V = {f, t} (false, true)
(2) The set of designated truth values V + = {t}
(3) The truth functions for classical two-valued connectives:
¬
f t
t f
∧ f t
f f f
t f t
∨ f t
f f t
t t t
⊃ f t
f t t
t f t
(4) The truth functions for the quantifiers ∀ and ∃:
∀˜({t}) = t ∀˜({t, f}) = ∀˜({f}) = f
∃˜({f}) = f ∃˜({t}) = ∃˜({t, f}) = t
1.3.3. Example The matrix for the three-valued  Lukasiweicz logic  L3 consists of:
(1) The set of truth values V = {f, p, t} (false, possible, true)
(2) The set of designated truth values V + = {t}
(3) The truth functions for the connectives:
¬
f t
p p
t f
∧ f p t
f f f f
p f p p
t f p t
∨ f p t
f f p t
p p p t
t t t t
⊃ f p t
f t t t
p p t t
t f p t
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(4) The truth functions for the quantifiers ∀ and ∃ (generalized ∧ and ∨):
∀˜({t}) = t ∃˜({t}) = t
∀˜({t, p}) = p ∃˜({t, p}) = t
∀˜({t, f}) = f ∃˜({t, f}) = t
∀˜({t, p, f}) = f ∃˜({t, p, f}) = t
∀˜({p}) = p ∃˜({p}) = p
∀˜({p, f}) = f ∃˜({p, f}) = p
∀˜({f}) = f ∃˜({f}) = f
1.3.4. Definition Let L be a first-order language, and let D be any set. The
extended language L(D) is obtained by adjoining to the set of constant symbols
of L the set D (D is assumed to be disjoint from L).
1.3.5. Definition A structure M = 〈D,Φ〉 for a language L (an L-structure)
consists of the following:
(1) A non-empty set D, called the domain (elements of D are called individuals).
(2) A mapping Φ that satisfies the following:
(a) Each n-ary function symbol f of L(D) is mapped to a function f˜ :Dn →
D if n > 0, or to an element of D if n = 0. If d ∈ D, then Φ(d) = d.
(b) Each n-ary predicate symbol P of L(D) is mapped to a function P˜ :Dn →
V if n > 0, or to and element of V if n = 0.
1.3.6. Definition Let M be an L-structure. An assignment s is a mapping from
the free variables of L to individuals.
1.3.7. Definition An interpretation I = 〈M, s〉 is an L-structure M = 〈D,Φ〉
together with an assignment s.
1.3.8. Definition Let I =
〈〈D,Φ〉, s〉 be an interpretation. The mapping Φ can
be extended in the obvious way to a mapping ΦI from terms to individuals:
(1) If t is a free variable, then ΦI(t) = s(t).
(2) If t is of the form f(t1, . . . , t2), where f is a function symbol of arity n and t1,
. . . , tn are terms, then ΦI(t) = Φ(f)
(
ΦI(t1), . . . , ΦI(tn)
)
.
1.3.9. Definition Given an interpretation I = 〈M, s〉, we define the valuation valI
to be a mapping from formulas F of L(D) to truth values as follows:
(1) If F is atomic, i.e., of the form P (t1, . . . , tn), where P is a predicate symbol
of arity n and t1, . . . , tn are terms, then valI(F ) = Φ(P )
(
ΦI(t1), . . . , ΦI(tn)
)
.
(2) If the outermost logical symbol of F is a propositional connective 2 of arity n,
i.e., F is of the form 2(F1, . . . , Fn), where F1, . . . , Fn are formulas, then
valI(F ) = 2˜
(
valI(F1), . . . , valI(Fn)
)
.
(3) If the outermost logical symbol of F is a quantifier Q, i.e., F is of the
form (Qx)G(x), then
valI(F ) = Q˜
(⋃
d∈D
valIG(d)
)
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Note that s maps variables to domain elements which are themselves constant
symbols in the extended language. An assignment, if constrained to a finite number
of variables, can then be viewed as a ground substitution. For a formula F it
obviously does not make a difference if val is applied to F or to Fs.
1.3.10. Definition Let I = 〈M, s〉 be an interpretation. An interpretation I′ =
〈M, s′〉 is called a variant of I modulo a1, . . . , an, in symbols I ∼a1,...,an I′, iff
s equals s′ except in the values of the free variables a1, . . . , an.
1.3.11. Proposition Let A be a formula, I = 〈M, s〉 be an interpretation, and
s(a) = d ∈ D for the free variable a. Then valI(A) = valI′(A[d/a]), for all I′ ∼a I.
1.3.12. Definition A formula F is called a many-valued tautology iff, for every
interpretation I, it holds that valI(F ) ∈ V +. It is called satisfiable iff there is an
interpretation I s.t. valI(F ) ∈ V +, and unsatisfiable otherwise.
Many-valued tautologies play an important roˆle in the area of Hilbert-style ax-
iomatizations of many-valued logics. We will not deal with Hilbert-style axiomatiza-
tions nor with many-valued tautologies here, and hence the set V + will not be very
important in our considerations. We will, however, point out how to incorporate
tautologies into our frameworks, e.g., in terms of provability.
1.4 Signed Formula Expressions
It is a well-known and not too surprising fact that the truth of many-valued formulas
can be reduced, in a sense, to the truth of formulas in two-valued classical logic. In
the words of Rosser and Turquette [1952] (p. 1), two-valued logic is sufficient
for the development of many-valued logic. The idea behind this “two-valisation”
of many-valued logics is as follows: We introduce m two-valued predicates Av1 ,
. . . , Avm for every many-valued atom A. These predicates are called signed atomic
formulas: Aw expresses that A takes the truth value w. This notation, and its
corresponding theory, will serve as a convenient formalism for specifying many-
valued logics. In fact, the truth table specification can easily be translated into
a specification by means of signed formula expressions, and it is this specification
from which we will be able to obtain calculi for the logics under consideration in a
completely systematic and mechanizable way.
We will use signed formula expressions (sfes) to give meaning to syntactical
constructs such as clauses and sequents, which will all have corresponding sfes of
a particular form. Satisfaction, validity, etc. of, e.g., a sequent or a clause will
be defined via satisfaction etc. of the corresponding sfes. On the other hand, sfe
schemata provide a convenient means for specifying calculi by recurring on the
semantics of sfes. Sfes of a certain kind will, e.g., be used to specify sequent calculi
rules.
1.4.1. Definition A signed formula is an expression of the form Avi , where vi is a
truth value, and A is a first order formula. A signed formula expression is a formula
built up from signed formulas using ∧ , ∨ , ¬.
A signed formula expression of the form Aw or ¬Aw is called a signed literal. It
is called an atomic literal iff A is atomic. In that case, Aw is also called a signed
atom.
Signed formula expressions are Boolean expressions in the signed formulas, and
every interpretation defines a Boolean truth value assignment to the signed formulas,
and to the expression as a whole. We call an sfe ∆ valid iff ∆ is true under every
interpretation via the induced valuation, and satisfiable iff there is an interpretation
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s.t. ∆ is true in the induced valuation. Furthermore, assume that ¬ occurs in ∆
only immediately in front of signed formulas, if at all. Then ∆ is called positive iff
all its signed literals are of the form Avi (i.e., ¬ does not occur at all), and negative
iff they are all of the form ¬Avi .
We shall use the following abbreviations: If A1, . . . , An are sfes, then
∨n
i=1Ai
stands for A1 ∨ (A2 ∨ . . . (An−1 ∨ An) · · ·), and
∧n
i=1 for A1 ∧ (A2 ∧ . . . (An−1 ∧
An) · · ·). If n = 0, we obtain the empty disjunction and the empty conjunction,
respectively. By convention, these represent sfes which are always false or always
true, respectively. If they occur in the context of other disjunctions or conjunctions,
respectively, they may be deleted in the obvious way. Furthermore, if W ⊆ V , then
AW denotes
∨
w∈W A
w. The usual conventions for omitting parentheses apply:
binary operators associate to the right, and precedence is given in the decreasing
order ¬, ∧ , ∨ . Furthermore, it is easy to see that the well-known equivalences for
classical logic also hold for sfes. So, e.g., associative, commutative, distributive and
de Morgan’s laws hold for sfes.
1.4.2. Definition Let I be an interpretation and F be a signed formula expression.
We say I satisfies F , in symbols: I |= F , iff
(1) F is of the form Aw, where A is an atomic formula, and valI(A) = w;
(2) F is of the form ¬A and I 6|= A;
(3) F is of the form A ∧ B and I |= A and I |= B;
(4) F is of the form A ∨ B and I |= A or I |= B;
Furthermore, F is called valid, in symbols |= F , iff every interpretation satisfies F ;
it is called satisfiable iff there is an interpretation I s.t. I |= F , and unsatisfiable
otherwise.
1.4.3. Proposition Let F be a formula. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) F is a tautology.
(2) The sfe
∨
w∈V + F
w is valid.
(3) The sfe
∧
w∈V \V + ¬Fw is valid.
(4) The sfe
∨
w∈V \V + F
w is unsatisfiable.
(5) The sfe
∧
w∈V + ¬Fw is unsatisfiable.
1.4.4. Proposition Let F be a formula. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) F is unsatisfiable.
(2) The sfe
∨
w∈V + F
w is unsatisfiable.
(3) The sfe
∧
w∈V \V + ¬Fw is unsatisfiable.
(4) The sfe
∨
w∈V \V + F
w is valid.
(5) The sfe
∧
w∈V + ¬Fw is valid.
1.4.5. Proposition Every sfe ∆ can be transformed to an equivalent positive sfe
p(∆) (negative sfe n(∆)).
Proof. Use de Morgan’s laws to bring ¬ immediately before the signed formulas.
Replace every signed literal ¬Avi (Avi) in ∆ by ∨ j 6=iAvj (∧ j 6=i ¬Avj ).
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1.4.6. Proposition Every sfe ∆ containing negation only immediately in front of
signed formulas can be transformed to an equivalent positive (negative) conjunction
of disjunctions of signed formulas (a conjunctive form of ∆).
Proof. We prove the proposition by induction on the complexity of ∆: If ∆ is
a signed atom Avi , then Avi is a positive and
∧
j 6=i ¬Avj a negative conjunction
of disjunctions equivalent to ∆. If ∆ is of the form Ψ ∧ Φ, then by induction
hypothesis, Ψ ′ is a conjunctive form of Ψ and Φ′ is a conjunctive form of Φ: Ψ ′ ∧ Φ′
is a conjunctive form of ∆. If ∆ is of the form Ψ ∨ Φ, then let Ψ = ∧ ri=1∨kij=1Ai,j
and Φ =
∧s
i′=1
∨ li′
j=1Bi′,j . We obtain a conjunctive form of ∆ by:
r∧
i=1
s∧
i′=1
( ki∨
j=1
Ai,j ∨
li′∨
j=1
Bi′,j
)
1.4.7. Proposition I |= ∆ iff I 6|= ¬∆.
1.4.8. Proposition |= ∆ iff ¬∆ is unsatisfiable.
1.5 Partial Normal Forms
Partial normal forms were introduced by Rosser and Turquette [1952], p. 53ff.
as a convenient means of specifying the truth-functional behaviour of many-valued
connectives and quantifiers. For a given connective 2, the i-th partial normal
form is a signed formula expression schema Fi equivalent to 2(A1, . . . , An) which
contains only the (signed) formulas A1, . . . , An, and is in conjunctive normal form1.
Partial normal forms are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, i.e., under any given
interpretation exactly one of the m partial normal forms comes out true. They can
easily be constructed from the truth tables of a given logic, also for the quantifiers
of that logic, and in essence provide us directly with the rules to be used in our
calculi.
1.5.1. Definition Let 2 be a propositional connective of arity n. An sfe schema F
is called an i-th partial form of 2(A1, . . . , An) if the following hold:
(1) The signed formulas in F are of the form Ajw (1 ≤ j ≤ n, w ∈ V ).
(2) For every instance F ′ of F and every interpretation I and it holds that I |= F ′
iff valI
(
2(A1, . . . , An)
)
= vi.
It is called a partial normal form, if it is in conjunctive normal form.
An i-th partial normal form for ¬2(A1, . . . , An) is defined as above, with =
replaced by 6=.
Thus, in other words, an i-th partial normal form for 2(A1, . . . , An) (or
¬2(A1, . . . , An)) is a conjunctive normal form in the Ajw which is equivalent to
2(A1, . . . , An)
vi (or ¬2(A1, . . . , An)vi). Note that we are actually talking about
schemata (our meta-notation of § 1.1) as objects, rather than using them to specify
a class of, e.g., sfes. A partial form is a schema, not its collection of instances.
This will be important in later chapters, as partial forms are used to define rules
of inference in sequent calculus and natural deduction, which are rule schemata
themselves. It should be noted again that from one partial normal form we will
obtain a clause translation rule, a sequent calculus introduction rule, and a natural
deduction rule (for a connective and a place). In this sense, the pnfs provide a
relationship between all these calculi.
1Rosser and Turquette [1952] used disjunctive normal forms.
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1.5.2. Example Positive partial normal forms for the connectives of classical two-
valued logic CL:
(¬A)f = At (¬A)t = Af
(A ∨B)f = Af ∧ Bf (A ∨B)t = At ∨ Bt
(A ∧B)f = Af ∨ Bf (A ∧B)t = At ∧ Bt
(A ⊃ B)f = At ∧ Bf (A ⊃ B)t = Af ∨ Bt
Negative pnfs for their negations are given by:
¬(¬A)f = ¬At ¬(¬A)t = ¬Af
¬(A ∨B)f = ¬Af ∨ ¬Bf ¬(A ∨B)t = ¬At ∧ ¬Bt
¬(A ∧B)f = ¬Af ∧ ¬Bf ¬(A ∧B)t = ¬At ∨ ¬Bt
¬(A ⊃ B)f = ¬At ∨ ¬Bf ¬(A ⊃ B)t = ¬Af ∧ ¬Bt
1.5.3. Example Partial normal forms for the connectives of three-valued
 Lukasiewicz logic  L3 are as follows:
(¬A)f = At
(¬A)p = Ap
(¬A)t = Af
(A ∨B)f = Af ∧ Bf
(A ∨B)p = (Ap ∨ Bp) ∧ (Af ∨ Ap) ∧ (Bf ∨ Bp)
(A ∨B)t = At ∨ Bt
(A ∧B)f = Af ∨ Bf
(A ∧B)p = (Ap ∨ Bp) ∧ (Ap ∨ At) ∧ (Bp ∨ Bt)
(A ∧B)t = At ∧ Bt
(A ⊃ B)f = At ∧ Bf
(A ⊃ B)p = (Ap ∨ At) ∧ (Ap ∨ Bp) ∧ (At ∨ Bf )
or, (A ⊃ B)p = (Ap ∨ Bp) ∧ (At ∨ Bf ) ∧ (Bf ∨ Bp)
(A ⊃ B)t = (Af ∨ Ap ∨ Bt) ∧ (Af ∨ Bp ∨ Bt)
Negative pnfs for the negations are:
¬(¬A)f = ¬At
¬(¬A)p = ¬Ap
¬(¬A)t = ¬Af
¬(A ∨B)f = ¬Af ∨ ¬Bf
¬(A ∨B)p = (¬Ap ∨ ¬Bp) ∧ (¬Ap ∨ ¬Bf ) ∧ (¬Af ∨ ¬Bp)
¬(A ∨B)t = ¬At ∧ ¬Bt
¬(A ∧B)f = ¬Af ∧ ¬Bf
¬(A ∧B)p = (¬Ap ∨ ¬Bp) ∧ (¬Ap ∨ ¬Bt) ∧ (¬At ∨ ¬Bp)
¬(A ∧B)t = ¬At ∨ ¬Bt
¬(A ⊃ B)f = ¬At ∨ ¬Bf
¬(A ⊃ B)p = (¬Ap ∨ ¬Bf ) ∧ (¬At ∨ ¬Bp)
¬(A ⊃ B)t = ¬Af ∧ ¬Bt ∧ (¬Ap ∨ ¬Bp)
We can immediately extract a partial normal form from the truth table in a
way analogous to the method of obtaining complete conjunctive normal forms for
two-valued functions: The idea is to look at the n-tuples of values for which 2 does
not take the required truth value vi, to describe the negations of these situations
and to combine these descriptions conjunctively. More precisely, let
I = {(w1, . . . , wn) | 2˜(w1, . . . , wn) 6= vi}.
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Then 2(A1, . . . , An)
vi =∧
(w1,...,wn)∈I
(¬A1w1 ∨ ¬A2w2 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Anwn)
is a negative i-th partial normal form for 2. We can obtain a positive partial normal
form by replacing each ¬Aw by ∨u∈V \{w}Au.
1.5.4. Example Consider ∧ in CL for the truth value t: Here,
I = {(f, f), (f, t), (t, f)}.
The corresponding negative partial normal form is:
(A ∧B)t = (¬Af ∨ ¬Bf ) ∧ (¬Af ∨ ¬Bt) ∧ (¬At ∨ ¬Bf ).
We obtain a positive normal form
(A ∧B)t = (At ∨ Bt) ∧ (At ∨ Bf ) ∧ (Af ∨ Bt).
A partial normal form constructed this way can have up to mn conjuncts (if
2 never takes the value vi), but standard methods for minimizing combinational
function, such as the Quine-McCluskey procedure, can be used to find minimal
positive or negative normal forms. Here, “minimal” is meant with respect to the
number of conjuncts and the number of formulas per conjunct. For instance, the
partial normal form for A ∧Bt given in Example 1.5.2 is minimal, compare this
to the one obtained in Example 1.5.4. Nevertheless, there are connectives which
admit no “simple” rule. This will be shown in the next section. An adaptation of
the Quine-McCluskey procedure has been implemented and gives minimal positive
pnfs in reasonable time for small m (see Baaz et al. [1993]).
If a connective always takes the truth value vi, then the i-th partial normal form
is the empty conjunction, which is always true.
1.5.5. Definition Let Q be a quantifier. An sfe schema F is called an i-th partial
form of (Qx)A(x) if the following hold:
(1) The signed atoms in F are among {A(τj)uji | 1 ≤ j ≤ p, 1 ≤ i ≤ m} ∪
{A(αj)wji | 1 ≤ j ≤ q, 1 ≤ i ≤ m} where the αi are eigenvariables and the τi
term variables.
(2) For every pre-instance F ′ of F and every interpretation I it holds that
(a) If for all d1, . . . , dq ∈ D there are e1, . . . , ep ∈ D s.t.
I |= F{e1/τ1, . . . , ep/τp, d1/α1, . . . , dq/αq}
then valI
(
(Qx)A′(x)
)
= vi.
(b) If for all e1, . . . , eq ∈ D there are d1, . . . , dp ∈ D s.t.
I 6|= F{e1/τ1, . . . , ep/τp, d1/α1, . . . , dq/αq}
then valI
(
(Qx)A′(x)
) 6= vi.
where A′ is the instance of A determined by F ′.
It is called a partial normal form iff it is in conjunctive normal form.
An i-th partial normal form for ¬(Qx)A(x) is defined as above, with = replaced
by 6=.
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Term variables and eigenvariables express universal and existential conditions
on formulas, in much the same way as the universal and existential quantifiers do
in classical logic. It is therefore convenient to introduce quantifiers in sfes as a
notational convention. The expression (∀ x)A(x) is then meant to stand for the
sfe resulting from A(x) by replacing x with some eigenvariable α, and similarly,
(∃ x)A(x) for A(τ). Different quantifiers correspond to different eigenvariables/term
variables. It is easy to prove the familiar equivalences (distribution of ∃ over ∨ , of ∀
over ∧ , de Morgan’s laws) for these quantifiers, allowing us to work with them just
as in classical logic. For instance, if (∀ x)(A(x)∧B(x)) then (∀ x)A(x)∧ (∀ x)B(x).
This is seen as follows: The first expression stands for F = A(α)∧ B(α), the second
for G = A(α) ∧ B(β). Let I be an interpretation. Now if for each assignment of
d ∈ D for α, I |= A(d/α) ∧ B(d/α), then also I |= A(d/α) and I |= A(d/α) for all
d ∈ D separately. We may rename one α and obtain I |= A(d/α) for all d ∈ D and
I |= A(d/β) for all d ∈ D. But this means that G is true in I.
1.5.6. Example Partial normal forms for the quantifiers of CL are as follows:(
(∀x)A(x))f = A(τ)f ((∀x)A(x))t = A(α)t(
(∃x)A(x))f = A(α)f ((∃x)A(x))t = A(τ)t
Negative pnfs for their negations are given by:
¬((∀x)A(x))f = ¬A(α)f ¬((∀x)A(x))t = ¬A(τ)t
¬((∃x)A(x))f = ¬A(τ)f ¬((∃x)A(x))t = ¬A(α)t
1.5.7. Example Partial normal forms for the quantifiers of  L3 are as follows:(
(∀x)A(x))f = A(τ)f ((∀x)A(x))t = A(α)t(
(∀x)A(x))p = A(τ)p ∧ (A(α)p ∨ A(α)t)(
(∃x)A(x))f = A(α)f ((∃x)A(x))t = A(τ)t(
(∃x)A(x))p = A(τ)p ∧ (A(α)f ∨ A(α)p)
Negative pnfs for their negations are given by:
¬((∀x)A(x))f = ¬A(α)f ¬((∀x)A(x))t = ¬A(τ)t
¬((∀x)A(x))p = ¬A(τ)p ∧ (¬A(α)p ∨ A(τ)t)
¬((∃x)A(x))f = ¬A(τ)f ¬((∃x)A(x))t = ¬A(α)t
¬((∃x)A(x))p = (A(α)p ∨ A(τ)f ) ∧ ¬A(τ)p
As in the case of the propositional connectives, truth tables for quantifiers yield
partial normal forms. Let DistrI(A(x)) = {valI(A(d)) | d ∈ D}, the so called
distribution of A(x) relative to I. The truth table for a quantifier Q maps distri-
butions to truth values. To describe the conditions for (Qx)A(x) to take the truth
value vi we proceed analogously to the case of a propositional connective: There, we
looked at those combinations of truth values w1, . . . , wn for which 2˜(w1, . . . , wn)
is different from the value vi and described these situations. The conjunctions over
the negations of these descriptions yields the required conjunctive partial normal
form. Accordingly, let W ⊂ V be a distribution s.t. Q˜(W ) 6= vi. For any particu-
lar interpretation I we have DistrI
(
A(x)
) 6= W iff either there is some d ∈ D s.t.
I |= A(d)V \W (i.e., DistrI
(
A(x)
)
contains a truth value not in W ), or there is a
truth value w ∈ W s.t. for all e ∈ D, I |= A(e)V \{w} (i.e., there is a truth value
in W which is never taken by A(x) under I). The conjunction of these conditions
over all W s.t. Q˜(W ) 6= vi fully describes Q˜(W ) = vi. Let
I = {W ⊆ V \ ∅ | Q˜(W ) 6= vi}
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The sfe expressing Q˜(W ) = vi is as follows∧
W∈I
(
(∃ x ∈ D)A(x)V \W ∨
∨
w∈W
(∀ y)A(y)V \{w})
Note that the quantifiers can be brought to the front in the order required by
Definition 1.5.5. The corresponding sfe is as follows:∧
W∈I
( ∨
u∈V \W
A(τ)u ∨
∨
w∈W
∨
u∈V \{w}
A(αw)
u
)
We have an upper bound on the number of conjuncts of 2m − 1: This is the case if
Q˜ never takes the value vi.
If a quantifier never takes a particular truth value vi, then the i-th partial normal
form is the empty conjunction, which is always true.
1.5.8. Example Consider the universal quantifier in CL at place t. We have I ={{f}, {f, t}}. The corresponding pnf is(
(∀x)A(x))t = (A(τ)t ∨ A(α)t) ∧ (A(αt)f ∨ A(αf )t)
The second conjunct says that A(x) is either false for all x or true for all x. The
first expresses that there is an element e, such that A(e) is true (or for all elements,
A(e) is true), hence the second alternative applies: A(x) is uniformly true.
1.5.9. Remark Rosser and Turquette [1952] use a very general quantifier def-
inition where a quantifier may take several variables and formulas: A quantified
formula then has the form
(Qx1, . . . , xk)
(
A1(x1, . . . , xk), . . . , Al(x1, . . . , xk)
)
.
The case where k = l = 1 is that of our distribution quantifiers.
1.6 Bounds for Partial Normal Forms
In the last section we gave examples of pnfs for n-ary connectives and quantifiers
having at most mn and 2m− 1 conjuncts, respectively. In this section we show how
this can be improved to pnfs of at most mn−1 and 2m−1 conjuncts, respectively. It
is also shown that these bounds are tight.
The following proposition occurs as Lemma 1 in Rousseau [1967].
1.6.1. Proposition Let 2 be an n-ary propositional connective. There is an i-th
positive partial normal form for 2(A1, . . . , An) of at most mn−1 conjuncts.
Proof. Consider the following disjunctive form:∨
(w1,...,wn−1)
(
A1
w1 ∧ . . . ∧ An−1wn−1 ∧
∨
wn
2˜(w1,...,wn−1,wn)6=vi
An
w
)
This sfe is equivalent to ¬2(A1, . . . , An)vi : Suppose that Aiwi holds for 1 ≤ i ≤
n) and that 2˜(w1, . . . , wn−1, wn) 6= vi. But then the first part of the disjunct
corresponding to (w1, . . . , wn−1) is true, and the second part is true since Anwn is
true. Conversely, assume that the disjunct corresponding to (w1, . . . , wn−1) is true.
Then Aiwi holds for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Furthermore, from the second part of the
disjunct, there is a wn s.t. Anwn holds and that 2˜(w1, . . . , wn−1, wn) 6= vi. But this
means that ¬2(A1, . . . , An)vi .
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By negating the whole sfe we obtain the following i-th partial normal form for
2(A1, . . . , An):∧
(w1,...,wn−1)
( ∨
u 6=w1
A1
u ∨ . . . ∨
∨
u 6=wn−1
An−1u ∨
∨
wn
2˜(w1,...,wn−1,wn)=vi
An
wn
)
This partial normal form has at most mn−1 conjuncts.
Rousseau [1967] also stated that the bound given above is tight, although
without detailed proof:
1.6.2. Proposition For every n, there is a propositional connective  of arity n
s.t. any i-th partial normal form for  contains mn−1 conjuncts.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that the set of truth values V =
{0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}, and let u = i − 1. Furthermore, let u′ ∈ V be a truth value
s.t. u′ 6= u. Define  as follows:
˜(i1, . . . , in) =
{
u′ i1 + · · ·+ in ≡ 0(m)
u otherwise
Obviously, ¬(A1, . . . , An)vi holds iff Aj takes the truth value ij (1 ≤ j ≤ n) and
i1 + · · ·+ in ≡ 0(m).
We show that any given minimal normal form for has mn−1 conjuncts: Assume
that
F =
∨
(W1,...,Wn)
( ∨
w1∈W1
A1
w1 ∧ . . . ∧
∨
wn∈Wn
An
wn
)
is equivalent to ¬(A1, . . . , An)u and is minimal in the number of disjuncts. This
is the case iff ∧
(W1,...,Wn)
( ∨
w1∈V \W1
A1
w1 ∨ . . . ∨
∨
wn∈V \Wn
An
wn
)
is a minimal conjunctive normal form for (A1, . . . , An)u.
Consider an interpretation I making the form for ¬(·)u true, i.e. there is a tuple
(W1, . . . ,Wn) such that the corresponding disjunct is true. We show that |Wj | = 1
for all Wj : Assume W1 ⊇ {k, l} and that valI(A1) = k. Then the interpretation I′
which is equal to I except that valI(A1) = l also satisfies F , and thus ¬(·)u. If
valI(Aj) = valI(Aj) = ij for 2 ≤ j ≤ n, then we have that
k + i2 + · · ·+ in ≡ 0(m)
l + i2 + · · ·+ in ≡ 0(m)
by the definition of . But this means that k− l ≡ 0(m) and hence, since 1 ≤ k, l <
m that k = l. Hence |W1| = 1. Similarly, we show |Wj | = 1 for j ≥ 2. Thus F is of
the form ∨
(i1,...,in)
(
A1
i1 ∧ . . . ∧ Anin
)
.
Every disjunct corresponds to exactly one tuple (i1, . . . , in) s.t. i1 + · · ·+ in ≡ 0(m).
There are mn−1 such n-tuples. (In general, there are mn−1 tuples s.t.
∑n
j=1 ij ≡
k(m) for any given k. Proof by induction: for n = 1, only (k) satisfies the condition.
Assume the statement holds for n. For any choice of in+1 there are mn−1 choices
for (i1, . . . , in) s.t.
∑n
j=1 ij ≡ k − in+1(m).)
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1.6.3. Proposition For every quantifier Q there is an i-th partial normal form
containing at most 2m−1 conjuncts.
Proof. Consider the disjunctive form∨
X⊆V \{w}
(∧
u∈X
(∃ x)A(x)u ∧ [B] ∧ (∀ x)
∨
u∈X
(
A(x)u ∨ [C]))
where B is (∃ x)A(x)v iff Q˜(X) = vi, and C is A(x)w iff Q˜(X ∪ {w}) 6= vi.
This form is equivalent to ¬(Qx)A(x)vi : Let I be an interpretation satisfying
¬(Qx)A(x)vi . In other words, DistrI(A(x)) = Y s.t. Q˜(Y ) 6= vi. But then the
disjunct corresponding to Y \{w} is true under I, since all the existential conjuncts
are true (for every truth value u ∈ Y there is a d ∈ D s.t. A(d)u), and the universal
conjunct is true as well (there is no d ∈ D s.t. A(d)u′ for some u′ 6∈ Y ).
Conversely, let I be an interpretation satisfying the disjunct corresponding to
X ⊆ V \ {w}. We distinguish cases according to which of B and C are present
in this disjunct: If B is present (not present) then X ∪ {w} ⊆ DistrI(A(x))
(X ⊆ DistrI(A(x))), since all existential conjuncts are satisfied. Since the universal
conjunct is true as well, there can be no u ∈ DistrI(A(x)) s.t. u 6∈ X (u 6∈ X∪{w} if
C is present). Hence, DistrI(A(x)) ⊆ X (DistrI(A(x)) ⊆ X ∪ {w}). Now, if neither
C nor D are present, we have DistrI(A(x)) = X, and if both C and D are present,
we have DistrI(A(x)) = X ∪{w}. In either case Q˜(X ∪{w}) 6= vi by the conditions
on C and D. If only C is present, then X ⊆ DistrI(A(x)) ⊆ X ∪ {w}. But C alone
is present iff Q˜(Y ) 6= vi for both Y = X and Y = X ∪ {w}. The case where B
alone is present is impossible (the the universal conjunct cannot be true because of
(∃ x)A(x)w).
By negating the whole expression we obtain a conjunctive form∧
X⊆V \{w}
(∨
u∈X
(∀ x)
∨
u′∈V \{u,w}
A(x)u
′ ∨ [B′] ∨ (∃ x)
∨
u∈V \(X∪{w})
A(x)u ∨ [C ′]
)
where B′ is (∀ x)∨u′∈V \{w}A(x)u′ and C ′ is A(x)w. This conjunctive normal form
contains at most 2m−1 conjuncts, the number of subsets of V \ {w}.
1.6.4. Proposition For every n, there is a distribution quantifier R s.t. any i-th
partial normal form contains 2m−1 conjuncts.
Proof. Let u 6= vi, and let R be defined by
R˜(W ) =
{
vi |W | ≡ 0(2)
u otherwise
Let ∧
〈V¯1,...,V¯r,W¯ 〉
(∀ x)
∨
w∈V¯1
A(x)w ∨ . . . ∨ (∀ x)
∨
w∈V¯r
A(x)w ∨ (∃ x)
∨
w∈W¯
A(x)w
)
be a minimal i-th partial normal form for (Rx)A(x) (Note that ∃ distributes over ∨ ,
hence any minimal pnf can be written in the above form). This gives a disjunctive
form for ¬(Rx)A(x)vi which is minimal iff the above pnf is minimal and is of the
form
F =
∨
〈V1,...,Vr,W 〉
(
(∃ x)
∨
w∈V1
A(x)w ∧ . . . ∧ (∃ x)
∨
w∈Vr
A(x)w ∧ (∀ x)
∨
w∈W
A(x)w
)
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where Vj = V \ V¯j and W = V \ W¯ . Observe that from minimality it follows that
no disjunct is redundant (i.e., for every disjunct there is an interpretation satisfying
this disjunct and no other) and that no existential conjunct is redundant (i.e., for
no k 6= l it holds that Vk ⊆ Vl). We show the following three properties for this
form:
(1)
⋃
Vj ⊆W ,
(2) W ⊆ ⋃Vj (and hence, W = ⋃Vj),
(3) |Vj | = 1.
(1) If there were a j and a v ∈ Vj with v 6∈W , then either v is redundant in the
sense that the form with v deleted from Vj is also equivalent to ¬(Rx)A(x)vi , or there
is some interpretation with domain D where A(d)v holds (d is the only witness for
(∃ x)∨w∈Vj A(x)w). But then the universally quantified conjunct cannot be true,
since v 6∈W .
(2) Assume that there were a w ∈W with w 6∈ Vj for j = 1, . . . , r. Let I be some
interpretation satisfying the disjunct under consideration, and let U = {w1, . . . , wr}
be truth values (wj ∈ Vj) s.t. there are d1, . . . , dr ∈ D with A(dj)wj . Without
loss of generality we can assume that D = {d1, . . . , dr}. It follows that R˜(U) 6= vi
and hence that |U | ≡ 1(2). Consider the interpretation I′ with D′ = D ∪ {dw} and
valI′(A(dw)) = w. Obviously, the above form is satisfied under I′, i.e., R˜(U∪{w}) 6=
vi. But |U ∪ {w}| ≡ 0(2), and this contradicts the definition of R.
(3) Assume there were some Vj with Vj = V ′j ∪ {u, v} where u 6= v. By way
of contradiction, we show that there are two interpretations I′ and I′′ which both
satisfy F , but I′ 6|= (Rx)A(x)vi and I′′ |= (Rx)A(x)vi .
Let I be some interpretation satisfying the disjunct under consideration, and let
U = {w1, . . . , wr} be truth values (wj ∈ Vj) s.t. there are d1, . . . , dr ∈ D with
A(dj)
wj . Without loss of generality we can assume that D = {d1, . . . , dr}. Assume
wj = v. We have two cases according to whether u ∈ U : If u 6∈ U , then take I′ = I
and U ′ = U . Otherwise, let k 6= j be such that A(dk)u and u ∈ Vk. Now there
is some w′k in Vk with w
′
k 6∈ Vj (otherwise we would have Vk ⊆ Vj). Let I′ be as
follows: D′ is D less all such dk for which A(dk)
u holds, plus new domain elements
d′k and let valI′(A(d
′
k)) = w
′
k. The distribution of A(x) under I
′ is U ′ = U \ {u}.
We have that |U ′| ≡ 1(2).
Now consider I′′ with D′′ = D′ ∪ {du} and valI′′(A(du)) = u. I′′ satisfies the
same disjunct as I′. The distribution of A(x) under I′′ is U ′′ = U ′ ∪ {u}. But
|U ′′| ≡ 0(2), a contradiction.
In summary, we have that |Vj | = 1, that W =
⋃r
j=1 Vj , and that Vk 6= Vl for
k 6= l. We see that no conjunct can describe more than one situation. But there
are 2|V |−1 subsets of V of odd cardinality (and thus non-empty), hence there are
as many disjuncts.
1.7 Induced Quantifiers
There is, however, a class of distribution quantifiers which have a lower complexity
of their pnf’s than the worst cases in the last section. These are the quantifiers
induced by certain connectives, namely those which are idempotent, associative
and commutative. For example, the usual existential and universal quantifiers are
induced by ∨ and ∧, respectively.
1.7.1. Definition Let 2 be an idempotent, associative and commutative connec-
tive. The quantifier Q2 induced by 2 is defined as follows:
Q˜2({w}) = w Q˜2({w1, . . . , wr}) = 2˜(w1, 2˜(w2, . . . , 2˜(wr−1, wr) · · ·)
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It is easily seen that the conditions of idempotence, associativity and commuta-
tivity are sufficient to make the induced quantifier well-defined. In fact, the induced
quantifiers can be characterized as follows:
1.7.2. Proposition A quantifier Q is an induced quantifier iff the following hold:
(1) Q˜({w}) = w and
(2) Q˜(U ∪W ) = Q˜(U ∪ {Q˜(W )}) for all U,W 6= ∅ with U ∪W ⊆ V .
The inducing connective is given by 2˜(u,w) = Q˜({u,w}).
Proof. If: Define 2 as above. From the definition of 2 it is easy to see that it is
idempotent and commutative. Furthermore, we have
2˜(u, 2˜(v, w)) = Q˜({u} ∪ Q˜{v, w}) = Q˜({u, v, w}) =
= Q˜(Q˜({u, v} ∪ {w}) = 2˜(2˜(u, v), w).
We prove Q˜(W ) = Q˜2(W ) by induction on |W |: Q˜({w}) = {w} = Q˜2({w}). Now,
for the induction step we have
Q˜({w1, . . . , wr+1) = Q˜({w1} ∪ Q˜({w2, . . . , wr+1)) =
= Q˜({w1} ∪ Q˜2({w2, . . . , wr+1)) =
= 2˜(w1, 2˜(w2, . . . , 2˜(wr, wr+1) · · ·) = Q˜2(w1, . . . , wr+1).
Only if: (1) and (2) immediately follow from Definition 1.7.1.
There is a close connection between idempotent, associative and commutative
connectives and upper semi-lattices over the set of truth values V :
1.7.3. Proposition Let 2 be an idempotent, associative and commutative con-
nective. The relation v defined by
u v w iff 2(u,w) = w
is a partial order on V with the property that the least upper bound of
{w1, . . . , wk} ⊆ V equals 2(w1,2(w2, . . . ,2(wk−1, wk) · · ·).
Proof. v is reflexive: 2 is idempotent, 2(u, u) = u, hence u v u for any u ∈ V . v
is antisymmetric: If u v w and w v u, then 2(u,w) = w and 2(w, u) = u. But 2 is
commutative, hence u = w. v is transitive: If u v v and v v w we have 2(u, v) = v
and 2(v, w) = w. Thus 2(u,w) = 2(u,2(v, w)) = 2(2(u, v), w) = 2(v, w) = w
whence u v w.
We prove that lub{w1, . . . , wk} = 2(w1, . . . ,2(wk−1, wk)) by induction on k:
For k = 1 the equality holds since 2 is idempotent. Assume the statement holds for
k > 1. Obviously, 2(w1, . . . ,2(wk, wk+1) · · ·) is an upper bound for {w1, . . . , wk+1}.
Now let u be an upper bound of {w1, . . . , wk+1}, in other words: 2(wj , u) = u. In
particular, u is an upper bound for {w2, . . . , wk+1}, and by induction hypothesis
2(w2, . . . ,2(wk, wk+1) · · ·) v u. But then
2(2(w1, . . . ,2(wk, wk+1) · · ·), u) =
= 2(w1,2(2(w2, . . . ,2(wk, wk+1) · · ·), u)) =
= 2(w1, u) = u.
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Conversely, every such order defines an idempotent, associative and commutative
connective by 2(u,w) = lub{u,w}. For finite V such upper semi-lattices can be
pictured as (non-planar) labeled, rooted trees. Hence, there are mm−1 idempotent,
associative and commutative connectives and as many induced quantifiers: Cayley’s
formula (see Cohen [1978], Theorem 98) gives the number of labeled trees as mm−2,
and each of the m vertices can serve as the root. The induced quantifiers are
obviously the supremum operators on the respective partial orders.
1.7.4. Proposition Let 2 be an idempotent, associative and commutative con-
nective. There is an i-th partial normal form for Q2 with at most m− 1 conjuncts.
Proof. We give a disjunctive normal form for ¬(Q2x)A(x)vi : (Q2x)A(x) does
not take the value vi iff either there is some d s.t. A(d)
u with u 6v vi holds, or for
one of vi’s lower neighbours, say w, we have that for all d, valI(A(d)) v w. This
is expressed as follows: Let v(w) = {u | u v w} and let w1, . . . , wk be all of vi’s
lower neighbours.
(∃ x)
∨
u∈V \v(vi)
A(x)u ∨
k∨
j=1
(∀ x)
∨
u∈v(wj)
A(x)u
The negation of this yields an i-th pnf for Q2:
(∀ x)
∨
u∈v(vi)
A(x)u ∧
k∧
j=1
(∃ x)
∨
u∈V \v(wj)
A(x)u
This pnf has less than or equal to m− 1 conjuncts, except when k = m− 1. But in
this situation, the first conjunct is redundant since v(vi) = V .
Chapter 2
Resolution
2.1 Introduction
With the rise of the digital computer in the 1950’s, several logicians became in-
terested in the possibilities of mechanizing proof search or theorem proving by
computer. A major breakthrough in this area was the introduction of the resolu-
tion calculus for classical logic in Robinson [1965]. The resolution calculus is an
elegant formalism, in that there is a single rule of inference, but no logical axioms.
It uses a special notation for formulas: clause syntax. This notation, or actually
the way one obtains clause syntax from ordinary formulas, hides much of the char-
acteristics of predicate logic. Resolution is arguably the most widely used calculus
for automated theorem proving, and also one of the most thoroughly investigated.
Departing from the original formulation of Robinson, several refinements have been
proposed and implemented. For an overview of resolution-based theorem proving
see the classic textbooks of Chang and Lee [1973] and Loveland [1978]. A more
recent account is Leitsch [1993]. See also Avron [1993] for a study of connections
between resolution, sequent calculus and tableaux.
Given its importance and ubiquity in the theorem proving arena, it is not sur-
prising that resolution systems have also been developed for non-classical logics,
among them many-valued logics. Probably the first such system was presented
by Morgan [1976] for a class of many-valued logics introduced in Rosser and
Turquette [1952]. Since then resolution formulations for several (classes of)
finite and infinite-valued logics (propositional and first order) have been intro-
duced. For a historical survey of theorem proving formalisms for many-valued
logics see Ha¨hnle [1993a]. The work of Stachniak et. al. should be mentioned here
in particular, see, e.g., Stachniak and O’Hearn [1990]. A different approach,
based on a truth-functional analysis of classical resolution, was proposed by Baaz
[1984, 1989, 1992]. The resolution rule in this context takes the form
C1 C2
(C1 \D1)σ ∪ (C2 \D2)σ
where D1 ⊆ C1, D2 ⊆ C2, the literals in D1 and D2 are signed with truth values
w1 and w2, respectively, w1 6= w2, and the atoms in D1 and D2 are unifiable with
mgu σ. This is a straightforward generalization of the classical case, where w1 = t
and w2 = f and the signs are expressed by absence or presence of ¬, respectively.
One advantage of this approach is that several methods of refining the deductive
system developed for the classical case can also be generalized to this framework. We
shall not give such refinements here, but see Baaz and Fermu¨ller [1992, 1993].
This chapter will be devoted to justifying the above rule. Some familiarity with
classical resolution terminology is assumed.
18
2.2. clauses and herbrand semantics 19
2.2 Clauses and Herbrand Semantics
2.2.1. Definition A (many-valued) clause C = {A1w1 , . . . , Anwn} is a finite set of
signed atoms. By 2 we denote the empty clause.
The atom set at(C) of a clause C is the set of its atomic formulas: at(C) =
{A1, . . . , An}.
The clause syntax is a convenient notation for automated theorem proving. In
the classical case, a clause denotes a disjunction of atoms or negations of atoms,
and a set of clauses a conjunction of such disjunctions. Clause sets are implicitly
considered as universally closed. By bringing a formula into prenex form and then
introducing Skolem functions, we can always obtain a formula in this form which
is satisfiable iff the original formula is. In this sense, clause syntax is sufficient to
capture full classical first order logic.
Similarly, for every set of many-valued clauses there is a corresponding sfe in
conjunctive normal form: A clause C = {A1w1 , . . . , Apwp}, where Ai is an atomic
formula and wi ∈ V , denotes
∨p
i=1Ai
wi . A set of clauses C denotes the conjunction
of the disjunctions corresponding to its members. The sfe in conjunctive normal
form corresponding to C is uniquely determined up to associativity and commuta-
tivity of ∧ and ∨ . When we say, e.g., that C is true in an interpretation, we mean
that the corresponding sfe is true.
2.2.2. Definition Let M = 〈D,Φ〉 be a structure. M universally satisfies a set of
clauses C iff C is true in 〈M, s〉 for every assignment s,.
2.2.3. Definition The Herbrand universe H(C) of a set of clauses C is the set of
all ground terms built up from the function symbols and constants in C, or from
the function symbols in C and a new constant a, if C contains no constants.
2.2.4. Definition The Herbrand base A(C) of a set of clauses C is the set of all
atomic formulas P (t1, . . . , tn) where P is a predicate symbol in C, and t1, . . . ,
tn ∈ H(C).
2.2.5. Definition An Herbrand interpretation (H-interpretation) H of a set of
clauses C is a set of ground literals {Lφ(L) | L ∈ A(C)}, where φ is a function from
A(C) to V .
H H-satisfies C, iff for every ground instance C ′ of a clause C ∈ C it holds that
C ′ ∩H 6= ∅. If no H-interpretation satisfies C, then C is said to be H-unsatisfiable.
If H |= C, then H is called an Herbrand model for C.
In general, if A is a set of atoms, then a set of the form {Lφ(L) | L ∈ A} is called
an assignment to A. A subset of an assignment is a partial assignment to A. Hence,
an H-interpretation is an assignment to A(C).
Intuitively, it is clear that every H-interpretation also constitutes a structure in
the sense of Definition 1.3.7, and that to every ordinary interpretation there is a
corresponding H-interpretation. It is then not surprising that H-satisfiability and
satisfiability proper coincide in the sense that a set of clauses is H-satisfiable iff it
(considered as an sfe) is satisfiable. Since in the case of classical logic, the meta-
notation of sfes can be interpreted on the level of the object language, the following
results subsume the corresponding results for classical logic as subcases.
2.2.6. Definition Let H be an H-interpretation of a set of clauses C. The structure
MH corresponding to H is defined as follows: MH = 〈H(C), Φ〉, with Φ as follows:
(1) function symbols: Φ(f) = f˜ where f˜ is the n-ary function mapping the ar-
guments t1, . . . , tn ∈ H(C) to f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ H(C), or Φ(f) = f if f is a
constant symbol.
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(2) predicate symbols: Φ(P ) = P˜ where P˜ is the function mapping 〈d1, . . . , dn〉
to φ
(
P (d1, . . . , dn)
)
.
2.2.7. Proposition If H H-satisfies a set of clauses C, then MH universally satis-
fies C.
Proof. Let C be a clause in C and let s be any assignment for MH. This maps free
variables to ground terms. C has a ground instance Cs obtained by replacing every
variable in C by its image under s. By hypothesis, there is a literal Lw ∈ Cs ∩H.
The way MH was constructed ensures that valMH(L) = w. But this means that C
is true in 〈MH, s〉.
2.2.8. Definition Let M = 〈D,Φ〉 be a structure, and C a set of clauses. An
H-interpretation HM corresponding to M is an H-interpretation satisfying the fol-
lowing condition:
(C) If valM(F ′) = v, where F ′ is a ground instance of some formula F , then
F ′v ∈ HM.
2.2.9. Proposition If M = 〈D,Φ〉 universally satisfies C, then any corresponding
HM H-satisfies C.
Proof. Assume that there were a ground instance C ′ of a clause in C and
an H-interpretation HM, s.t. C ′ ∩ HM = ∅. Let C ′ = Cσ, where σ =
{t1/a1, . . . , tn/an} and a1, . . . , an are all the variables occurring in C. Let
σ′ = {Φ′(t1)/a1, . . . , Φ′(tn)/an}, where Φ′ is Φ extended by a value for the new
constant a in case C contained no constant symbols.
By (C) we have for all A′i
wi ∈ C ′ that valM(A′i) 6= wi (where A′i is an instance
of a literal Ai ∈ C), and hence that the assignment σ′ of domain elements to the
free variables of C is such that C is not satisfied in 〈M, σ′〉. This contradicts the
assumption that M universally satisfies C.
It is easy to see that H is an H-interpretation corresponding to MH for a
given M.
2.3 Clause Translation Calculi
In the two-valued case, there is a direct interpretation of a set of clauses as a first-
order formula, namely as the universal closure of a conjunction of disjunctions,
where the literals in the disjunction are exactly the members of the individual
clauses. Since any classical first-order formula can be written in this form by fa-
miliar equivalences of connectives, distribution rules, and skolemization, resolution
becomes applicable as a refutational proof system. To establish the unsatisfiability
of a formula, we have to test if the corresponding clause form derives the empty
clause. In the many-valued case we also need to find such a translation mechanism
in order for resolution to be of any practical value. It is not surprising that the
partial normal forms for connectives and quantifiers provide us with such a transla-
tion mechanism. The conditions such a translation has to satisfy are soundness and
completeness: A signed formula is universally unsatisfiable iff its clause translation
is. By the last two propositions, this coincides with H-unsatisfiability on the clause
level.
The clause translation calculi presented here are language preserving. A differ-
ent, and more effective way to translate formulas to clause forms is the structure
preserving method (see Ha¨hnle [1993b] and Baaz and Fermu¨ller [1993]).
2.3.1. Definition An extended clause is a finite set of signed formulas.
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Here again, an extended clause is read as the sfe consisting of the disjunction of
its members. A set of extended clauses is the conjunction of its members. Every
clause is also an extended clause, and every signed formula can be thought of as a
unit extended clause. Universal satisfiability is defined just as in the case of ordinary
clause sets.
2.3.2. Proposition Let F be a closed formula.
(1) The extended clause {Fw | w ∈ W ⊆ V } is satisfiable iff it is universally
satisfiable.
(2) F is a many-valued tautology iff {Fw | w ∈ V \V +} is universally unsatisfiable.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 1.4.3, since F contains no free variables.
Proof. By Proposition 1.4.3
2.3.3. Definition Let
∧
j∈I ∆2:i(j) be a positive i-th partial normal form of
2(A1, . . . , An), where 2 is of arity n, ∆2:i(j) is a disjunction of signed atoms of the
form Aiw (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and let ∆′2:i(j) be the clause corresponding to ∆2:i(j)
A translation rule for 2 at place i is a schema of the form:
C ∪ {C ∪ {2(A1, . . . , An)vi}}
C ∪ {C ∪∆′2:i(j) | j ∈ I}} 2:i
2.3.4. Theorem Let C, C, 2(A1, . . . , An)vi and ∆′2:i(j) be as in Definition 2.3.3.
Then
D = C ∪ {C ∪∆′2:i(j) | j ∈ I}}
is satisfiable iff
E = C ∪ {C ∪ {2(A1, . . . , An)vi}}
is satisfiable.
Proof. Let H be an H-interpretation satisfying D (E). MH universally satisfies
D (E) by Proposition 2.2.7. Let s be an assignment to the free variables of D(resp.,
E). 〈MH, s〉 satisfies all clauses in C. If it does not satisfy C, then it has to satisfy
all the ∆′2:i(j) (resp., 2(A1, . . . , An)
vi). By the definition of a partial normal form
for 2, 〈MH, s〉 then satisfies also 2(A1, . . . , An)vi (resp., all of ∆′2:i(j)). Hence MH
universally satisfies E (resp., D). By Proposition 2.2.9, E (resp., D) is H-satisfied
by H.
2.3.5. Definition Let
∧
j∈I ∆Q:i(j) be a positive i-th partial normal form of
(Qx)A(x), where ∆Q:i(j) is a disjunction of signed atoms of the form A(τi)
w
(1 ≤ i ≤ p) respectively A(αi)w (1 ≤ i ≤ q), and let ∆′Q:i(j) be the clause cor-
responding to ∆Q:i(j).
A translation rule for Q at place i is a schema of the form:
E = C ∪ {C ∪ {((Qx)A(x))vi}}
D = C ∪ {C ∪∆′′Q:i(j) | j ∈ I}} 2:i
where ∆′′Q:i(j) is obtained from ∆
′
Q:i(j) by
(1) replacing term variables τi by terms of the form fi(a1, . . . , ak), where fi are
distinct new k-ary function symbols and a1, . . . , ak are all free variables in
C ∪ {((Qx)A(x))vi}, and by
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(2) replacing eigenvariables αi by distinct new free variables bi (not occurring in
E).
2.3.6. Theorem Let C, C, ((Qx)A(x))vi and ∆′′2:i(j) be as in Definition 2.3.5.
Then
D = C ∪ {C ∪∆′′Q:i(j) | j ∈ I}}
is satisfiable iff
E = C ∪ {C ∪ {(Qx)A(x)vi}}
is satisfiable.
Proof. If: Let H be an H-interpretation satisfying E . MH universally satisfies E
by Proposition 2.2.7. Assume, by way of contradiction, that D were not universally
satisfiable, i.e., for every structure M′ for D, there is an assignment s′ s.t. 〈M′, s′〉
does not satisfy D. In particular, any structure M′H extending MH by providing
an interpretation for the new function symbols cannot universally satisfy D. We
show that this would imply that MH does not universally satisfy E :
Let M′H be such a structure extending MH. There is an assignment s′ s.t.
〈M′H, s′〉 does not satisfy D. If 〈M′H, s′〉 falsifies a clause in C, then so does 〈MH, s〉
since the new function symbols and variables do not occur in C. So assume that
〈M′H, s′〉 falsifies some ∆′′Q:i(j). That is, for the assignment of f˜i
(
s′(a1), . . . , s′(ak)
)
to τi and s′(bi) for αi we have 〈M′H, s′〉 6|= ∆Q:i(j). We know that this property holds
for every structure extending MH, i.e., for every possible interpretation of the func-
tion symbols and every possible assignment to the variables, there are assignments
to the new (eigen-) variables s.t. some ∆Q:i(j) is falsified. By Definition 1.5.5 (2b)
of partial form for Q, valMH
(
(Qx)A(x)
) 6= vi.
Only if: If D is satisfiable, it is also universally satisfiable. Let M be a structure
universally satisfying D, and let s be an assignment for M. In 〈M, s〉 either C is
true or all of ∆′′Q:i(j) (j ∈ I). In the first case, 〈M, s〉 also satisfies E . Otherwise, let
s′ be an assignment with s′ ∼b1,...,bq s. 〈M, s′〉 also satsifies all of ∆′′Q:i(j) (j ∈ I),
since the bi do not occur in C. But this means that for all assignments to the
eigenvariables (namely, all s′), there are assignments to the term variables (namely,
Φ〈M,s′〉
(
fi(a1, . . . , ak)
)
) s.t. the conjunction of the ∆′′Q:i(j) is true in 〈M, s〉. By
Definition 1.5.5 (2a) then 〈M, s〉 |= (Qx)A(x)vi . The assignment s was arbitrary,
so E is universally satisfiable, and, by Proposition 2.2.9, H-satisfiable.
Using the translation rules defined above, any set of extended clauses E can
be transformed to a set of clauses C which is H-unsatisfiable iff E is universally
unsatisfiable. In case E contains no free variables, this is just the case iff E is
unsatisfiable. If we want to prove that a given closed formula F is unsatisfiable,
Proposition 2.3.2 gives us a set of extended formulas which is unsatisfiable iff F is.
Using the translation, we can apply resolution to obtain a proof.
2.3.7. Example The following are the well known translation rules for classical
logic:
C ∪ {C ∪ {¬Af}}
C ∪ {C ∪ {At}} ¬:f C ∪
{
C ∪ {¬At}}
C ∪ {C ∪ {Af}} ¬:t
C ∪ {C ∪ {A ∧Bf}}
C ∪ {C ∪ {Af , Bf}} ∧:f C ∪
{
C ∪ {A ∧Bt}}
C ∪ {C ∪ {At}, C ∪ {Bt}} ∧:t
C ∪ {C ∪ {A ⊃ Bf}}
C ∪ {C ∪ {At}, C ∪ {Bf}} ⊃:f C ∪
{
C ∪ {A ⊃ Bt}}
C ∪ {C ∪ {Af , Bt}} ⊃:t
C ∪ {C ∪ {(∀x)A(x)f}}
C ∪ {C ∪ {A(f(a1, . . . , ak))f}} ∀:f
C ∪ {C ∪ {(∀x)A(x)t}}
C ∪ {C ∪ {A(b)t}} ∀:t
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2.4 Semantic Trees and Herbrand’s Theorem
2.4.1. Definition Let C be a set of clauses, and K ⊆ A(C). Let B(K) = {Avi |
A ∈ K, vi ∈ V } be the union of all assignments to K.
A semantic tree S for K is a finitary, rooted, downward directed tree with labeled
edges s.t. the following hold:
(1) Every edge e is labeled by a subset l(e) ⊆ B(K).
(2) If e1, . . . , ek are all the edges leaving some node X, then {l(e1), . . . , l(ek)} is
H-unsatisfiable.
(3) For every branch B in S the following hold: Let B consist of the edges e1, e2,
. . . There is exactly one assignment AK to K s.t. AK ∩
⋃
i≥1 l(ei) = ∅. We
say B omits AK .
(4) For every assignment AK to K there is a branch B in S which omits AK .
By I(X) we denote the union of labels on the unique path from the root to X. I(X)
is called the refutation set of X. If B is a branch in S then I(B) =
⋃
X∈B I(X).
2.4.2. Remark Note that the concept of semantic tree as defined here is dual to the
usual one (see Kowalski and Hayes [1969]).
We see from the above definition that, given a semantic tree S for A(C), every
H-interpretation is omitted by a branch in S and every branch in S omits an H-
interpretation.
2.4.3. Example We construct a special binary semantic tree for K were every
edge is labeled by a singleton. For this, let A be an atom. By T (A) denote the tree
constructed as follows:
(1) Stage 0: T (A)0 contains a single node X.
(2) Stage k + 1: Let Xs be a leaf of T (A)k, and let V (X) = {w | Aw ∈ I(Xs)}
be the set of all truth value indices labeling the edges on the path from X to Xs.
Let i < j be minimal indices s.t. vi /∈ V (X), vj /∈ V (X). Append to Xs two nodes
Xs,1 and Xs,2, and label the edges leading to them {Avi} and {Avj}, respectively.
(3) Stop at stage m− 1.
The following holds for T (A): First, all branches of T (A) have length m−1 and
the labels on one branch are distinct. Hence, every branch omits exactly one literal.
Furthermore, every literal is omitted by some branch in T (A). Proof by in-
duction on m: For m = 2 this is evident. Now consider the tree T (A)m−2: The
maximal index on a branch is m − 1. In fact, T (A)m−2 equals the tree T ′(A) for
V ′ = V \{vm}. By induction hypothesis, some branch B in T (A)m−2 omits a given
literal Au. Whatever the vi and vj are in the construction of the successors of the
last node on B, one of them is certainly distinct from u. The respective branch in
T (A) omits Au.
Now let K be enumerated (without repetitions) by A1, A2, A3, . . . Define T in
stages as follows:
(1) Stage 1: Write down T (A1).
(2) Stage k+1. Replace all leaves of the tree constructed in stage k by T (Ak+1).
It is easy to see that T is indeed a semantic tree.
2.4.4. Definition Let C be a clause and S a semantic tree. C fails at a node X
in S iff there is a ground instance C ′ of C s.t. C ′ ⊆ I(X).
A node X in S falsifies a set of clauses C iff some C ∈ C fails at X. If there is
no node above X with this property, then X is called a failure node w.r.t. C. If all
successors of a node Y are failure nodes for C, then Y is called an inference node.
If every branch in S contains a failure node, then S is said to be closed w.r.t. C.
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2.4.5. Proposition A set of clauses C is unsatisfiable iff every semantic tree for
A(C) is closed w.r.t. C.
Proof. If: Let S be a semantic tree for A(C) and let H be an H-interpretation
for C. By definition of a semantic tree, H is omitted by some branch B in S. S is
closed, so there is a failure node X on B. For a ground instance C ′ of a clause C ∈ C
we have C ′ ⊆ I(X). If H would H-satisfy C, then C ′ ∩ H 6= ∅ and consequently
I(X) ∩H 6= ∅. But this contradicts the assumption that B omits H.
Only if: Let S be a semantic tree for A(C). Every branch B of S omits an
H-interpretation H. Since C is H-unsatisfiable, we have that for a ground instance
C ′ of some clause C ∈ C we have C ′ ∩H = ∅. From this it follows that C ′ ⊆ I(B)
(since B omits H, and hence B(A(C)) \H = I(B)), and C fails at some node X on
B. So S is closed w.r.t. C.
2.4.6. Proposition The tree R(S) resulting from pruning a closed semantic tree S
at all its failure nodes is finite.
Proof. Assume R(S) were infinite. By Ko¨nig’s Lemma, it would then contain an
infinite branch. This contradicts the assumption that S is closed.
2.4.7. Theorem (Herbrand’s Theorem) A set of clauses C is unsatisfiable iff there
is a finite unsatisfiable set of ground instances of clauses in C.
Proof. If: This follows immediately from the definition of H-satisfaction.
Only if: By Propositions 2.4.5 and 2.4.6, there is a closed semantic tree R, all of
whose (finitely many) failure nodes Xi falsify ground instances C ′i of clauses in C.
If X1, . . . , Xn are all failure nodes of R, then {C ′1, . . . , C ′n} is a finite unsatisfiable
set of ground instances of clauses in C.
2.5 Soundness and Completeness
2.5.1. Definition Let C1 and C2 be clauses s.t. var(C1) ∩ var(C2) = ∅, and let
D1 ⊆ C1, D2 ⊆ C2 be such that every literal in D1 is signed with a truth value v,
every literal in D2 with a truth value w, and v 6= w. If A = at(D1 ∪D2) is unifiable
with mgu σ, then 〈D1, D2, A〉 is called a key triple with mgu σ for C1, C2.
Resolution of two clauses C ′1 and C
′
2 requires that they be variable disjoint, i.e.,
that var(C ′1)∩var(C ′2) = ∅. We call C1 and C2 variable disjoint renamings of C ′1 and
C ′2, if C1 = C
′
1λ1 and C2 = C
′
2λ2, where λi leaves the variables in var(Ci) \ var(Cj)
intact, and maps var(Ci)∩var(C2) to different new variables not in ran(λj) (i = 1, 2;
j = 2, 1).
2.5.2. Definition (Resolvent) Let C ′1 and C
′
2 be clauses, let C1 and C2 be variable
disjoint renamings, respectively, and let 〈D1, D2, A〉 be a key triple with mgu σ for
C1, C2. Then the clause (C1 \D1)σ ∪ (C2 \D2)σ is a resolvent of C ′1, C ′2.
2.5.3. Definition A resolution deduction of a clause D from a set of clauses C is a
finite sequence of clauses R1, R2, . . . , Rs = D s.t. either Ri ∈ C or Ri is a resolvent
of clauses Rj , Rj′ , j, j′ < i. In that case we write C ` D.
2.5.4. Lemma Let R be a resolvent of C1 and C2. If a model H satisfies C1 and
C2, then it also satisfies R.
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Proof. Clearly, H satisfies C1 and C2 iff it satisfies their variable disjoint re-
namings. W.l.o.g. we can therefore assume that var(C1) ∩ var(C2) = ∅ and hence
var(R) ⊆ var(C1)∪var(C2). Assume, by way of contradiction, that H would not sat-
isfy R, i.e., that Rλ∩H = ∅ for some ground substitution λ. If a literal Lvσλ occurs
in Rλ, then Lv occurs in C1 or C2 (σ is the mgu the resolution). The substitution
σλ can be extended to a ground substitution η with ran(η) = var(C1)∪ var(C2) s.t.
η | var(R) = σλ.
Now (C1 \D1)η∩H = ∅. D1η is a singleton set, say, {Lv}, and since H satisfies
C1 we have that {Lv} ∩ H 6= ∅. In other words, Lv ∈ H. Similarly, we obtain
D2η = {Lw} ⊆ H. But v 6= w and this contradicts the definition of Herbrand
model.
2.5.5. Theorem (Soundness) If C ` 2 then C is unsatisfiable.
Proof. If C were satisfiable, then a model of C would also be a model of the
resolvents R1, . . . , Rs in the corresponding resolution deduction by Lemma 2.5.4.
But Rs = 2 and 2 is unsatisfiable.
2.5.6. Theorem (Lifting Lemma) Let C ′1 and C
′
2 be ground instances of clauses
C1 and C2, respectively, and let R
′ be a resolvent of C ′1 and C
′
2. Then there is a
resolvent R of C1 and C2 s.t. R
′ is a ground instance of R.
Proof. Let C ′1 = C1λ1 and C
′
2 = C2λ2, and 〈D′1, D′2, A〉 be the key triple for R
with D′1 ⊆ C ′1 and D′2 ⊆ C ′2. D′1 and D′2 are ground, so the corresponding mgu
is the empty substitution, D′1 = {L′v} and D′2 = {L′w}. Let D1 and D2 be
maximal subsets of C1 and C2, respectively, s.t. D1λ1 = D′1 and D2λ2 = D
′
2.
Since λ1λ2 is a unifier of at(D1 ∪D2), we have a key triple 〈D1, D2, at(D1 ∪D2)〉
with mgu σ. Since σ is more general than λ1λ2 we have that R′ is an instance of
R = (C1 \D1)σ ∪ (C2 \D2)σ.
2.5.7. Remark Note that the proof of the lifting lemma given in Chang and
Lee [1973] is flawed, as has been pointed out by Leitsch [1989]. This is also the
reason why we have followed Robinson’s [1965] original formulation of resolution
with key triples and implicit factoring as the starting point for the generalization
to the many-valued case.
2.5.8. Theorem (Completeness) If C is unsatisfiable then C ` 2.
Proof. By Proposition 2.4.5, the semantic tree T for A(C) of Example 2.4.3
is closed w.r.t. C, and hence (by Proposition 2.4.6), the corresponding reduced
tree R(T ) is finite. We prove, by induction on the number of nodes in R(T ), that
there is a resolution deduction of 2 from C.
If R(T ) has only one node, then 2 must be in C, since no other clause is falsified
at the root of a semantic tree. Otherwise R(T ) contains a node X, s.t. its immediate
successors X1, X2 are failure nodes. The edges leaving X are labeled by {Au1} and
{Au2}, u1 6= u2. There are ground instances C ′1 and C ′2 of clauses C1 and C2
in C s.t. I(X1) falsifies C ′1 and I(X2) falsifies C ′2, but I(X) does not falsify either
. Therefore, C ′1 must contain a literal A
u1 and C ′2 must contain a literal A
u2 .
Now 〈{Au1}, {Au2}, {A}〉 is a key triple for C ′1 and C ′2 with mgu id . We obtain the
resolvent R′ = (C ′1\{Au1})∪(C ′2\{Au2}). R′ fails at X, since otherwise there would
be some literal L ∈ R′ with L /∈ I(X). Assume L ∈ C ′1 \ {Au1}. Then L /∈ I(X1),
contradicting the assumption that C ′1 fails at X1. Similarly for L ∈ C ′2 \ {Au2}.
By the lifting lemma, there is a resolvent R of Ci and Cj , s.t. R′ is an instance
of R. T is also closed w.r.t. C ∪ {R}, and the tree R(T )′ obtained from R(T ) by
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pruning at the first node that falsifies R′ (at worst, this is X) is a proper subtree
of R(T ) containing all failure nodes. By induction hypothesis, there is a resolution
deduction of 2 from C ∪ {R}.
2.5.9. Proposition Any resolution deduction R from C can be rewritten as a res-
olution deduction R′ in tree form where no variable renaming is necessary in the
resolution steps, possibly using renamed copies (variants) of clauses in C.
Proof. By induction on the length l of R = C1, . . . , Cl:
l = 1: C1 ∈ C. This proof is in tree form, R′ = R.
l > 1: Cl is the resolvent of clauses Ci, Cj where i, j < l. The deductions of
Ci and Cj from C have length < l. By induction hypothesis, they have tree like
deductions R1, R2. Then the deduction R′
.... R1
C1
.... R2
C2
Cl
is in tree form.
If we take vaiable-disjoint renamings of all topmost clauses and carry the re-
namings through to the conclusion, then all resolved clauses are variable-disjoint.
Being in tree form means that every clause occurence in R is used only once in
a resolution step. R can therefore be written as a tree, where the nodes are the
clauses in R. This tree has a well-defined height. We call resolution proofs of the
form given in the preceding proposition regular. If R contains only ground clauses,
then the corresponding proof in tree form uses only literal copies of the clauses in R.
2.5.10. Definition The cumulative substitution ρ(R) of a regular resolution proof
is defined by induction on the height h of R:
h = 1: ρ(R) = id .
h > 1: R ends in a resolution of the form
.... R1
C1
.... R2
C2
C
with mgu σ. C1 and C2 are variable-disjoint. ρ(R) =
(
ρ(R1)ρ(R2)
)
σ =
(
ρ(R1) ∪
ρ(R2)
)
σ.
Regular resolution proofs have the property that they can be grounded, as the
following lemma shows. This property will be used in the next section.
2.5.11. Lemma Let R be a regular resolution deduction of C from C. There is a
substitution γ which grounds R. That is, γ is s.t. Rγ contains only ground clauses
and Rγ is a resolution deduction of Cγ from Cγ.
Proof. Let var(R) be the set of all variables occurring in R. We define a partition
of var(R) = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vp by the equivalence relation x ∼ y ⇐⇒ xρ(R) = yρ(R).
Let c1, . . . , cp be p new, distinct, constant symbols, and λ the substitution mapping
members of Vi to ci. Then γ = ρ(R)λ grounds R, if Rρ(R) is a deduction of Cρ(R)
from Cρ(R). But this follows from the definition of ρ(R).
2.5.12. Remark The so-called ground projection is a standard notion in the resolu-
tion literature. Cumulative substitutions exist for all (not only regular) resolution
proofs which have ground projections. See Baaz and Leitsch [1992] for results
relating proof complexity and ground projections. Their Theorem 3.6 also shows
that the assumption of regularity in Lemma 2.5.11 is necessary.
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2.6 Negative Resolution
2.6.1. Definition A negative clause C is a set of negations of signed atoms.
The positive translation C+ of a set of negative clauses C is the set of clauses C
obtained by replacing every negative clause {¬A1w1 , . . . ,¬Anwn} by
⋃n
j=1{Ajvi |
vi 6= wj}. If D = C+, then we define C = D−.
The sfe corresponding to a negative clause and universal satisfiability are de-
fined analogous to the positive case. It is obvious that a set of negative clauses is
satisfiable iff its positive translation is. For this notion of clause the appropriate
notion of resolution is as follows:
2.6.2. Definition Let C1, C2, . . . , Cm be negative clauses s.t.
⋂m
i=1 var(Ci) = ∅,
and let ¬Di ⊆ Ci be such that every literal in ¬Di is signed with the truth value vi,
If A = at(
⋃m
i=1
¬Di) is unifiable with mgu σ, then 〈¬D1, . . . ,¬Dm, A〉 is called an
negative key tuple (n-key tuple) with mgu σ for C1, C2, . . . , Cm.
2.6.3. Definition Let C ′1, C
′
2, . . . , C
′
m be clauses, let C1, C2, . . . , Cm be variable
disjoint renamings, respectively, and let 〈D1, . . . , Dm, A〉 be an n-key tuple with
mgu σ for C1, . . . , Cm. Then the clause (C1 \D1)σ∪ . . .∪ (Cm \Dm)σ is a resolvent
of C ′1, . . . , C
′
m.
Negative resolution will play a part in the cut-elimination theorem for negative
sequent calculus in the next chapter. We need the following theorem:
2.6.4. Theorem (Soundness) If C ` 2 then C is unsatisfiable.
Proof. We prove that for every interpretation H satisfying C, if C `n C then
H satisfies C. By induction on the height h of the derivation tree of C from C: If
h = 1, then C ∈ C and hence is satisfied by every interpretation which satisfies C.
If h > 1, then let
C1 C2 . . . Cm
C
be the last resolution in the derivation, and let 〈¬D1, . . . ,¬Dm, A〉 be its n-key
tuple with mgu σ. Since D1, . . . , Dm are unifiable, we can simulate the step by a
sequence of positive resolutions on the positive translations: Let ¬Ci = ¬Ei ∪¬Di,
and let C¯i, E¯i and D¯i be the positive translations of ¬Ci, ¬Ei and ¬Di, respectively.
By D¯vi we denote those elements of D¯i with sign v. We show that there is a positive
resolution derivation of C¯ from {C¯1, . . . , C¯m} or, equivalently, a deduction of 2 from
{D¯1, . . . , D¯m}.
In general, call a set of clauses F = {F1, . . . , Fl+1} contractible iff F is unifiable,
for every Fi there is a set Wi = {w1, . . . , wm−l} of truth values s.t. wj ∈ Wi iff
F
wj
i is empty, and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ l + 1 there are truth values wi, wi ∈ Wi (not
necessarily distinct) s.t. for all j > i, wi /∈Wj and for all k < i, wi /∈Wk.
It is easy to see that {D¯1, . . . , D¯m} is contractible with l = m − 1, Wi = {vi},
wi = wi = vi. We show by induction on l that 2 is derivable by positive resolution
from a contractible set F :
l = 0: This means F = {2}. (Note that {2} is contractible.)
l > 0: We have F = {F1, . . . , Fl+1}. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ l and consider Fi and Fi+1.
F
wi+1
i and F
wi
i+1 are nonempty. Hence we have that Fi and Fi+1 have a resolvent Gi
with key triple 〈Fwi+1i , F
wi
i+1, at(F
wi+1
i ∪F
ui
i+1)〉. The set of clauses G = {G1, . . . , Gl}
is contractible: For Gi, the corresponding set W ′i is Wi ∪Wi+1 having m − l + 1
elements, u′i = ui and w′i = wi+1.
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The following diagram illustrates the case of m = 4.
l m− l ¬A1 ¬A2 ¬A3 ¬A4
3 1 A2, A3, A4 A1, A3, A4 A1, A2, A4 A1, A2, A3
1 2 3 4
2 2 A3, A4 A1, A4 A1, A2
1, 2 2, 3 3, 4
1 3 A4 A1
1, 2, 3 2, 3, 4
0 4 2
1, 2, 3, 4
Note how the lists of signed A’s form a tree-like resolution deduction of the empty
clause.
2.6.5. Lemma (Lifting Lemma) Let C ′1, C
′
2, . . . , C
′
m be ground instances of clauses
C1, C2, . . . , Cm, respectively, and let C
′ be a negative resolvent of C ′1, C
′
2, . . . , C
′
m.
Then there is a negative resolvent C of C1, C2, . . . , Cn s.t. C
′ is a ground instance
of C.
Proof. Analogous to the positive case.
2.6.6. Lemma Let R′ be a ground proof of C ′ from C′, where C′ is a ground instance
of C. Then there is a proof R of C from C, s.t. C ′ is a ground instance of C.
Proof. By induction on the height h of R′:
h = 1: Then C ′ ∈ C′, and hence R consist only of the clause C.
h > 1: R′ ends in a resolution step from the clauses C ′1, . . . , C
′
m. If C
′
i is a
topmost clause, then it is a ground instance of some clause Ci ∈ C. Otherwise, C ′i
is the last clause in a resolution deduction R′i. By induction hypothesis, there is a
resolution deduction Ri of Ci from C where C ′i is a ground instance of Ci. From
the lifting lemma, we know that there is some C of which C ′ is a ground instance,
s.t. C is a resolvent of C1, . . . , Cm.
2.6.7. Theorem (Completeness) If C is unsatisfiable then C ` 2.
Proof. Since C+ is unsatisfiable, there is a regular resolution deduction R of 2
from C+ of length l. By Lemma 2.5.11, R can be grounded, resulting in a ground
proof R′ of 2 from a ground instance C′+. We translate this deduction into a
negative deduction ν(R′) of 2 by induction on the height h or R′:
h = 1: Then 2 ∈ C.
h > 1: We proceed in three stages: (1) First, we mark those literals throughout
the proof, which result in the last literals resolved upon (in a sense to be made
more precise). This results in a proof where some groups of literals in the initial
clauses are marked. Every such group is the positive translation of one negative
literal in the original set of negative clauses. (2) The proof is pruned by omitting
each of these groups from the initial clauses, one at a time. This results in several
proofs of 2 of height less than h from subclauses of the initial clauses (all of which
are positive translations of subclauses of the original negative clauses). (3) The
induction hypothesis is applied to these proofs, yielding negative proofs of 2 from
subclauses of the original negative clauses. (4) We add the negative translations
of the groups that were left out in step (2), obtaining several negative proofs of
clauses of the form {¬P v}. The set of all these clauses is inconsistent, since there
is a subproof of R′ of 2 from their positive translations. Hence there is one such
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clause for each v ∈ V , and furthermore, P is of the same form in all of these clauses.
(5) By resolving, we obtain a negative ground proof of 2 from ground instances of
C. By Lemma 2.6.6, there is a negative resolution proof of 2 from C.
(1) Let R′ be as follows:
.... R
′
1
{Avi}
.... R
′
2
{Avj}
2
We introduce an indexing system of literals in R′. The initial clauses C′+ are
the positive translations of negative clauses in C′. We provide every literal in C′
by an index s.t. no two occurrences of literals in C′ have the same index. If
¬Bw ∈ C ′ ∈ C′ and the index of ¬Bw is x, then we write the indexed literal as
¬xBw. The indexes are extended to literals in the positive translation of C: If∨
v∈V \w B
v is the positive translation of ¬xBw, then all the Bv are indexed by x,
too. So, if {¬x1Aw11 , . . . ,¬xnAwnn } ∈ C′, then
{x1Av1 | v ∈ V \ w1} ∪ . . . ∪ {xnAvn | v ∈ V \ wn} ∈ C′+
This way, all literals in R′ are marked.
Define the operator u(S) on indexed ground proofs S inductively as follows: If
S is only an initial clause, then u(S) = S. Otherwise, S ends in a resolution step:
.... S1
D1 ∪ {xAw1}
.... S2
D2 ∪ {yAw2}
D1 ∪D2
let D′i ∪ {x′Avi} be the last clause of u(Si) (i = 1, 2). Then u(S) is
.... u(S1)
D′1 ∪ {x′Aw1}
.... u(S2)[x/y]
D′2[x/y] ∪ {x′Aw2}
D′1 ∪D′2[x/y]
where [x/y] means that the index y is replaced everywhere by the index x.
Furthermore, we introduce an operator d(S, C, X) which is defined for an indexed
ground proof u(S), a set of initial clauses C and a set of indices X as follows:
h = 1: u(S) is only the initial clause D: if D ∈ C, then d(S,X) = D∗, where D∗
is the clause obtained from D by omitting every literal indexed by some index x ∈ X.
Otherwise d(S,D,X) = D.
h > 1: u(S) is of the form
.... S1
D1 ∪ {yAw1}
.... S2
D2 ∪ {yAw2}
D1 ∪D2
where C = D1∪D2. Let D∗i be the last clause in d(Si, C,X) (i = 1, 2). If yAw1 /∈ D∗1 ,
then d(S,C,X) = d(S1, C,X). If yAw2 /∈ D∗2 , then d(S,C,X) = d(S2, C,X).
Otherwise, let d(S,X) be
.... d(S1, C,X)
D∗1
.... d(S2, C,X)
D∗2
D∗1 \ {yAw1} ∪D∗2 \ {yAw2}
Intuitively, u specifies a relation among literal occurrences in the indexed proof
S where all literals are either related by having the same negative literal as their
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common ancestor, or are related to literals which are resolved upon in the proof.
The operator s then is the pruning operator, parametric on a set of inices X. Given
an indexed proof S, d(S, C, X) is the proof resulting from S by deleting all literals
indexed by members of X from the initial clauses C and all resolutions acting on
such literals.
(2) We have indexed the proofs R′1 and R
′
2, resulting in indexed proofs of {xAvi}
and {xAvj}, respectively. Let C1,1, . . . , C1,p and C2,1, . . . , C2q be the initial clauses
of R1 and R2 respectively. By applying d, we obtain proofs d(R′1, {C1,i}, {x})
(1 ≤ i ≤ p) and d(R′2, {C2,j}, {x}) (1 ≤ j ≤ q) with 2 as their last clause. (3) These
proofs are of length < h, hence the induction hypothesis applies. This yields neg-
ative resolution proofs N1,i and N2,j of 2 from initial clauses among {D−1,i}i and
{D−2,j}j , respectively. In Nr,s, the initial clause D−r,k is the negative translation of
Cr,k if k 6= s and the negative translation of d(Cr,k, Cr,k, {x}) otherwise.
(4) By adding the negative literals ¬Lvr,sr,s omitted from clause Cr,s in Nr,s again
we obtain proofs N ′r,s of {¬Lvr,sr,s }. Now consider the original proof R′. Its pruning
d(R′, C, I \ {x}) is a proof of 2 from the positive translations of the clauses in
N = {{¬Lvr,sr,s } | r, s}. This ensures that all Lr,s are actually equal (i.e., unifiably
with unifier id). Furthermore, the set of all vr,s is the whole set of truth values V .
For if there were some w ∈ V which is not among the vr,s, the structure which makes
Lr,s take the value w satisfies N+. But this is impossible, since N is unsatisfiable.
(5) Thus, we obtain a negative resolution proof R′− of 2 from C′. By
Lemma 2.6.6, there is a negative resolution proof of 2 from C.
Chapter 3
Sequent Calculus
3.1 Introduction
Sequent calculus was introduced by Gentzen [1934] for classical and intuitionistic
logic and has since proved to be an important formalism for proof theoretic studies
of formal systems. Gentzen’s sequents are expressions of the form Γ → ∆, where Γ
and ∆ are finite sequences of formulas. The full calculus consists of axioms of the
form A→ A, rules for introducing propositional connectives resp. quantifiers in the
left and right sides of the sequent, as well as structural rules (among them the cut
rule).
The sequent notation can be interpreted in two different ways: firstly, as ex-
pressing entailment. A sequent A→ B stands for: A entails B, or more generally:
Γ → ∆ stands for: the conjunction of the formulas in Γ entails the disjunction of
the formulas in ∆. Secondly, the sequent may be interpreted truth-functionally:
either one of the formulas in Γ is false or one of the formulas in ∆ is true. For
classical logic, these two interpretations coincide, since the truth-functional charac-
terization is equivalent to the derivability of
∧
Γ ⊃ ∨∆, and this, by the deduction
theorem, to
∧
Γ ` ∨∆.
For many-valued logics, however, these notions are in general distinct, and we
have two fundamental alternatives as to what we mean by “sequent calculus for a
many-valued logic”: Firstly, we can seek to formalize the entailment relation (or, if
we have a complete axiomatization of a given many-valued logic, of derivability) as
a sequent calculus. Avron [1992] has developed a general theory of consequence
relations for logics, and has also applied this to the study of 3-valued logics in his
[1991], where he gives a calculus of hypersequents for  Lukasiewicz logic.
Here, we will take the second approach via truth-functionality, a property every
many-valued logic has. For this, we need a sequent with one place for every truth
value in the logic: Γ1 | Γ2 | . . . | Γm, where m is the number of truth values. We
interpret this sequent as true under a given interpretation iff one of the Γi contains
a formula that takes the value vi. From this point of view, we then see axioms
as expressing the fact that every formula must take at least one truth value, and
introduction rules as characterizing the truth value of a composite formula in terms
of its subformulas. Yet we may also take another, in a sense dual standpoint: A
sequent is true under an interpretation, if one of the Γi contains a formula that does
not take the value vi. Then, an axiom comes to state the fact that a formula may
take at most one truth value. An introduction rule can be viewed as a rule for how
to falsify a composite formula by falsifying a subformula. This second interpretation
corresponds, in the classical case, exactly to the semantic tableaux of Beth [1955].
We call the first interpretation positive, the second negative.
These two perspectives give rise to two different, but closely related, sets of
calculi for a many-valued logic—not only two sequent calculi, but also two tableau
systems, two natural deduction systems, and two clause translation calculi (for pos-
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itive and negative resolution, respectively). This correspondence has been described
in Baaz et al. [1993a].
This approach has often been used in the literature, and people have reinvented
the wheel over and over again. The works differ in notation, and in degrees of
generality. Some have used the positive, some the negative approach.
The first to introduce a calculus of sequents for many-valued logics (for the
propositional case) seems to have been Schro¨ter [1955]. He used the negative
approach. His method of axiomatization has also been given treatment in the
textbook of Gottwald [1989].
Seemingly independent, Rousseau [1967] treated sequent calculus for first-order
finitely-valued logics in full generality and also gave soundness and completeness
proofs. In Rousseau [1970] he investigated generalizations of intuitionistic sequent
calculus LJ to the many-valued case (with a concept of sequent distinct from the one
in his [1967]). Takahashi [1967a] considers a sequent calculus for first-order many-
valued logics with universal and existential quantifiers. Interpolation and definabil-
ity theorems are proven using this calculus by Miyama [1974], and Hanazawa and
Takano [1985]. In Takahashi [1970] a very general Gentzen-style proof theory
for continuous logics, i.e., many-valued logics over a topological space as the set of
truth values, has been developed. The model theory of continuous logics has been
worked out in Chang and Keisler [1966]. Ohya [1967] extended the formalism
of Takahashi [1967a] to a system of simple type theory, for which he also shows
cut-elimination along the lines of Takahashi [1967b].
After Schro¨ter’s work, the negative approach has been taken also by
Borowik [1985] for the propositional case only. Earlier, Becchio and
Pabion [1977] have outlined a negative sequent calculus for three-valued
 Lukasiewicz logic. A tableau system for m-valued  Lukasiewicz logic was given in
Suchon´ [1974]. Similar work has been done on equivalent tableau systems starting
with Surma [1977] and Carnielli [1987b]. Recently, Carnielli [1991] has pre-
sented a notational variant of our negative sequent calculi, based on his work on
tableau calculi for many-valued logics in [1987b]. Ha¨hnle [1992, 1993a] presents an
in-depth study of many-valued tableaux systems. He introduces several refinements
such as sets-as-signs, and investigates classes of many-valued logics (e.g., so-called
normal logics) where rules can be efficiently and uniformly represented.
Several other papers deal with sequent calculi for specific many-valued logics,
in particular Post logic. Kirin [1966] has given sequent calculi based on semantic
considerations in Post algebras (see also his [1968]). Similar work was done by
Rasiowa [1972], Saloni [1972], and Przymusin´ska [1980a].
3.2 Semantics of Sequents
3.2.1. Definition An (m-valued) sequent Γ is an m-tuple Γ1 | . . . | Γmof finite
sequences Γi of formulas. If Γ is a sequent, then Γi denotes the i-th component
of Γ .
If ∆ is a sequence of formulas and I ⊆M = {1, . . . ,m} (or W ⊆ V ), we denote
by [I:∆] ([W :∆]) the sequent whose i-th component is ∆ if i ∈ I (vi ∈ W ), and
is empty otherwise. For [{i1, . . . , ik}:∆] ([{w1, . . . , wk}:∆]) we write [i1, . . . , ik:∆]
([w1, . . . , wk:∆]). If Γ and Γ ′ are sequents, then we write Γ, Γ ′ for the sequent
Γ1, Γ
′
1 | . . . | Γm, Γ ′m.
3.2.2. Definition Let I be an interpretation. I p-satisfies (n-satisfies) a sequent Γ
iff there is an i (1 ≤ i ≤ m) s.t., for some formula F ∈ Γi, valI(F ) = vi (valI(F ) 6=
vi). I is called a p-model (n-model) of Γ and we write I |=p Γ (I |=n Γ ).
Γ is called p-satisfiable (n-satisfiable) iff there is an interpretation I s.t. I |=p Γ
(I |=n Γ ), and p-valid (n-valid) iff for every interpretation I, I |=p Γ (I |=n Γ ).
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Evidently, these two notions of satisfiability resp. validity are distinct: an inter-
pretation may be a p-model of a sequent, but not an n-model; a sequent may be
p-satisfiable but not n-satisfiable; it may be p-valid but not n-valid (or vice versa).
3.2.3. Example To see how the notion of many-valued sequent is a generalization
of the classical case, consider PL with V = {f, t}: A sequent takes the form Γ | ∆
(usually written Γ → ∆). It is p-satisfied if some formula in Γ is false or some
formula in ∆ is true. It is n-satisfied if some formula in Γ is true or some formula
in ∆ is false. The calculus resulting from p-satisfaction is the calculus given by
Gentzen [1934], the one from n-satisfaction corresponds to Beth’s 1955 tableaux.
If we exchange t and f , then we also obtain Gentzen’s system from n-sequents
(cf. Carnielli [1991], p. 66). However, in the general case the correspondence is
not one of “trivial” duality as in the classical case: you cannot in general pass from
the positive to the negative system just by switching the sides of the sequents.
We can employ the metaformalism of sfes introduced in Chapter 1 to study
the connection between p- and n-sequent calculi. The notions of satisfaction and
validity of p- and n-sequents can be straightforwardly translated by interpreting
sequents as sfes of a certain form: A sequent Γ corresponds to the sfe
psfe(Γ ) =
∨
A∈Γ1
Av1 ∨ . . . ∨
∨
A∈Γm
Avm
modulo p-satisfiability and to
nsfe(Γ ) =
∨
A∈Γ1
¬Av1 ∨ . . . ∨
∨
A∈Γm
¬Avm
modulo n-satisfiability. Note how the first sfe-translation of a sequent corresponds
to a positive clause as in Definition 2.2.1, and of the second to a negative clause as
in Definition 2.6.1.
We can now apply the metatheory of sfes to sequents. P-satisfiability corre-
sponds to reading a sequent as a positive disjunction, and n-satisfiability to reading
it as a negative disjunction of signed formulas. Call the translation of a sequent to a
disjunction of positive signed formulas a p-sequent, and the translation to a negative
disjunction an n-sequent. In light of Proposition 1.4.6, any sfe can be expressed as
a conjunction of p- or n-sequents, and a conjunction of p-sequents (n-sequents) can
be transformed to an equivalent conjunction of n-sequents (p-sequents) by Propo-
sition 1.4.5. The negation of a p-sequent (n-sequent) is equivalent to a conjunction
of n-sequents (p-sequents). Proposition 1.4.8 provides us with a relation between
validity of a sequent and the unsatisfiability of its negation. For the special case
where the sequent contains only one formula i:A we obtain the following:
3.2.4. Proposition A sequent [i:A] is p-unsatisfiable (n-unsatisfiable) iff it is n-
valid (p-valid).
Proof. The negation of the p-sequent Avi is the n-sequent ¬Avi . The claim
follows from Proposition 1.4.8.
On the other hand, the n-sequent ¬Avi can also be written as a p-sequent∨
j 6=iA
vj , and hence the p-unsatisfiability of [i:A] can be established by proving
[V \ {vi}:A] p-valid. Proposition 3.2.4 gives us as an alternative to proving the
latter sequent in order to establish the unsatisfiability of [i:A]. Instead, we can
use a complete (w.r.t. n-validity) calculus for proving [i:A] n-valid and, hence, p-
unsatisfiable. This is of value especially if there is only one designated truth value:
3.2.5. Proposition Let F be a formula. Then the following are equivalent:
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(1) F is a tautology
(2) The sequent [V +:F ] is p-valid
(3) The sequents [j:F ], where j ∈ V \ V +, are all n-valid.
3.2.6. Proposition Let F be a formula. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) F is a unsatisfiable
(2) The sequent [V \ V +:F ] is p-valid
(3) The sequents [j:F ], where j ∈ V +, are all n-valid.
3.3 Construction of Sequent Calculi
3.3.1. Definition Let
∧
j∈I ∆2:i(j) be a positive (negative) i-th partial normal
form of 2(A1, . . . , An) (¬2(A1, . . . , An)), where 2 is of arity n, ∆2:i(j) is a dis-
junction of signed atoms (literals) of the form Aiw (¬Aiw), where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
let ∆′2:i(j) be the sequent corresponding to ∆2:i(j).
A p- (n-) introduction rule for 2 at place i is a schema of the form:
〈Γ,∆′2:i(j)〉j∈I
Γ, [i:2(A1, . . . , An)]
2:i
3.3.2. Example Consider the implication in three-valued  Lukasiewicz logic  L3
given in Example 1.3.3. The partial normal forms from Example 1.5.3 yield the
following introduction rules for P L3:
Γ | ∆ | Π,A Γ,B | ∆ | Π
Γ,A ⊃ B | ∆ | Π ⊃:f
Γ | ∆,A | Π,A Γ | ∆,A,B | Π Γ,B | ∆ | Π,A
Γ | ∆,A ⊃ B | Π ⊃:p
Γ,A | ∆,A | Π,B Γ,A | ∆,B | Π,B
Γ | ∆ | Π,A ⊃ B ⊃:t
and the following rules for N L3:
Γ | ∆ | Π,A Γ,B | ∆ | Π,A
Γ,A ⊃ B | ∆ | Π ⊃:f
Γ,A | ∆,A | Π Γ | ∆,B | Π,A
Γ | ∆,A ⊃ B | Π ⊃:p
Γ,A | ∆ | Π Γ | ∆ | Π,B Γ | ∆,A,B | Π
Γ | ∆ | Π,A ⊃ B ⊃:t
3.3.3. Definition Let
∧
j∈I ∆Q:i(j) be a positive (negative) i-th partial normal
form of (Qx)A(x) (¬(Qx)A(x)), where ∆Q:i(j) is a disjunction of signed atoms
(literals) of the form A(α)w or A(τ)w (¬A(α)w or ¬A(τ)w), and let ∆′Q:i(j) be the
sequent corresponding to ∆Q:i(j)
A p- (n-) introduction rule for Q at place i is a schema of the form:〈
Γ,∆′Q:i(j)
〉
j∈I
Γ, [i: (Qx)A(x)]
Q:i
where the free variables α occurring in the ∆′Q:i(j) satisfy the eigenvariable condi-
tion: No α occurs in the lower sequent.
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In an introduction rule as above, the formula—2(A1, . . . , An) or (Qx)A(x)—
being introduced is called the main formula, the formulas in ∆f :i(j) are called the
auxiliary formulas and the formulas in Γ are called the side formulas. The sequents
above the line are called the upper sequents or premises, the sequent below the line
is called the lower sequent or the conclusion of this rule.
3.3.4. Example Consider the universal quantifier ∀ in the three-valued  Lukasiewicz
logic  L3. From the pnfs in Example 1.5.7 we obtain the following rules:
Γ,A(τ) | ∆ | Π,A
Γ, (∀x)A(x) | ∆ | Π ∀:f
Γ | ∆ | Π,A(α)
Γ | ∆ | Π, (∀x)A(x) ∀:t
Γ | ∆,A(α) | Π,A(α) Γ | ∆,A(τ) | Π
Γ | ∆, (∀x)A(x) | Π ∀:p
3.3.5. Definition A p-sequent calculus PL for a logic L is given by:
(1) axiom schemas of the form: [V :A],
(2) for every connective 2 and every truth value vi a p-introduction rule 2:i,
(3) for every quantifier Q and every truth value vi a p-introduction rule Q:i,
(4) weakening rules for every place i:
Γ
Γ, [i:A]
w:i
(5) exchange rules for every place i:
Γ, [i:B,A],∆
Γ, [i:A,B],∆
x:i
(6) contraction rules for every place i:
Γ, [i:A,A]
Γ, [i:A]
c:i
(7) cut rules for every two i 6= j:
Γ, [i:A] ∆, [j:A]
Γ,∆
cut:ij
(2) and (3) are called logical rules, (4)–(7) are called structural rules.
3.3.6. Definition An n-sequent calculus NL for a logic L is given by:
(1) axiom schemas of the form: [i, j:A], where i 6= j,
(2) for every connective 2 and every truth value vi an n-introduction rule 2:i,
(3) for every quantifier Q and every truth value vi an n-introduction rule Q:i,
(4) weakening rules for every place i:
Γ
Γ, [i:A]
w:i
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(5) exchange rules for every place i:
Γ, [i:B,A],∆
Γ, [i:A,B],∆
x:i
(6) contraction rules for every place i:
Γ, [i:A,A]
Γ, [i:A]
c:i
(7) the cut rule:
Γ1, [1:A] . . . Γm, [m:A]
Γ1, . . . , Γm
cut
(2) and (3) are called logical rules, (4)–(7) are called structural rules.
3.3.7. Definition An upward tree P of sequents is called a proof in a sequent
calculus SL iff every leaf is an instance of an axiom in SL, and all other sequents
in it are obtained from the ones standing immediately above it by an application
of one of the rules of SL. The sequent at the root of P is called its end-sequent.
A sequent Γ is called provable in SL (in symbols: `SL Γ ) iff it is the end-sequent
of some proof (in SL). In the case of PL (NL), we say that Γ is p-provable (n-
provable).
3.3.8. Theorem (Soundness for PL) If a sequent is p-provable, then it is p-valid.
Proof. By induction on the length l of a proof of a sequent Π.
l = 1: Π is an axiom. Since every formula takes some truth value, the disjunction
over all truth values is always true.
l > 1: Π is the conclusion of a rule of inference. Let I be an interpretation. The
induction hypothesis is that all upper sequents are p-valid, and in particular that
each is satisfied by I. We distinguish cases according to the rule J applied last:
(1) J is a weakening: I |=p Π since A implies A or B.
(2) J is an exchange: I |=p Π since disjunction is commutative.
(3) J is a contraction: I |=p Π since A or A implies A.
(4) J is a cut: The upper sequents are Γ, [i:A] and Γ ′, [j:A] (i 6= j), and Π =
Γ, Γ ′. Now either I |=p Γ , in which case also I |=p Γ, Γ ′, or I |=p [i:A]. But
then I 6|=p [j:A] and hence I |=p Γ ′.
(5) J is an introduction rule for a propositional connective 2 at place i: The upper
sequents are instances Γ,∆′′2:i(j) and Π = Γ, [i:2(A1, . . . , An)]. If I |=p Γ ,
then also I |=p Π. Otherwise, I |= ∧ psfe(∆′′2:i(j)). Hence, by Definitions
3.3.1 and 1.5.1 we have that I |=p [i:2(A1, . . . , An)].
(6) J is an introduction rule for a quantifier Q at place i: The upper sequents are
instances Γ,∆′′Q:i(j), and Π = Γ, [i: (Qx)A(x)]. If I |=p Γ , then also I |=p Π.
Otherwise, I |= ∧ psfe(∆′′Q:i(j)). Note that in ∆′′Q:i(j) (and psfe(∆′′Q:i(j)))
terms t1, . . . , tp take the place of the term variables and free variables a1,
. . . , aq take the place of the eigenvariables. Since a1, . . . , aq do not occur
in Γ , we have that for all d1, . . . , dq ∈ D, there are e1, . . . , ep ∈ D—
namely ΦI(t1[d1/a1, . . . , dq/aq]), . . . , ΦI(tp[d1/a1, . . . , dq/aq])—such that I |=∧
psfe(∆′′Q:i(j)[d1/a1, . . . , dq/aq, e1/t1, . . . , ep/tp]) (Note that the ei may ac-
tually depend on the dj , since the terms may contain eigenvariables). Hence,
by Definitions 3.3.3 and 1.5.5, we have that I |=p [i: (Qx)A(x)].
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3.3.9. Theorem (Soundness for NL) If a sequent is n-provable, then it is n-valid.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the case for p-sequent calculus, simply replace
|=p by |=n and psfe(·) by nsfe(·) throughout the proof. The cases of axioms and cut
rules are handled as follows:
Π is an axiom, say [i, j:A]. Let I be an interpretation. If I |= ¬Avi or I |= ¬Avj
then I |=n [i, j:A]. Since A can take only one truth value, these are the only possible
cases.
(4′) J is a cut: The upper sequents are Γi, [i:A] 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and Π = Γ1, . . . , Γm.
Now either I |=n Γ1, in which case also I |=n Π. Otherwise I |=n [1:A]. But
then I 6|=n [i:A] for all 2 ≤ i ≤ m, hence I |=n Γi and a fortiori I |=n Π.
3.3.10. Theorem (Completeness for PL) If a sequent is p-valid, then it is p-
provable without cuts from atomic axioms.
Proof. We use the method of reduction trees, due to Schu¨tte [1956] (see also
Takeuti [1987], Ch. 1, § 8). We show that every sequent Γ is either provable in
the sequent calculus or has a counter-model.
Let E be an enumeration of all tuples of terms over L. Call a free variable
available at stage k iff it occurs in the tree constructed before stage k (if there is
no such variable, pick any and call it available) and new otherwise. A p-tuple t¯ of
terms is available for the reduction of a formula F at place i with eigenvariables a1,
. . . , aq at stage k on a branch B iff
(1) t¯ contains only variables which are available at stage k or which are among
a1, . . . , aq, and either
(2a) t¯ has not been used at all for a reduction of F at place i on B in a stage
before k, or
(2b) the pre-instance of the premise lying on B of a reduction of F at place i in a
stage before k where t¯ has been used did not contain any term variables.
A reduction tree TΓ is an upward, rooted tree of sequents constructed from Γ
in stages as follows:
Stage 0: Write Γ at the root of the tree.
Stage k: If the topmost sequent Γ ′ of a branch contains an atomic formula A
s.t. A ∈ ⋂j∈I Γ ′j then stop the reduction for this branch. Call a branch open if it
does not have this property.
Repeat the following reduction steps for every formula F occurring at place i in
the topmost sequent Γ ′ of an open branch, which has neither already been reduced
at place i on this branch in this stage, nor is the result of a reduction at this stage:
(1) F ≡ 2(A′1, . . . , A′n): Replace Γ ′ in the reduction tree by:
〈Γ ′,∆′′2:i(j)〉j∈I
Γ ′
where ∆′′2:i(j) is an instance of ∆
′
2:i(j) in the rule 2:i introducing F as in
Definition 3.3.1, obtained by instantiating A1, . . . , An with A′1, . . . , A
′
n,
respectively.
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(2) F ≡ (Qx)A′(x): Let a1, . . . , ap be all eigenvariables and t1, . . . , tq be all term
variables in the premises of the rule schema Q:i. Replace Γ ′ in the reduction
tree by: 〈
Γ ′,∆′′Q:i(j)
〉
j∈I
Γ ′
where ∆′′Q:i(j) is an instance of ∆
′
Q:i(j) in Q:i introducing F as in Defini-
tion 3.3.3, obtained by instantiating A with A′, the eigenvariables α1, . . . , αq
with the first q-tuple a1, . . . , aq of new free variables in the enumeration E,
and the term variables τ1, . . . , τq with the first (w.r.t. E) p-tuple t1, . . . , tp of
terms which is available for the reduction of F at place i with eigenvariables
a1, . . . , aq at stage k on B. Observe that F ∈ Γ ′i and thus occurs in all upper
sequents.
If TΓ is finite, then every topmost sequent contains an atomic formula that
occurs at each place in that sequent. A cut-free proof of Γ from axioms containing
these formulas is easily constructed by inserting weakenings and exchanges.
If TΓ is infinite it has an infinite branch B by Ko¨nig’s Lemma. For every atomic
formula P (t1, . . . , tn) in B, there is an l, 1 ≤ l ≤ m, s.t. P (t1, . . . , tn) never occurs
at position l in any sequent on B. We construct an interpretation I as follows: the
domain is the set of terms, ΦI(t) = t (t a term), and ΦI
(
P (t1, . . . , tn)
)
= vl, where
vl is the truth value corresponding to the place l.
If F is a formula occurring in B, and F occurs at place i anywhere in B, then
valI(F ) 6= vi. This is seen by induction on the complexity of F :
(1) F is atomic: valI(F ) 6= vi by the construction of I.
(2) F ≡ 2(A1, . . . , An): F is reduced somewhere in B. Let ∆′′2:i(j) be the main
formulas in the corresponding premises. By induction hypothesis none of
the Al in the premise that belongs to B evaluates to the truth value corre-
sponding to its place in the premise. In other words, if Γ ′,∆′′2:i(k) is the
premise on B, the induction hypothesis says that I 6|=p ∆′′2:i(k), and hence
I 6|= ∧ j psfe(∆′′2:i(j)). By Definitions 3.3.1 and 1.5.1, I(F ) 6= vi.
(3) F ≡ (Qx)A(x): F is reduced somewhere in B. Let ∆′′′Q:i(j) be the pre-instances
of the main formulas in the premises, corresponding to ∆′′Q:i(j). In particular,
let ∆′′′Q:i(k) be the one on B, and let α1, . . . , αr be the eigenvariables and τ1,
. . . , τs be the term variables occurring in it.
Now consider the substitution instances of A(x) occurring on B above the
lowermost reduction of F : F is reduced in every stage above this one in B.
We want to show that for all terms (i.e., domain elements) t1, . . . , tp there
are terms t′1, . . . , t
′
q s.t. I 6|=p ∆′′′Q:i(l)[t1/τ1, . . . , tp/τp, t′1/α1, . . . , t′q/αq]. Obvi-
ously, we need only consider the term- and eigenvariables actually occurring
in ∆′′′Q:i(l). If ∆
′′′
Q:i(k) contains an eigenvariable α, then in ∆
′′
Q:i(k) this α is
replaced by a free variable a, and by induction hypothesis, A(a) does not take
the truth value at which it stands (in ∆′′′Q:i(l)). If ∆
′′′
Q:i(l) contains a term
variable τ , we have two cases:
(a) There are infinitely many reductions of F on B s.t. the pre-instance of
the corresponding premise on B contains a term variable. Hence, B
contains infinitely many occurrences of instances of A[t/τ ] where t is any
term, and in fact all such instances (This follows from the way available
tuples of terms are chosen). None of these instances take the truth values
corresponding to the place at which they stand (in ∆′′′Q:i(j)). Together
with what has been said above for the eigenvariables, it follows that I 6|=p
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∆′′′Q:i(l)[t1/τ1, . . . , tp/τp, t
′
1/α1, . . . , t
′
q/αq] and hence that valI(F ) 6= vi by
Definition 1.5.5.
(b) The reductions of F on B yield only a finite number (including zero) of
instances A[t/τj ] on B because there are only finitely many reductions
of F on B at place i whose pre-instances of premises on B contain term
variables. Since F is reduced infinitely often on B, there is a first reduc-
tion where the pre-instance of the corresponding premise on B contains
no term variables and such that all reductions above it share this prop-
erty. Let ∆˜′′′Q:i(l
′) be the corresponding pre-instance of the premise on B.
∆˜′′′Q:i(l
′) contains only eigenvariables, and we have that I 6|=p ∆˜′′Q:i(l′)
for the corresponding instance (by induction hypothesis) and hence that
valI(F ) 6= vi by Definition 1.5.5.
In particular, no formula in Γ evaluates to the truth value corresponding to the
position at which it stands. Hence I does not p-satisfy Γ .
3.3.11. Corollary Let A be any formula. [V :A] is provable in PL without cuts
from atomic axioms.
Proof. Since [V :A] is valid, the construction of T[V :A] terminates and gives a
cut-free proof with atomic axioms.
3.3.12. Theorem (Completeness for NL) If a sequent is n-valid, then it is n-
provable without cuts from atomic axioms.
Proof. The construction of the reduction tree for a sequent Γ is as in the positive
case, only that a branch with topmost sequent Γ ′ is closed, if there is a formula A
s.t. A ∈ Γ ′i and A ∈ Γ ′j for i 6= j.
If TΓ is infinite it has, again, an infinite branch B by Ko¨nig’s Lemma. For every
atomic formula P (t1, . . . , tn) there is at most one position i where it ever appears
in the sequents of B. We construct an interpretation I as follows: the domain is the
set of terms, ΦI(t) = t (t a term) and ΦI
(
P (t1, . . . , tn)
)
= vi, where vi is the truth
value corresponding to the position i.
If F is a formula occurring in B, and F occurs at place i anywhere in B, then
valI(F ) = vi. This is proved as in the positive case, mutatis mutandis. In particular,
every formula in Γ evaluates to the truth value corresponding to the position at
which it stands. Hence I does not n-satisfy Γ .
3.4 Equivalent Formulations of Sequent Calculi
The way we defined sequent calculus is the one closest to Gentzen’s original defi-
nition. There are several minor modifications to the definitions that can be made,
concerning the structural rules and the sequents as sequences of formulas, according
to taste and convenience. First of all, it is possible to divide the side formulas of
introductions similar to the way the cuts are defined, as follows:
3.4.1. Definition Let f be 2 or Q, let F be 2(A1, . . . , An) or (Qx)A(x), respec-
tively, and let ∆′f :i(j) be as in Definition 3.3.1 or 3.3.3, respectively. Then the
following is called a combinational rule:〈
Γj ,∆
′
f :i(j)
〉
j∈I
Γ, [i:F ]
f :i
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where Γ = 〈Γj | j ∈ I〉. Furthermore, we allow an inference to be made, even if
only subsequents of ∆′f :i(j) are present in the premises.
The resulting calculus is called the combinational sequent calculus.
3.4.2. Proposition If Γ is provable, then a subsequent of Γ is provable without
weakenings.
Proof. We inductively translate a proof P of Γ to a proof η(P ) of a subsequent
of Γ ′:
If Γ is an axiom, we take η(P ) = P . Otherwise, distinguish cases according to
the last rule J in P :
(1) J is an exchange: Γ is of the form Λ, [i:B,A],Π. By induction hypothesis we
have a proof η(P ′) of Λ′,∆,Π ′, where Λ′ and Π ′ are subsequents of Λ and
Π, respectively, and ∆ is either empty, [i:A], [i:B], or [i:A,B]. In the former
cases, we are done (η(P ) = η(P ′)). In the latter case we get η(P ) as
.... η(P
′)
Λ′, [i:A,B],Π ′
Λ′, [i:B,A],Π ′
x:i
(2) J is a contraction: Γ is of the form Λ, [i:A,A]. By induction hypothesis we
have a proof η(P ′) of Λ′,∆, where Λ′ is a subsequent of Λ and ∆ is either
empty, [i:A] or [i:A,A]. In the former cases, we are done (η(P ) = η(P ′)). In
the latter case we get η(P ) as
.... η(P
′)
Λ′, [i:A,A]
Λ′, [i:A]
c:i
(3) J is a weakening: Γ is of the form Λ, [i:A]. By induction hypothesis we have
a proof η(P ′) of Λ′, where Λ′ is a subsequent of Λ. We take η(P ) = η(P ′),
which contains no weakening.
(4) J is a cut: Γ is of the form Λ1, . . . , Λk. By induction hypothesis we have
proofs η(Pj) of Λ′j ,∆
′
j , where Λ
′
j is a subsequent of Λj and ∆j is either empty
or [ij :A] (In the positive case, k = 2, in the negative case k = m and ij = j).
If one of the ∆j is empty, we take η(P ) = η(Pj). Otherwise, we get η(P ) as
.... η(P1)
Λ′1, [i1:A] . . .
.... η(Pk)
Λ′k, [ik:A]
Λ′1, . . . , Λ
′
j
cut
(5) J is an introduction of f at place i: Π is of the form Γ, [i:F ] (F is
2(A1, . . . , An) or (∀x)A(x), according to whether f is 2 or Q). By induc-
tion hypothesis we have proofs η(Pj) of Γ ′j ,∆
′′
f :i(j), where Γ
′
j and ∆
′′
f :i(j)
are subsequents of Γj and ∆′f :i(j). If one of the ∆
′′
f :i(j) is empty, we take
η(P ) = η(Pj). Otherwise, we get η(P ) as
〈 .... η(Pj)
Γ ′j ,∆
′′
f :i(j)
〉
j∈I
Γ ′, F
f :i
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Note that by allowing inferences on premises with subsets of the auxiliary for-
mulas present, we can in effect simulate the weakening rule. In the case of Gentzen’s
LK, this allowance need not be made to obtain the previous result. This is because
the rules of LK have the property that every premise contains only one occurrence
of an auxiliary formula. By inspection of the proof of the preceding proposition, we
see that this is also sufficient (see also Kleene [1952], § 80). In the many-valued
sequent calculus, it is in fact possible to give an equivalent formulation with this
property, but only for the propositional case. Consider an introduction rule for 2
at place i, where ∆′2:i(j) contains more than one formula, i.e., ∆
′
2:i(k) = ∆, [l:Ap].
Then we can split the rule into two as follows:〈
Γj ,∆
′
f :i(j)
〉
j∈I\k
Γk,∆
Γ, [i:2(A1, . . . , An)]
2:i′
〈
Γj ,∆
′
f :i(j)
〉
j∈I\k
Γk, [l:Ap]
Γ, [i:2(A1, . . . , An)]
2:i′′
It is easily seen by induction that we can obtain for any propositional rule a set of
rules with only one auxiliary formula per premise. The resulting system is called the
split-rule calculus. This system is equivalent to the combinational sequent calculus:
Every instance of a split rule can be made into an instance of the original rule by
means of a series of weakenings. On the other hand, assume we have a deduction
in the combinational calculus, 〈 .... Pj
Γj ,∆
′
f :i(j)
〉
j∈I
Γ, [i:2(A1, . . . , An)]
2:i
Then we can give a deduction in the split-rule calculus. It suffices to give the case
of a rule split into two, the general case is by induction:
〈 .... Pj
Γj ,∆
′
f :i(j)
〉
j∈I\k
〈 .... Pj
Γj ,∆
′
f :i(j)
〉
j∈I\k
.... Pk
Γk,∆, [l:Ap]
Γk, [l:Ap],∆
x
Γ, [l:Ap], [i:2(A1, . . . , An)]
2:i′
Γ, [i:2(A1, . . . , An)], [l:Ap]
x
Γ ′, [i:2(A1, . . . , An),2(A1, . . . , An)]
2:i′′
Γ, [i:2(A1, . . . , An)]
xc
Nota bene that the method of splitting rules does in general not work for quantifier
rules. Consider for instance the sequent [i, j:A(α)], which might be a premise for a
quantifier introduction. It expresses the condition that, for all α, A(α) either takes
the value vi or the value vj . The corresponding split sequent, however, says that
either for all α, A(α) takes the value vi or, for all α, A(α) takes the value vj . In a
word, ∀ does not distribute over ∨ .
We could also define a sequent to be a tuple of sets (instead of sequences) of
formulas. We call such sequents set-sequents. If sequent calculus formulated with
set-sequents, the contraction and exchange rules become superfluous.
It should be pointed out that the study of sequent systems where combinational
and ordinary rules are combined while some or all structural rules are left out is a
difficult and highly interesting topic. Considerations along these lines lead to the
investigation of so-called substructural logics, for instance Girard’s Linear Logic, or
Relevance Logic. For a short survey see Troelstra [1992], § 2.8.
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3.5 The Cut-elimination Theorem for PL
The cut-elimination theorem, or Hauptsatz, was first proved for classical logic in
Gentzen [1934]. It is one of the most important theorems in proof theory. Its
underlying idea is to eliminate structure from a given proof to extract information
from it. This is an idea often used, and cut-elimination corresponds closely to meth-
ods used in other calculi to obtain similar results: the 2nd ε-Theorem in Hilbert
and Bernays [1939] in ε-calculus, the normalization theorem of Prawitz [1971]
in natural deduction, and the normalization results for free deduction obtained by
Parigot [1992]. Important consequences of the Hauptsatz for classical (and in-
tuitionistic) logic include the Midsequent Theorem, Herbrand’s Theorem, Craig’s
Interpolation Theorem, and Beth’s Definability Lemma (see Takeuti [1987], ch. 1,
§ 6).
The proof of the cut-elimination theorem for the family PL of many-valued
sequent calculi is analogous to the proof of the classical case given by Gentzen. It
proceeds by reducing cuts to cuts on formulas of smaller complexity and moving
the cuts in a given proof upwards until they only involve axioms; such cuts are
easily removed. The most important prerequisite for the proof is the ability to
transform a cut on a composite formula to a derivation using only cuts acting on
subformulas of the original cut-formula. In the classical case, this is established by
case distinction; we, however, have to establish this uniformly by the lemmas below.
Note how the way Takahashi [1967a] defined his sequent calculus makes similar
lemmas unnecessary for his proof of cut-elimination.
In the proof of the cut-elimination theorem, we replace the cut rule, for technical
reasons, by an equivalent rule called mix:
Π Λ
Π(i), Λ(j)
(A, i, j)
where A occurs in Πi and Λj, and Π(i) (Λ(j)) is obtained from Π (Λ) by deleting
every occurrence of A in Πi (Λj). A cut can be replaced by a mix followed by a
sequence of weakenings, and a mix can be emulated by a series of cuts. Call the
calculus obtained from PL by replacing the cut rule with the mix rule PL′.
3.5.1. Lemma Consider the derivation schema
〈Π,∆′2:i(r)〉r
Π, [i:2(A1, . . . , An)]
〈Λ,∆′2:j(s)〉s
Λ, [j:2(A1, . . . , An)]
Π,Λ
(2(A1, . . . , An), i, j)
where neither Πi nor Λj contains 2(A1, . . . , An). Then there is a proof of Π,Λ from
the sequents Π,∆′2:i(r) and Λ,∆
′
2:j(s) using only mixes on A1, . . . , An.
Proof. It suffices to show the lemma for Π = Γ = ∅: If we have a proof of the
empty sequent from the sequents ∆2:i(r) and ∆2:j(s), then we can immediately
obtain (using exchanges and contractions) a proof of Π,Λ by writing Π or Λ left of
every sequent in the deduction, as appropriate.
The conjunction
∧
r psfe
(
∆′2:i(r)
) ∧ ∧s psfe(∆′2:j(s)) of the sfes corresponding
to the sequents ∆′2:i(r) and ∆
′
2:j(s) is clearly unsatisfiable, since
∧
r psfe
(
∆′2:i(r)
)
is equivalent to 2(·)vi and ∧s psfe(∆′2:j(s)) is equivalent to 2(·)vj , where i 6= j.
We translate this conjunction to a set of clauses, which is also unsatisfiable: Let
C = ⋃j∈I C2:i(j) be the set of clauses where
C2:i(j) = {PAvk | A ∈ ∆′2:i(j)k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m}
C is unsatisfiable, since the conjunction of the ∆’s is. By the completeness of
many-valued resolution (Theorem 2.5.8), there is a resolution deduction R of 2
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from C. Note that the literals in C are all ground, and hence, in every resolution
step, there is only one literal that is resolved upon. Without loss of generality,
assume that the resolution proof is in tree form (cf. Proposition 2.5.9). Such a
proof can immediately be translated to a PL′ deduction as follows: Let
C1 ∪ {Aλvk} C2 ∪ {Aλvl}
C1 ∪ C2
be the last resolution step in R, where A is a of one of A1, . . . , An. The corre-
sponding mix is:
∆1, [k:A, . . . , A] ∆2, [l:A, . . . , A]
∆1,∆2
(A, k, l)
where ∆1 and ∆2 are the sequents corresponding to C1 and C2, respectively.
3.5.2. Lemma Consider the derivation schema
〈Π,∆2:i(r)〉r
Π, i: (Qx)A(x)
〈Λ,∆Q:j(s)〉s
Λ, j: (Qx)A(x)
Π,Λ
((Qx)A(x), i, j)
where neither Πi nor Λj contains (Qx)A(x), and the appropriate eigenvariable con-
ditions are satisfied. Then there is a proof of Π,Λ from the sequents Π,∆Q:i(l) and
Λ,∆Q:j(k) using only mixes on instances Aσ of formulas A occurring in the ∆’s,
where dom(σ) contains only eigenvariables.
Proof. Again, it suffices to show the lemma for Π = Γ = ∅. The conjunc-
tion
∧
r psfe
(
∆′Q:i(r)
) ∧ ∧s psfe(∆′Q:j(s)) of the sfes corresponding to the sequents
∆Q:i(r) and ∆Q:j(s) is universally unsatisfiable (where universal satisfiability for
sfes is defined analogous to Definition 2.2.2. We translate this conjunction to a set
of clauses, which is also universally unsatisfiable: Let C = ⋃j∈I CQ:i(j) be the set
of clauses where
CQ:i(j) = {PA(cτ )vk | A(τ) ∈ ∆′Q:i(j)k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m} ∪
∪{PA(aτ )vk | A(α) ∈ ∆′Q:i(j)k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m}
where the aα are distinct free variables and the cτ are distinct constant symbols. By
the completeness of many-valued resolution (Theorem 2.5.8), there is a resolution
deduction R of 2 from C, which is (w.l.o.g.) in tree form. We recursively translate
Rρ(R) (ρ the cumulative substitution of Definition 2.5.10) into a PL′-derivation as
follows: Let .... R1
C1
.... R2
C2
(C1 \ {A})} ∪ (C2 \ {A}}
be the last resolution step in Rρ(R), where 〈{A}, {A}, at({A})〉 is a key triple (with
mgu id), A contains an atom of the form PA(a) or PA(c) (a is a variable and c a
constant symbol). Recall that the cumulative substitution has been applied to R,
so resolution steps actually do take this special, ground-like, form.
Let P1 (P2) be the result of the recursive translation of R1 (R2). The corre-
sponding deduction in PL′ is:
.... P1
∆
(k)
1 , [k:A]
.... P2
∆
(l)
2 , [l:A]
∆1,∆2
(A, r, s)
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where ∆1 and ∆2 are the sequents corresponding to C1 and C2, respectively (where
free variables are replaced by eigenvariables and constants by term variables). The
corresponding σ is easily obtained from ρ(R).
Note that here, too, we can add Π and Λ to the sequents without changing the
term structure of formulas other than the ones in the ∆’s, since only eigenvariables
(which must not occur in Π or Λ) are substituted into.
It is clear that σ will in general substitute into eigenvariables. This corresponds
to the case in the cut-elimination theorem for LK where a cut on (∀x)A(x) is
reduced to a cut on A(t). The eigenvariable above the strong premise of the cut is
replaced throughout the whole proof with the term occurring in the premise of the
weak ∀-introduction above the right premise of the cut.
We are now ready to state and prove the Hauptsatz for PL:
3.5.3. Theorem A PL-proof with end sequent Λ can be transformed into a cut-free
PL-proof of Λ.
Proof. It suffices to show that mixes can be eliminated from PL′-proofs. If every
PL′-proof with only one mix as its last inference can be transformed to a PL′-proof
without a mix, then the mixes can be eliminated from all PL′-proofs. This is seen by
induction on the number c of mixes in the proof: For c = 1 this is the hypothesis.
If c > 1, then consider a mix s.t. the subproof ending in the mix contains only
this mix as its last inference. By hypothesis, this mix can be eliminated, and the
subproof replaced by a mix-free proof of the same endsequent. The resulting proof
has c − 1 mixes, and the induction hypothesis applies. Hence, it suffices to show
the following:
3.5.4. Lemma Let P be a PL′-proof containing only one mix (A, i, j) as its last
inference. Then P can be transformed to a mix-free PL′-proof P ′ of the same
end-sequent.
Let P be a PL′-proof containing only one mix (A, i, j) which occurs as the last
inference in P . The degree of P , denoted d(P ), is the complexity deg(A) of the mix
formula A.
We call a thread in P containing the left (right) upper sequent of the mix a
left (right) thread. The rank of a left (right) thread is the number of consecutive
sequents counting upwards from the left (right) upper sequent of the mix which
contain the mix formula at place i (j). The left (right) rank of P , denoted rl(P )
(rr(P )) is the maximum of the ranks of its left (right) threads. The rank of P ,
denoted r(P ), is the sum of its left and right rank: r(P ) = rl(P ) + rr(P ).
The proof is by double induction on the rank and degree of P :
(1) r = 2, i.e., left and right rank of P equal 1. We distinguish cases according to
the type of the inferences above the mix:
(a) Π is an axiom [V :A]: P is of the form
[V :A]
.... P1
Λ
[V \ vi:A], Λ(j)
(A, i, j)
We can derive Π(i), Λ(j) without a mix as follows:
.... P1
Λ
[j:A, . . . , A], Λ(j)
x
[j:A], Λ(j)
c
[V \ vi:A], Λ(j)
w
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(b) Λ is an axiom. Similarly.
(c) Π is the conclusion of a structural inference. Since the left rank is 1, this
inference must be a weakening at place i:
.... P1
Π(i)
Π(i), [i:A]
w: i
.... P2
Λ
Π(i), Λ(j)
(A, i, j)
where Π is Π ′, [i:A]. We obtain Π(i), Λ(j) without a mix as follows:
.... P1
Π(i)
Π(i), Λ(j)
w
(d) Λ is the conclusion of a structural inference. Similarly.
(e) Both Π and Λ are conclusions of introduction rules 2:i and 2:j for the
connective 2:
〈Π,∆2:i(r)〉r
Π, i:2(· · ·)
〈Λ,∆2:j(s)〉s
Λ, j:2(· · ·)
Π,Λ
(2(· · ·), i, j)
By Lemma 3.5.1, there is a derivation of Π,Λ from Π,∆2:i(r) and
Λ,∆2:j(s), using only mixes, exchanges, and contractions. Since the
formulas in the ∆’s are subformulas of 2(· · ·), the degrees of all the re-
sulting mixes are less than the degree of the original mix. We iteratively
apply the induction hypothesis to the new mixes and obtain a derivation
without mixes of Π,Λ.
(f) Both Π and Λ are conclusions of introduction rules Q:i and Q:j for the
quantifier Q:
〈Π,∆Q:i(r)〉r
Π, i: (Qx)A(x)
〈Λ,∆Q:j(s)〉s
Λ, j: (Qx)A(x)
Π,Λ
((Qx)A(x), i, j)
By Lemma 3.5.2, there is a derivation of Π,Λ from Π,∆Q:i(r)σ and
Λ,∆Q:j(s)σ, using only mixes, exchanges, and contractions, where σ only
substitutes into eigenvariables of the two quantifier introductions. Since
the formulas in the ∆’s are subformulas of (Qx)A(x), the degrees of all
the resulting mixes are less than the degree of the original mix. We
iteratively apply the induction hypothesis to the new mixes and obtain
a derivation without mixes of Π,Λ.
(2) rr(P ) > 1: Again, we distinguish cases:
(a) Λi contains A: We obtain the following mix-free proof:
.... P1
Π
Π(i), [i:A, . . . , A]
e
Π(i), [i:A]
c
Π(i), Λ(j)
w
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(b) Πj contains A: We obtain the following mix-free proof:
.... P2
Λ
Λ(j), [j:A, . . . , A]
e
Λ(j), [j:A]
c
Π(i), Λ(j)
w
(c) Λ is the consequence of an inference J2, which is either structural (but
not cut), or a logical inference not introducing A at place j. P is of the
form
.... P1
Π
.... P (1)
Ψ(1) . . .
.... P (p)
Ψ(p)
Λ
J2
Π(i), Λ(j)
(A, i, j)
Let j1, . . . , js, 1 ≤ jk ≤ p, be all indices s.t. Ψ(jk) contains A (There
is at least one such jk, otherwise the right rank of P would equal 1).
Consider the proofs P (jk)′:
....
Π
....
Ψ(jk)
Π(i), Ψ(jk)(j)
(A, i, j)
In P (jk)′, rl(P (jk)′) = rl(P ) and rr(P (jk)′) ≤ rr(P ) − 1, and in sum
r(P (jk)′) ≤ r(P ) − 1. Hence the induction hypothesis applies and we
have mix-free proofs P (jk)′′ of Π(i), Ψ(jk)(j). For indices l not occurring
in the above list, we have that Ψ(l) equals Ψ(l)(j), and we define P (l)′′
as .... P (l)
Ψ(l)
Π(i), Ψ(l)
w
If J2 is a (w:j) (and consequently, p = 1 and Ψ(1)(j) = Λ(j)), then P (1)′′
serves as our transformed proof. Otherwise, construct a proof as follows:
.... P (1)
′′
Π(i), Ψ(1)(j) . . .
.... P (p)
′′
Π(i), Ψ(p)(j)
Π(i), Λ(j)
J2
Π(i), Λ(j)
x
(d) Λ is the consequence of a logical inference J2 introducing A at place j.
P is of the form
.... P1
Π
.... P (1)
Λ,∆(1) . . .
.... P (p)
Λ,∆(p)
Λ, [j:A]
J2
Π(i), Λ(j)
(A, i, j)
Consider the proofs P (k)′ (Note that ∆(k) does not contain A—only
proper subformulas of A—and hence ∆(k)(j) equals ∆(k)):
.... P1
Π
.... P (k)
Λ,∆(k)
Π(i), Λ(j),∆(k)
(A, i, j)
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In P (k), rl(P (k)′) = rl(P ), rr(P (k)′) ≤ rr(P )−1 and in sum r(P (k)′) ≤
r(P )−1. Hence, the induction hypothesis applies and we obtain mix-free
proofs P (k)′′ of Π(i), Λ(j),∆(k). Construct a proof P ′ as follows:
.... P1
Π
.... P (1)
′′
Π(i), Λ(j),∆(1) . . .
.... P (p)
′′
Π(i), Λ(j),∆(p)
Π(i), Λ(j), [j:A]
J2
Π(i),Π(i), Λ(j)
(A, i, j)
Note that A does not occur at place j in Π(i), since otherwise case (2)(b)
would have applied, hence rr(P ′) = 1. With rl(P ′) = rl(P ) we have that
r(P ′) < r(P ) and the induction hypothesis yields a mix-free proof P ′′ of
Π(i),Π(i), Λ(j). We obtain a mix-free proof:
.... P
′
Π(i),Π(i), Λ(j)
Π(i), Λ(j)
xc
(3) rr(P ) = 1 and rl(P ) > 1: This case is dealt with in the same way as (2)
above, mutatis mutandis.
This completes the proof of the cut-elimination theorem.
3.6 The Cut-elimination Theorem for NL
The cut elimination theorem also holds for the negative sequent calculus.
Carnielli [1991] gives a proof of cut-elimination for his (n-)sequent calculus via
tableaux.
The induction proof itself is again very similar to the proof for the positive case.
As above, we first have to ensure that cuts on composite formulas are decomposable.
The mix in the negative sequent calculus takes the form
Π1 . . . Πm
Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(m)
m
(A)
where A occurs in Πii (1 ≤ i ≤ m), and Π(i)i is obtained from Πi by deleting every
occurrence of A in Πii. Call the calculus obtained from NL by replacing the cut
rule with the mix rule NL′.
3.6.1. Lemma Consider the derivation schema
〈Π1,∆2:1(r1)〉r1
Π1, [1:2(A1, . . . , An)] . . .
〈Πm,∆2:m(rm)〉rm
Πm, [m:2(A1, . . . , An)]
Π1, . . . ,Πm
(
2(A1, . . . , An)
)
where Πii does not contain 2(A1, . . . , An). Then there is a proof of Π1, . . . ,Πm
from the sequents Πi,∆2:i(ri) using only mixes on A1, . . . , An.
Proof. Completely analogous to the positive case, using negative resolution de-
ductions.
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3.6.2. Lemma Consider the derivation schema
〈Π1,∆Q:1(r1)〉r1
Π1, [1: (Qx)A(x)] . . .
〈Πm,∆Q:m(rm)〉rm
Πm, [m: (Qx)A(x)]
Π1, . . . ,Πm
(
(Qx)A(x)
)
where Πii does not contain (Qx)A(x), and the appropriate eigenvariable conditions
are satisfied. Then there is a proof of Π1, . . . ,Πm from the sequents Πi,∆Q:i(ri)
using only mixes on instances Aσ of formulas A occurring in the ∆’s, where dom(σ)
contains only eigenvariables.
Proof. Completely analogous to the positive case, using negative resolution de-
ductions.
3.6.3. Theorem A NL-proof with end sequent Λ can be transformed into a cut-free
NL-proof of Λ.
Proof. It suffices to show the following:
Let P be a NL′-proof containing only one mix A as its last inference. Then P
can be transformed to a mix-free NL′-proof P ′ of the same end-sequent.
Let P be a NL′-proof containing only one mix A which occurs as the last infer-
ence in P . The degree of P , denoted d(P ), is the complexity of the mix formula A.
We call a thread in P containing the i-th upper sequent of the mix an i-th thread.
The rank of an i-th thread is the number of consecutive sequents counting upwards
from the i-th upper sequent of the mix which contain the mix formula at place i.
The i-th rank of P , denoted ri(P ) is the maximum of the ranks of its i-th threads.
The rank of P , denoted r(P ), is the sum of its i-th ranks rank: r(P ) =
∑m
i=1 ri(P ).
The proof is by double induction on the rank and degree of P :
(1) r = m, i.e., all i-th ranks of P equal 1. We distinguish cases according to the
type of the inferences above the mix:
(a) Πi is an axiom [i, j:A]: P is of the form
.... P1
Π1 . . . [i, j:A]
.... Pm
Πm
Π
(1)
1 , . . . , [j:A], . . . ,Π
(m)
m
(A)
We can derive the conclusion without a mix as follows:
.... Pj
Πj
[j:A, . . . , A],Π(j)j
x
[j:A],Π(j)j
c
Π
(1)
1 , . . . , [j:A], . . . ,Π
(m)
m
wx
(b) Πi is the conclusion of a structural inference. Since the i-th rank is 1,
this inference must be a weakening at place i:
.... P1
Π1 . . .
.... Pi
Π
(i)
i
Π
(i)
i , [i:A]
w: i
. . .
.... Pm
Πm
Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(i)
i , . . . ,Π
(m)
m
(A)
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where Πi is Π
(i)
i , [i:A]. We obtain the conclusion without a mix as
follows:
.... Pi
Π
(i)
i
Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(i)
i , . . . ,Π
(m)
m
wx
(c) All the Πi are conclusions of introduction rules 2:i for the connective 2:
〈Π1,∆2:1(r1)〉r1
Π1, [1:2(· · ·)] . . .
〈Πm,∆2:m(rm)〉rm
Πm, [m:2(· · ·)]
Π1, . . . ,Πm
(
2(· · ·))
By Lemma 3.6.1, there is a derivation of Π1, . . . ,Πm from Πi,∆2:i(ri)
(1 ≤ i ≤ m), using only mixes, exchanges, and contractions. Since
the formulas in the ∆’s are subformulas of 2(· · ·), the degrees of all the
resulting mixes are less than the degree of the original mix. We iteratively
apply the induction hypothesis to the new mixes and obtain a derivation
without mixes of Π1, . . . ,Πm
(d) All the Πi are conclusions of introduction rules Q:i for the quantifier Q:
〈Π1,∆Q:1(r1)〉r1
Π1, [1: (Qx)A(x)] . . .
〈Πm,∆Q:m(rm)〉rm
Πm, [m: (Qx)A(x)]
Π1, . . . ,Πm
(
(Qx)A(x)
)
By Lemma 3.6.2, there is a derivation of Π1, . . . ,Πm from Πi,∆Q:i(ri)σ
(1 ≤ i ≤ m), using only mixes, exchanges, and contractions, where σ
only substitutes into eigenvariables of the two quantifier introductions.
Since the formulas in the ∆’s are subformulas of (Qx)A(x), the degrees
of all the resulting mixes are less than the degree of the original mix. We
iteratively apply the induction hypothesis to the new mixes and obtain
a derivation without mixes of Π1, . . . ,Πm.
(2) ri(P ) > 1 and rj(P ) = 1 for all j < i: Again, we distinguish cases:
(a) Πkl (k 6= l) contains A: We obtain the following mix-free proof:
.... Pl
Πl
Π
(l)
l , [l:A, . . . , A]
e
Π
(l)
l , [l:A]
c
Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(m)
m
wx
(b) Πi is the consequence of an inference J2, which is either structural, or a
logical inference not introducing A at place i. P is of the form
.... P1
Π1 . . .
.... P (1)
Ψ(1) . . .
.... P (p)
Ψ(p)
Πi
J2 . . .
.... Pm
Πm
Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(m)
m
A
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Let j1, . . . , js, 1 ≤ jk ≤ p, be all indices s.t. Ψ(jk) contains A (There is at
least one such jk, otherwise the i-th rank of P would equal 1). Consider
the proofs P (jk)′:
....
Π1 . . .
....
Ψ(jk) . . .
....
Πm
Π
(1)
1 , . . . , Ψ(jk)
(i), . . . ,Π
(m)
m
A
In P (jk)′, rj(P (jk)′) = rj(P ) (j 6= i) and ri(P (jk)′) ≤ ri(P ) − 1, and
in sum r(P (jk)′) ≤ r(P ) − 1. Hence the induction hypothesis applies
and we have mix-free proofs P (jk)′′ of Π
(1)
1 , . . . , Ψ(jk)
(i), . . . ,Π
(m)
m . For
indices l not occurring in the above list, we have that Ψ(l) equals Ψ(l)(i),
and we define P (l)′′ as
.... P (l)
Ψ(l)
Π
(1)
1 , . . . , Ψ(l), . . . ,Π
(m)
m
w
If J2 is a (w:i) (and consequently, p = 1 and Ψ(1)(i) = Π
(i)
i ), then P (1)
′′
serves as our transformed proof. Otherwise, construct a proof as follows:
.... P (1)
′′
Π
(1)
1 , . . . , Ψ(1)
(i), . . . ,Π
(m)
m
Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(m)
m , Ψ(1)(i)
x
. . .
.... P (p)
′′
Π
(1)
1 , . . . , Ψ(p)
(i), . . . ,Π
(m)
m
Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(m)
m , Ψ(p)(i)
x
Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(m)
m ,Π
(i)
i
J2
Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(m)
m
x
(c) Πi is the consequence of a logical inference J2 introducing A at place i.
P is of the form
.... P1
Π1 . . .
.... P (1)
Πi,∆(1) . . .
.... P (p)
Πi,∆(p)
Πi, [i:A]
J2
. . .
.... Pm
Πm
Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(m)
m
(A)
Consider the proofs P (k)′ (Note that ∆(k) does not contain A—only
proper subformulas of A—and hence ∆(k)(i) equals ∆(k)):
.... P1
Π1 . . .
.... P (k)
Πi,∆(k) . . .
.... Pm
Πm
Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(i)
i ,∆(k), . . . ,Π
(m)
m
(A)
In P (k), rj(P (k)′) = rj(P ) (j 6= i), ri(P (k)′) ≤ ri(P ) − 1 and in sum
r(P (k)′) ≤ r(P )−1. Hence, the induction hypothesis applies and we ob-
tain mix-free proofs P (k)′′ of Π(1)1 , . . . ,Π
(i)
i ,∆(k), . . . ,Π
(m)
m . Construct
a proof P ′ as follows:
.... P1
Π1 . . .
.... P (1)
′′
Π
(1)
1 , . . . , Π
(i)
i , ∆(1), . . . , Π
(m)
m
Π
(1)
1 , . . . , Π
(m)
m , ∆(1) . . .
.... P (p)
′′
Π
(1)
1 , . . . , Π
(i)
i , ∆(p), . . . , Π
(m)
m
Π
(1)
1 , . . . , Π
(m)
m , ∆(p)
Π
(1)
1 , . . . , Π
(m)
m , [i:A]
J2
. . .
.... Pm
Πm
Π
(1)
1 , . . . , Π
(i−1)
i−1 , Π
(1)
1 , . . . , Π
(m)
m , Π
(i+1)
i+1 , . . . Π
(m)
m
(A)
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Note that A does not occur at place i in Π(j)j (j 6= i), since otherwise
case (2) would have applied, hence ri(P ′) = 1. With rj(P ′) = rj(P )
(j 6= i) we have that r(P ′) < r(P ) and the induction hypothesis yields a
mix-free proof P ′′, whence we have:
.... P
′′
Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(i−1)
i−1 ,Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(m)
m ,Π
(i+1)
i+1 , . . . Π
(m)
m
Π
(1)
1 , . . . ,Π
(m)
m
xc
This completes the proof of the cut-elimination theorem.
3.7 Analytical Properties of PL
The cut-elimination theorem is often invoked to show certain simple properties of
sequent calculus, such as the subformula property, the decidability of propositional
logic, or consistency. In fact, these properties do not depend on the cut-elimination
theorem itself, i.e., on the availability of an algorithm for eliminating cuts from a
given proof, but on the completeness of the cut-free fragment. However, we may
want to extract information from cut-free proofs. The cut-elimination algorithm
makes the constructive extraction of such information possible, given an arbitrary
proof (containing cuts).
The following subformula property says that a proof of a statement (i.e., a
sequent) need only consist of subformulas of the formulas in the given sequent.
This makes the notion precise that a sequent can be proved without “detours,”or
having to use information unrelated to the end sequent.
3.7.1. Proposition (Subformula Property) A cut-free PL-proof contains only for-
mulas which are subformulas of the end-sequent.
Proof. By induction on the length of proofs: All rules except the cut rule have the
property that every formula occurring in the premises also occurs in the conclusion.
The midsequent theorem is what Gentzen called his Verscha¨rfter Hauptsatz,
meaning a strengthening of the cut-elimination theorem. It shows the existence of
proofs which are not only cut-free, but also have all quantifier inferences below all
propositional inferences.
3.7.2. Theorem (Midsequent Theorem) Let Π be a sequent consisting only of
prenex formulas which is provable in PL. Then there is a cut-free proof of Π con-
taining sequents Σ1, . . . , Σp, s.t.
(1) Σj is quantifier-free,
(2) every inference above Σj is either structural or propositional, and
(3) every inference below Σj is either structural or a quantifier inference.
Proof. By the cut-elimination theorem and Corollary 3.3.11, there is a cut-free
proof P of Π from atomic axiom sequents. The order of a quantifier introduction J
in P is defined as the number of propositional inferences below J . The order o(P )
of P is the sum of the orders of all quantifier inferences occurring in P .
We prove the theorem by induction on the order of P :
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(1) o(P ) = 0: There is no propositional inference occurring below any quantifier
inferences. Let B be a branch in P . If there is a propositional inference on B,
then let ΣB be the conclusion of the lowermost such, otherwise let ΣB be the
(atomic) axiom sequent on B. If ΣB contains a quantified formula F , then
F has to be introduced by weakenings. To see this, recall that Π contains
only prenex formulas: By the subformula property, ΣB is a subformula of a
formula in Π, hence no propositional inferences apply to it. Eliminate F and
all inferences applying to it from the part of B above ΣB , and add appropriate
weakenings and exchanges directly below ΣB . The (finite) set of all ΣB serves
as the set of Σi in the statement of the theorem.
(2) o(P ) > 0: Then there is a quantifier inference I with the following property:
The topmost logical inference below I is a propositional inference, say J . The
part of P between I and J takes the following form:
....
Γ1 . . .
〈 ....
Γ ′,∆Q:i(k)
〉
k
Γ ′, [i: (Qx)A(x)]
I
.... ∗
Γ ′′ . . .
....
Γn
Γ
J
where the part denoted by ∗ contains only structural inferences, and Γ and
Γ ′′ contains (Qx)A(x) as a sequent-formula. We can now lower the order by
exchanging the positions of I and J :
/
∖
....
Γ1
∆Q:i(k), Γ1 . . .
....
Γ ′,∆Q:i(k)
Γ ′,∆Q:i(k), [i: (Qx)A(x)]
w
∆Q:i(k), Γ ′, [i: (Qx)A(x)]
e
.... ∗
∆Q:i(k), Γ ′′ . . .
....
Γn
∆Q:i(k), Γn
∆,Γ
J
Γ,∆Q:i(k)
e
∖
/
k
Γ, [i: (Qx)A(x)] I
Γ
ec
In classical logic, the quantifier rules all have only one premise each. From
this it follows that there always is one midsequent. This midsequent contains, in
essence, an Herbrand disjunction of the prenex formula in the end-sequent. If the
many-valued logic under consideration has a similar structure, i.e., the quantifiers
considered have only one premise, then an analogue of Herbrand’s Theorem holds
for this logic.
3.8 Interpolation
Interpolation is an interesting problem for logics with something resembling an
implication connective. The question asked is, for two given formulas A and B
where A ⊃ B, is there a formula C, called an interpolant of A and B, s.t. (1) A ⊃ C
and C ⊃ B, (2) C contains only predicate symbols common to A and B and
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(3) C contains only free variables common to A and B. For classical logic, the
interpolation theorem was first proved by Craig [1957]. Maehara [1960] showed
the interpolation theorem in a proof theoretical fashion by making use of what has
become known as Maehara’s Lemma (see also Takeuti [1987], p. 31ff). It also
enabled Schu¨tte [1962] to extend the theorem to intuitionistic predicate logic.
Maehara’s Lemma states that, if a sequent Γ1, Γ2 → ∆1,∆2 is provable, then there
is an interpolant such that Γ1,→ ∆1, C and C,Γ2 → ∆2 are provable and the
analogues of (2) and (3) hold. We prove a version of Maehara’s Lemma in the
framework of the p-sequent calculus for many-valued logic. This was first done by
Miyama [1974] and more recently in a slightly more general form by Hanazawa
and Takano [1985] for the formalism of Takahashi [1967a]. Gill [1970] was the
first to consider interpolation in three-valued logic.
The interpolation theorem for classical logic follows immediately from Maehara’s
Lemma since the sequent arrow and the implication are equivalent in the sense that
A ⊃ B is valid iff A → B is. The theorem is obtained from the lemma simply by
taking Γ1 = A, ∆2 = B, and Γ2 = ∆1 = ∅. In the many-valued case of course,
no such correspondence holds in general. In fact, Maehara’s Lemma is true in any
many-valued logic, while the interpolation theorem need not hold. For instance,
none of the  Lukasiewicz logics (other than two-valued) interpolate, as has been
shown by Krzystek and Zachorowski [1977].
Assume the logic under consideration contains the following truth functions
(either as primitive connectives or representable):
(1) For every truth value v the constant truth function C˜v
(2) Every unary truth function G˜Uv,w, where G˜Uv,w(v) = v if v ∈ V \ U and = w
otherwise. (Note that these are all unary truth function taking only two truth
values.)
(3) Every n-ary truth function H˜nu,w, where H˜nv,w(v1, . . . , vn) = w if v1 = . . . =
vn = w and = v otherwise.
(4) Every quantifier K˜v,w, where K˜v,w(V ) = v if V = {v} and = w otherwise.
We denote by Ci, GUv,w, H
n
v,w and Kv,w the corresponding formula schemata, re-
spectively.
3.8.1. Theorem (Maehara’s Lemma) Let Γ,Λ be a p-provable (and hence p-valid)
sequent where Γ ∩ Λ = ∅. Then there is, for every pair v 6= w of truth values, a
formula C, called an interpolant of Γ and Λ, with the following properties:
(1) Γ, [v:C] and Λ, [w:C] are both provable.
(2) Every predicate symbol of C occurs in both Γ and Λ.
(3) Every free variable of C occurs in both Γ and Λ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the height h of the proof of Γ,Λ:
h = 0: Γ,Λ is an axiom. We distinguish cases:
(1) Γ = ∅: Take for C the constant formula Cv. Since [u:Cu] is p-valid, Γ, [v:Cv]
is provable. Λ is provable by hypothesis, hence Λ, [w:Cv] is provable by weak-
ening.
(2) Λ = ∅: Similarly, with C = Cw.
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(3) Γ = [U :A] and Λ = [V \ U :A]: Take for C the formula GUv,w(A). Let I be
some interpretation. By the definition of G˜Uv,w, C takes the value w if A takes
a value from U , and takes v otherwise. So when I p-satisfies Γ , i.e., does not
p-satisfy Λ, then C takes the value w. Conversely, if Γ is not p-satisfied by I,
then C takes the value v. From this it follows that Γ, [v:C] and Λ, [w:C] are
both p-valid (and hence provable by completeness).
h > 0: Γ,Λ is the conclusion of a rule of inference J . We distinguish cases
according to this last rule in the proof:
(1) J is a weakening at place i: Assume the weakening formula A belongs to Γ
(the other case is symmetric). J is of the form:
Γ ′, Λ
Γ ′, [i:A], Λ
w
By induction hypothesis, there is an interpolant C of Γ ′ and Λ. C is also an
interpolant of Γ and Λ, since Γ, [v:C] is provable from Γ ′, [v:C] by weakening,
and C contains no predicate symbols or free variables of A which do not occur
in Λ.
(2) J is a introduction rule for 2 at place i: Assume the introduced formula
2(A1, . . . , An) belongs to Γ (the other case is symmetric). The proof ends in
Γ ′,∆2:i(1), Λ . . . Γ ′,∆2:i(p), Λ
Γ ′, [i:2(A1, . . . , An)], Λ
2:i
The induction hypothesis yields interpolants Cj of Γ ′,∆2:i(j) and Λ (j = 1,
. . . , p). Let C equal Hpv,w(C1, . . . , Cp). C is an interpolant of Γ and Λ: First,
it contains no predicate symbols or free variables not common to Γ and Λ.
Furthermore, Γ, [v:C] and Λ, [w:C] are both p-valid. Let I be an interpreta-
tion. I p-satisfies all of Γ ′,∆2:i(j), [v:Cj ] (j = 1, . . . , p). This is the case if
either (a) I p-satisfies Γ ′, (b) I p-satisfies all of ∆2:i(j), or (c) I p-satisfies at
least one [v:Cj ]. In case (a), Γ ′, [i:2(A1, . . . , An)], [u:C] is p-satisfied, since
Γ ′ is p-satisfied. In case (b), we know that 2(A1, . . . , An) takes the value vi
by the definition of partial normal forms. In case (c), C takes the value v,
since not all of the arguments to Hpv,w equal w. In any case, then, we have
that I p-satisfies Γ, [v:C]. On the other hand, if I does not p-satisfy Λ, it
p-satisfies all of [w:Cj ] (j = 1, . . . , p), since Λ, [w:Cj ] are all p-valid. But
then all the arguments to Hpv,w in C equal w, hence C takes the value w.
Hence, Λ, [w:C] is also p-valid.
(3) J is an introduction rule for Q at place i: We will again only treat the case
where the introduced formula [i: (Qx)A(x)] belongs to Γ . J takes the form
Γ ′,∆Q:i(1), Λ . . . Γ ′,∆Q:i(p), Λ
Γ ′, [i: (Qx)A(x)], Λ
Q:i
There are interpolants Cj for the premises Γ ′,∆Q:i(j) and Λ (j = 1, . . . , p),
by induction hypothesis. As in the last case, D = Hpv,w(C1, . . . , Cp) is such
that Γ, [v:D] and Λ, [w:D] are p-valid. Note that the Cj and hence D do not
contain eigenvariables of the inference J . To see this, recall that Cj contains
only free variables common to Γ ′,∆Q:i(J) and Λ. But eigenvariables cannot
have this property, since they must not appear in Λ.
However, since the Cj are interpolants of the premises, they may contain free
variables which occur only in terms being replaced by the bound variable x
3.8. interpolation 55
and do not occur in Γ ′. These variables occur only in Λ and no longer in
Γ ′, [vi: (Qx)A(x)]. The truth or falsity of Γ, [v:D] can obviously not depend
on the assignment of such a variable in a given interpretation. We can then
bind all these variables by the quantifier K.
To be more precise, let a1, . . . , aq be all free variables occurring in D which do
not occur in Γ . Let I be an interpretation. If Γ, [v:D] is p-satisfied by I′, then
every interpretation I′ ∼a1,...,aq I p-satisfies Γ, [v:D] as well. In particular, this
holds for every I′′ ∼a1 I. But this means that DistrI
(
D(x, a2, . . . , aq)
)
= {u}
where u = valI
(
D(a1, . . . , aq)
)
. Hence, if I p-satisfies [v:D] (i.e., u = v),
then also I |=p [v: (Kx)D(x, a2, . . . , aq)]. By induction, this holds also for
C = (Kx1) . . . (Kxq)D(x1, . . . , xq). In other words, Γ, [v:C] is p-valid.
On the other hand, the truth of Λ, [w:D(a1, . . . , aq)] may depend on the as-
signment of a1, . . . , aq, since they occur in Λ. But if there is an interpre-
tation I′ ∼a1 I s.t. I |=p Λ and I′ 6|=p Λ but I′ |=p [w:D(a1, . . . , aq)] this
means that DistrI
(
D(x, a2, . . . , aq)
) 6= {v}. By the definition of K it holds
that valI
(
(Kx)D(x, a2, . . . , aq)
)
= w. By induction we have that any given
interpretation I either p-satisfies Λ or [w:C], i.e., Λ, [w:C] is p-valid.
In contrast to the proofs of Maehara [1960] and Miyama [1974], the above
proof is not entirely proof theoretical in that the p-validity of certain sequents was
shown by semantical considerations. This makes it necessary to invoke the com-
pleteness theorem. However, this is only due to the fact that the formulas/functions
Cv, GUv,w, H
n
v,w and Kv,w are, to a certain extent, left unspecified. One could, for
instance, require that they be given as primitive connectives and quantifiers in the
logic, and fix certain introduction rules for them. If this is done, it seems prob-
able that the demonstrations of p-validity of certain sequents in the proof can be
replaced by giving derivation schemata of these sequents. For instance, it should
be possible to give a uniform way of deriving Γ ′, [vi:2(A1, . . . , An)], [v:C] from
Γ ′,∆2:i(j), [v:Cj ], like in the proofs of Maehara and Miyama. This has the ad-
vantage of not only giving a constructive method of obtaining the interpolant (this
is also accomplished by our proof), but also of obtaining proofs of Γ, [v:C] and
Λ, [w:C].
Deeper investigations are also needed for exploring the connections between
Maehara’s Lemma and interpolation as a property of implication. For instance,
what does an implication function have to look like so that Maehara’s Lemma
implies the interpolation property? Can one find simpler, or more natural, families
of functions so that Maehara’s Lemma can be proved?
Chapter 4
Natural Deduction
4.1 Introduction
Gentzen [1934] formulated natural deduction for intuitionistic logic as the sys-
tem NJ. In correspondence with the intuitionistic sequent calculus LJ, where the
right side of a sequent is restricted to at most one formula, NJ deals with inference
patterns (“Schlußweisen”) of one conclusion from a set of assumptions. At the ap-
plication of rules, assumptions of a certain form can be discharged in parts of the
proof. A proof of a formula is a deduction tree where all assumptions have been
discharged.
In NJ, the symbol “⊥” is used to denote falsehood, or equivalently, an empty
conclusion. Gentzen gives introduction and elimination rules for the connectives
and quantifiers, as well as the weakening rule for NJ:
⊥
A
Natural deduction for classical logic NK is then obtained by adding tertium non
datur to NJ. Alternatively, one can drop the restriction to one formula in the con-
clusion and allow sets of formulas. For a discussion of the resulting systems see for
instance Ungar [1992], Chapters 4 and 5, or Girard [1987], § 2. Parigot [1992]
has given computational meaning to the multi-conclusion natural deduction calcu-
lus for classical logic by normalization and Curry-Howard isomorphism (see also his
[1993]).
A general construction of sound and complete natural deduction calculi leads to
an adequate syntactical (proof-theoretic) characterization of many-valued logics for
which one wants to emphasize the roˆle of a particular (set of) truth value(s). We
generalize the classical multi-conclusion system of natural deduction to the m-valued
case. This is done in essence by splitting the many-valued (positive) sequent into
the part corresponding to the designated truth values and the part corresponding
to the non-designated ones. The former then corresponds to facts derived, the
latter to facts assumed. We give, in a systematic way, introduction rules for every
connective or quantifier for every designated position, and elimination rules for
every non-designated position. This system, with the set of designated truth values
restricted to {vm}, has been presented in Baaz et al. [1993a].
In contrast to the many different (more or less equivalent) approaches in the
literature to sequent calculi and tableaux calculi, natural deduction has not been
treated in this fashion before (to the best of the author’s knowledge). For the
three-valued logic of  Lukasiwewicz, however, natural deduction systems have been
developed, e.g., the calculus of White [1980]. The approach of Becchio and
Pabion [1977] is very similar to the one used here. In fact, in the same paper they
first consider three-part sequents to formalize  L3. This is their starting point for
a natural deduction system, which uses the operator M to indicate that a formula
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takes the intermediate truth value. Still, their formulation is closer to the original
NJ.
Natural deduction is concerned with validity, or with valid patterns of inference.
Hence, we make use of the theory of positive sequent calculi only. This seems more
natural, as the positive sequent calculus is more closely related to the notion of
validity, in the same way as the negative system is more closely related to unsatis-
fiability. It is obvious how to adapt the presentation for a dual system of negative
natural deduction. All the results of this chapter remain valid for the negative case.
4.2 Natural Deduction Systems
Let Γ be a (set) sequent, V + ⊆ V a set of designated truth values. The set of
non-designated truth values is then V − = V \ V +. We divide the sequent Γ into
its designated part Γ+ and its non-designated part Γ− in the obvious way:
Γ+ := 〈Γi | i = 1, . . . ,m; vi ∈ V +〉
Γ− := 〈Γi | i = 1, . . . ,m; vi ∈ V −〉
In natural deduction, we deal with inferences from certain assumptions Γ− to cer-
tain conclusions Γ+. Such an inference is written thus:
Γ−
Γ+
The semantics employed here are the positive semantics for sequents. More precisely,
an interpretation I makes an inference pattern true, if I p-satisfies Γ . In other words,
whenever all formulas in Γ− take a truth value not corresponding to the place at
which they stand, then some formula in Γ+ does take a truth value corresponding
to its place. In the two-valued case we have the following situation: V = {t, f},
V + = {t}. An inference schema is of the form
Γ
∆
The meaning of this is that if everything in Γ is not false (i.e., true), then some-
thing in ∆ is true. Hence, to say that it means “if Γ is true, then ∆ is true” is
misleading, since we are dealing with a conjunction over Γ but a disjunction over
∆. The disanalogy is even more apparent in the many-valued case. Of course, in
intuitionistic natural deduction, ∆ is a singleton, so the problem only arises in the
classical multiple-deduction calculus.
The natural deduction calculus acts on such inferences by giving rules how some
of these inferences can be combined or altered to give new inferences. This will
be made precise later. First, we give the deduction rules. These are based on
the introduction rules of the positive sequent calculus, modified as described in
Section 3.4 to deal with set-sequents and combinational rules.
4.2.1. Definition Let f be either 2 or Q, and let F be 2(A1, . . . , An) or (Qx)A(x),
respectively. Let an introduction rule for f at place i ∈ V + be given as in Defini-
tion 3.4.1. The (natural deduction) introduction rule f :Ii for f at place i ∈ V + is
given by: 〈
Γ−j , d∆′f :i(j)−e
Γ+j ,∆
′
f :i(j)
+
〉
j∈I
Γ+, [i:F ]
The formulas in d. . .e are those which can be discharged at this inference. If f
is Q, then the rule has to satisfy the appropriate eigenvariable conditions: The
eigenvariables in ∆′f :i(j) (j ∈ I) must not occur in Γ or in F = (Qx)A(x).
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The partial sequents Γ+j ,∆
′
f :i(j) are called the premises of the rule; Γ
+, [i:F ] is
called the conclusion.
4.2.2. Definition Let f be either 2 or Q, and let F be 2(A1, . . . , An) or (Qx)A(x),
respectively. Let an introduction rule for f at place i ∈ V − be given as in Defini-
tion 3.4.1. The elimination rule f :Ei for f at place i ∈ V − is given by:
Γ−0 , d[V − \ vi:F ]e
Γ+0 , [V
+:F ]
〈
Γ−j , d∆′f :i(j)−e
Γ+j ,∆
′
f :i(j)
+
〉
j∈I
Γ+0 , Γ
+
The formulas in square brackets are those which can be discharged at this inference.
If f is Q, then the rule has to satisfy the appropriate eigenvariable conditions: The
eigenvariables in ∆′f :i(j) (j ∈ I) must not occur in Γ0, Γ or in F = (Qx)A(x).
The partial sequent Γ+0 , [V
+:F ] is called the major premise of the rule, the
partial sequents Γ+j ,∆f :i(j) are called the minor premises of the rule, and Γ
+
0 Γ
+
is called the conclusion.
4.2.3. Example The introduction rule for ⊃ in the logic  L3 is:
Γ, dAe | ∆, dAe
Π,B
Γ ′, dAe | ∆′, dBe
Π ′, B
Π,Π ′, A ⊃ B
The elimination rule at place p is:
Γ, dA ⊃ Be | ∆
Π,A ⊃ B
Γ ′′ | ∆′′, dAe
Π ′, A
Γ ′′ | ∆′′, dA,Be
Π ′′
Γ ′′′, dAe | ∆′′′]
Π ′′′, A
Π,Π ′,Π ′′,Π ′′′
The elimination rule at place f is:
Γ | ∆, dA ⊃ Be
Π,A ⊃ B
Γ ′′ | ∆′′
Π ′, A
Γ ′′, dBe | ∆′′
Π ′′
Π,Π ′,Π ′′
4.2.4. Remark Note that some of Gentzen’s original rules for LK are different from
the those as obtained by Definition 3.3.1, in that a rule for a given place is split
into two, which together give a complete characterization of the connective. These
rules can also be translated into natural deduction rules as above.
4.2.5. Definition A natural deduction system for a logic L is given by:
(1) Assumptions of the form [V −:A] where A is any formula,
(2) For every connective 2 and every truth value vi an introduction rule 2:Ii (if
vi ∈ V +) or an elimination rule 2:Ei (if vi ∈ V −);
(3) For every quantifier Q and every truth value vi an introduction rule Q:Ii (if
vi ∈ V +) or an elimination rule Q:Ei (if vi ∈ V −);
(4) The weakening rule for all vi ∈ V +:
Γ−
Γ+
Γ+, [i:A]
w: i
Weakenings are considered as introductions.
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4.2.6. Definition A natural deduction derivation is defined inductively as follows:
(1) Let A be any formula. Then
[V −:A]
[V +:A]
is a derivation of A from the assumption [V −:A] (an initial derivation).
(2) If Dk are derivations of Γ+k ,∆
+
k from the assumptions Γ
−
k , ∆ˆ
−
k , and〈
Γ−k , d∆−k e
Γ+k ,∆
+
k
〉
k∈K
Π+
is an instance of a deduction rule with ∆ˆ−k a subsequent of ∆
−
k , and all eigen-
variable conditions are satisfied, then
〈Dk〉k∈K
Π+
is a derivation of Π+ from the assumptions
⋃
k∈K Γ
−
k . The formulas in ∆ˆ
−
k
which do not occur in
⋃
k∈K Γ
−
k are said to be discharged at this inference.
4.2.7. Definition We call a formula occurrence A
(1) the conclusion formula of an introduction, if it is the formula being introduced,
i.e., it is F in the conclusion [i:F ];
(2) a premise formula of an introduction, if it is one of the formulas in ∆′f :i(j)
+
in that introduction;
(3) a major premise formula of an elimination, if it is among the formula being
eliminated, i.e., in the major premise [V +:F ];
(4) a minor premise formula of an elimination, if it is among the formulas in
∆′f :i(j)
+ in that elimination,
(5) a discharged assumption formula of an elimination, if it stands immediately
below an assumption which contains the formulas in ∆′f :i(j)
− being discharged
at that elimination.
A formula occurrence A is said to follow A′, if both are of the same form and A′
stands immediately above A at the same position.
4.2.8. Theorem (Soundness) If a partial sequent Γ+ can be derived from the as-
sumptions Γ−, then the following holds for every interpretationM: If no formula in
iΓ− (vi ∈ V −) evaluates to the truth value vi, then there a vj ∈ V + and a formula
in Γ+j that evaluates to vj .
Proof. The statement of the theorem is obviously equivalent to: If Γ+ can be
derived from assumptions Γ−, then Γ is p-valid. We prove this by inductively
translating every derivation D of Γ+ from Γ− to a positive sequent calculus proof
of Γ :
(1) D is an initial derivation:
[V −:A]
[V +:A]
The translated proof pi(D) is
[V :A]
which is an axiom.
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(2) D ends in an introduction rule at place i:〈 Γ−j , d∆′f :i(j)−e.... Dj
Γj ,∆
′
f :i(j)
〉
j∈I
Γ+, F
f :Ii
The corresponding sequent calculus proof pi(D) is:〈 .... pi(Dj)
Γj ,∆
′
f :i(j)
〉
j∈I
Γ, [i:F ]
f :i
(3) D ends in an elimination rule at place i:
Γ−0 , d[V − \ vi:F ]e.... D0
Γ+0 , [V
+:F ]
〈 Γ−j , d∆′f :i(j)−e.... Dj
Γ+j ,∆
′
f :i(j)
+
〉
j∈I
Γ+0 , Γ
+
f :Ei
Now let S be the following sequent deduction:〈 .... pi(Dj)
Γj ,∆
′
f :i(j)
〉
j∈I
Γ, [i:F ]
f :i
The corresponding sequent calculus proof pi(D) is:
.... pi(D0)
Γ0, [V \ {vi}:F ]
.... S
Γ, [i:F ]
Γ0, Γ, [V \ {v1, vi}:F ] cut:1i
.... S
Γ, [i:F ]
Γ0, Γ, [V \ {v1, v2, vi}:F ] cut:2i....
Γ0, Γ, [vm:F ]
.... S
Γ, [i:F ]
Γ0, Γ
cut:mi
(4) D ends in a weakening at place i: Add a weakening at place i to the translated
sequent calculus proof.
Note that eigenvariable conditions remain satisfied in pi(D).
4.2.9. Remark Translating sequent rules for two-valued logic yield natural deduc-
tion elimination rules which differ from those given by Gentzen. However, Gentzen’s
rules can be obtained in a systematic way by a simplification of the constructed
rules. The resulting schema falls outside of our definition of natural deduction
rules. We demonstrate this simplification pars pro toto for the ∀-elimination rule.
The classical version as given by Parigot [1992] is:
Γ
∆, (∀x)A(x)
∆,A(t)
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The constructed rule is:
Γ
∆, (∀x)A(x)
Γ ′, dA(t)e
∆′
∆,∆′
Taking {A(t)} for ∆′ and ∅ for Γ ′, we obtain Parigot’s rule by disregarding the
redundant right premise.
4.3 Normal Derivations
A maximum segment in the intuitionistic natural deduction calculus NJ is a se-
quence of formulas in a derivation that starts with an introduction and end with
an elimination. In the classical multi-conclusion system, it is a sequence starting
with an introduction of a formula and ending in an elimination acting on the same
formula. A maximum segment constitutes a redundancy in the proof. In NJ,
and also in multi-valued natural deduction, there are always proofs without such
redundancies (see Prawitz [1971]).
4.3.1. Definition A sequence A1, . . . , Ar of occurrences of one and the same for-
mula is called a maximum segment, if A1 is the conclusion formula of an introduc-
tion, Aj+1 stands immediately below Aj , and Ar is the the major premise formula
in an elimination.
4.3.2. Definition A normal derivation is a natural deduction derivation where no
major premise of an elimination stands below an introduction.
4.3.3. Proposition A normal derivation contains no maximum segments.
4.3.4. Theorem Every cut-free sequent calculus proof of a sequent Λ can be trans-
lated into a normal natural deduction derivation of Λ+ from the assumptions Λˆ−,
where Λˆ− ⊆ Λ−.
Proof. By induction on the height h of the proof P of Λ.
h = 1: Then Λ is an axiom of the form [V :A]. The corresponding natural
deduction proof δ(P ) is the initial derivation
[V −:A]
[V +:A]
h > 1: We distinguish cases according to the last rule in P :
(1) P ends in an introduction rule for f at place vi ∈ V +. Λ is of the form Γ, [i:F ]:〈 .... Pj
Γj ,∆
′
f :i(j)
〉
j∈I
Γ, [i:F ]
f :i
Construct a natural deduction proof δ(P ) of Γ+, [i:F ] from the assump-
tions Γ− as follows: 〈 Γ−j , d∆′f :i(j)−e.... δ(Pj)
Γ+j ,∆
′
f :i(j)
+
〉
j∈I
Γ+, [i:F ]
f :Ii
This only adds an introduction at the end of the derivation, hence δ(P ) is
normal.
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(2) P ends in an introduction rule at place vi ∈ V −: Λ is of the form Γ, [i:F ]:〈 .... Pj
Γj ,∆
′
f :i(j)
〉
j∈I
Γ, [i:F ]
f :i
Construct a natural deduction proof δ(P ) of Γ+ from the assumptions
Γ−, [i:F ] as follows:
d[V \ vi:F ]e, [vi:F ]
[V +:F ]
〈 Γ−j , d∆′f :i(j)−e.... δ(Pj)
Γ+j ,∆
′
f :i(j)
+
〉
j∈I
Γm
f :Ei
This only adds an elimination at the beginning of a normal derivation, hence
δ(P ) is normal.
(3) P ends in a weakening at place vi ∈ V +: Append a weakening at vi to the
natural deduction proof.
(4) P ends in a weakening at place vi ∈ V −: Do nothing.
Note that eigenvariable conditions remain satisfied in the translated proof.
4.3.5. Corollary (Completeness) Natural deduction systems are complete.
Proof. By Theorem 3.3.10, cut-free sequent calculus is complete, hence every
valid sequent Λ has a cut-free sequent calculus proof. The translation of this proof
yields a natural deduction derivation of Λ+ from the assumptions Λˆ− (Λˆ− ⊆ Λ−).
Every valid inference schema is of this form.
4.3.6. Corollary (Normal Form Property) For every natural deduction deriva-
tion, there exists a normal natural deduction derivation of the same set of formulas
from a subset of the assumptions.
Proof. If there is a derivation of Λ+ from Λ− then by Theorem 4.2.8 there is a
cut-free sequent calculus proof of Λ, whose translation yields a normal derivation.
4.3.7. Definition A path in a natural deduction derivation is a sequence of occur-
rences of formulas A1, . . . , Ar s.t.
(1) A1 is either
(a) a formula standing immediately below an assumption or
(b) is the conclusion formula of an introduction without premise formulas
(e.g., weakenings);
(2) Ar is either
(a) an end formula of the derivation or
(b) a minor premise formula of an elimination or
(c) a major premise formula of an elimination without discharged assump-
tion formulas, and
4.3. normal derivations 63
(3) Aj+1 (1 ≤ j ≤ r − 1) is either
(a) a discharged assumption formula of an elimination rule, if Aj is the major
premise formula of that elimination, or
(b) the conclusion formula of an introduction if Aj is a premise formula of
that rule, or
(c) follows Aj .
4.3.8. Proposition A path in a normal derivation can be divided into three (pos-
sibly empty) parts:
(1) The analytical part A1, . . . , Ap, where each formula is the major premise
formula of an elimination and stands immediately below an assumption; Aj
is a subformula of Aj−1 (2 ≤ j ≤ p).
(2) The minimum part Ap+1, . . . , Aq; Aj is equal to Aj+1 (p ≤ j ≤ q).
(3) The synthetical part Aq+1, . . . , Ar; Aq+1 is the conclusion formula of an
introduction with premise formula Aq; Aj−1 is a subformula of Aj (q + 1 ≤
j ≤ r).
4.3.9. Remark If a cut-free sequent calculus proof with atomic axiom sequents is
translated as in the proof of Theorem 4.3.4, the minimum segment in a path with
non-empty analytical and synthetical part is atomic.
4.3.10. Remark It remains to be investigated for which collections of operators one
can achieve strong normalization (i.e. normal form transformations with Church-
Rosser property) according to some reasonable definition. (See Parigot [1992] for
positive and Zucker [1974] for negative results in the two-valued case.)
Chapter 5
Approximating Propositional Logics
5.1 Introduction
It is clear by what has been said so far that many-valued logics are, from the
perspective of proof theory, very close to classical logic. In particular, procedures for
algorithmic proof search are very similar to those developed for classical two valued
logic, both in the concepts used and in their complexity. Furthermore, the structural
proximity to classical logic allows the translation or adaptation of many strategies
and heuristics which have been developed for classical logic. This is especially
true of propositional many-valued logic. The resolution method can be carried
much further than in Chapter 2, see for instance Baaz and Fermu¨ller [1992] or
Baaz and Fermu¨ller [1993]. The method of tableaux, a calculus very similar to
the (negative) sequent calculus, can also be used for mechanical theorem proving
in many-valued logics, see Ha¨hnle [1993a]. This approach has in fact produced
an efficient tautology checker for many-valued logics (see Ha¨hnle et al. [1992]).
Although satisfiability in many-valued propositional logics is (as in classical logic)
NP-complete (see Mundici [1987]), this is still much better than several other
propositional formalisms currently under investigation. Especially in the area of
logics for Artificial Intelligence, the corresponding decision problems are hard or
complete for classes higher up in the polynomial hierarchy (see, e.g., Eiter and
Gottlob [1992]). From a practical point of view it seems natural to ask for other
logics, which in a sense approximate these more complex logics to a satisfactory
degree, but are not as complex themselves. The remarks above suggest that many-
valued logic might be an appropriate candidate for this task. Of course, the results
in this chapter are far from being applicable for real applications. But they are, if
not a first step in a promising direction, at least theoretically appealing.
5.2 Propositional Logics
5.2.1. Definition A propositional language L consists of the following:
(1) propositional variables: X0, X1, X2, . . . , Xj , . . . (j ∈ ω)
(2) propositional connectives of arity nj : 2n00 , 2
n1
1 , . . . , 2
nr
r . If nj = 0, then 2j
is called a propositional constant.
(3) Auxiliary symbols: (, ), and , (comma).
Formulas are defined as usual. We denote the set of formulas over a language
L by Frm(L), or by simply by Frm if the language is understood. A propositional
many-valued logic M is given by a set of truth values V (M) = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, the set
of designated truth values V +(M), and a set of truth functions 2˜i:V (M)i → V (M)
for all connectives 2i.
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5.2.2. Example Examples are provided by classical propositional logic and propo-
sitional three-valued  Lukasiewicz logic. These are given by the truth functions for
the connectives given in Examples 1.3.2 and 1.3.3. Furthermore, we have the se-
quence of m-valued Go¨del logics Gm given by V (Gm) = {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}, the
designated values V +(Gm) = {m− 1}, and the following truth functions:
¬˜Gm(v) =
{
m− 1 for v = 0
0 for v 6= 0
∨˜Gm(v, w) = max(a, b)
∧˜Gm(v, w) = min(a, b)
⊃˜Gm(v, w) =
{
m− 1 for v ≤ w
w for v > w
This sequence of logics was used in Go¨del [1932] to show that intuitionistic logic
can not be characterized by a finite matrix.
5.2.3. Definition A valuation I is a mapping from the set of propositional vari-
ables into V (M). A valuation I can be extended in the standard way to a function
from formulas to truth values. I satisfies a formula F , in symbols: I |=M F , if
I(F ) ∈ V +(M). In that case, I is called a model of F , otherwise a countermodel. A
formula F is a tautology of M iff it is satisfied by every valuation. Then we write
M |= F . We denote the set of tautologies of M by Taut(M).
5.2.4. Definition A propositional logic L in the language L is given by a finite
set of propositional rule schemas R(L) being a subset of Frm∗. Rules of length 1
are called axioms. A formula F is a theorem of L, if there is a derivation of F from
R(L), i.e., a finite sequence
F1, F2, . . . , Fn = F
of formulas, s.t. for each Fi there is a rule 〈A1, . . . , An〉 ∈ R(L) where Fi is a
substitution instance of An, and there are k1, . . . , kn−1 < i s.t. Fkj is a substitution
instance of Aj (1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1). In that case we write L ` F . The set of theorems
of L is denoted by Thm(L).
5.2.5. Remark Propositional logics as defined here are always finitely axiomatized
and have the substitution property. Many well-known propositional logics are
finitely axiomatizable, e.g., classical and intuitionistic propositional logic, as well as
many modal logics. The assumption of finite axiomatizability is used essentially in
some proofs.
5.2.6. Example Intuitionistic propositional logic H is given by the following ax-
ioms (We give the axiomatization of Heyting [1930]):
a1 A ⊃ A ∧A
a2 A ∧B ⊃ B ∧A
a3 A ⊃ B ⊃ (A ∧B ⊃ B ∧ C)
a4 (A ⊃ B) ∧ (B ⊃ C) ⊃ (A ⊃ C)
a5 B ⊃ (A ⊃ B)
a6 A ∧ (A ⊃ B) ⊃ B
a7 A ⊃ A ∨B
a8 A ∨B ⊃ B ∨A
a9 (A ⊃ C) ∧ (B ⊃ C) ⊃ (A ∨B ⊃ C)
a10 ¬A ⊃ A ⊃ B
a11 (A ⊃ B) ∧ (A ⊃ ¬B) ⊃ ¬A
and the following rules (in usual notation):
A B
A ∧B r1
A A ⊃ B
B
r2
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5.3 Singular Approximations
First of all, we are interested in the relationship of many-valued logics to arbitrary
logics in respect to the formulas they prove. In other words, what we are interested
in is the containment relation between Taut(M) and Thm(L):
5.3.1. Definition A many-valued logic M approximates a logic L iff Thm(L) ⊆
Taut(M). M is called a (singular) approximation of L.
5.3.2. Example Every m-valued logic having the set of formulas Frm(L) as its set
of tautologies is a singular approximation of any logic. Less trivially, the m-valued
Go¨del logic Gm is an m-valued singular approximation of H.
If we have an approximation of a given logic L, we have a simple test if a formula
is not a theorem of L: If F is not valid in M, then F cannot be a theorem of L.
Since we cannot hope for the converse to hold, unless L is a many-valued logic, we
want M to have as few theorems as possible. In fact, we would like to be able to
find the best m-valued approximation for a given logic L. This is often possible,
since
(1) all m-valued propositional logics for a language L can be enumerated mechan-
ically, and there is only a finite number of them,
(2) it is decidable of two m-valued logics given by their truth tables, which of
them has fewer theorems.
The additional condition which needs to be satisfied is this: It is decidable whether
an m-valued logic M approximates a given propositional logic L. The naive test for
this would be to check that M satisfies all axioms and rules of L. However, this
test might fail even though M actually is an approximation of L, e.g., if there are
redundant rules. Therefore, we restrict attention to many-valued logics where this
test is positive. Such many-valued logics are called sound approximations of L.
Set inclusion of the sets of theorems orders all m-valued logics for a language into
a finite complete lattice. The minimal elements in the lattice restricted to (sound)
approximations of a given logic L then are the optimal approximations of L. We
make all this precise.
5.3.3. Proposition There are
∏r
j=1m
mnj many m-valued logics.
Proof. The number of different truth functions V nj → V equals ∣∣V V nj ∣∣ = mmnj .
5.3.4. Proposition An m-valued logic M approximates the logic L if (not iff)
(A) for every rule r in R(L): if a valuation of the variables in r makes all the
premises of r true, it also makes the conclusion true.
Proof. If: Let L ` F . We show that M |= F by induction on the length l of the
derivation in L:
l = 1: This means F is a substitution instance of an axiom A. By hypothesis,
M |= A. Let I be a valuation of the variables in F . Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be all the
variables in A, let F = A[B1/X1, . . . , Bn/Xn] and let vi = I(Bi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n). By
hypothesis, M |= A and, a fortiori, {X1 7→ v1, . . . , Xn 7→ vn} |= A. But this means
that I |= F . Hence, M |= F .
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l > 1. F is the conclusion of a rule r ∈ R(L). If r is 〈A1, . . . , Ak, A〉, and X1,
X2, . . . , Xn are all the variables in A, A1, . . . , Ak, then the inference has the form
A1[B1/X1, . . . , Bn/Xn] . . . Ak[B1/X1, . . . , Bn/Xn]
F = A[B1/X1, . . . , Bn/Xn]
r
Let I be a valuation of the variables in F , and let vi = I(Bi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n). By
induction hypothesis, the premises of r are valid. This implies that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we
haveu {X1 7→ v1, . . . , Xn 7→ vn} |= Ai. By hypothesis then, {X1 7→ v1, . . . , Xn 7→
vn} |= A. But this means that I |= F . Hence, M |= F .
5.3.5. Definition An m-valued logic M soundly approximates a given logic L iff
condition (A) of Proposition 5.3.4 holds.
5.3.6. Corollary It is decidable if a givenm-valued logic M soundly approximates
a given propositional logic L.
Proof. There are only finitely many rules to check, and condition (A) of Propo-
sition 5.3.4 can be checked in finite time.
5.3.7. Remark The adjective sound has been chosen because a many-valued logic
M which is an approximation but not a sound approximation of a given logic L has
the following paradoxical property:
For M we can construct the positive sequent calculus as in Chapter 3. Every
rule of L can be written as a sequent calculus rule as follows: Let 〈F1, F2, . . . , Fn〉
be the rule in question. The corresponding sequent calculus rule is:
Γ, [V +:F1] . . . Γ, [V +:Fn−1]
Γ, [V +:Fn]
The system resulting from combining these rules with the sequent calculus for M
becomes unsound when all truth value constants are added.
5.3.8. Example The m-valued Go¨del logics Gm are sound approximations of H.
For instance, take axiom a3: B ⊃ A ⊃ B. This is a tautology in Gm, for assume
we assign some truth values a and b to A and B, respectively. We have two cases:
If a ≤ b, then (A ⊃ B) takes the value m−1. Whatever b is, it certainly is ≤ m−1,
hence B ⊃ A ⊃ B takes the designated value m − 1. Otherwise, A ⊃ B takes the
value b, and again (since b ≤ b), B ⊃ A ⊃ B takes the value m− 1.
Modus ponens (r2) also passes the test: Assume A and A ⊃ B both take the
value m− 1. This means that a ≤ b. But a = m− 1, hence b = m− 1.
5.3.9. Remark In connection with the relation of approximations and sound ap-
proximations the following questions are open, which have an influence on the ap-
plicability and range of the results in this chapter:
By Proposition 5.3.4 it is decidable whether a given m-valued logic soundly
approximates a given logic. Is the corresponding problem decidable or undecidable
for approximations in general? Are there reasonable classes of logics where it is
decidable? Is there a way to determine, for a given (class of) logic(s), whether it
has only sound approximations?
What are the reasons for the discrepancy between approximations and sound
approximations? We have the following situation: An m-valued logic M and a logic
L are given. M singularly approximates L, but the test fails. This may be due to
(at least) two reasons: (1) The axiom system for L contains a rule for which the
test fails, but which is never actually used in a deduction in L. (2) If the test fails,
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this means that there is a rule r in L and an assignment to the variables occurring
in r, s.t. the premises of r are true but the conclusion is true. Now it is prima
facie conceivable that those formulas which, if substituted for the variables in the
premises, make those premises provable, actually never take the truth values of the
counterexample. For instance, r might be F (X) ` G(X), and for an interpretation
with val(X) = v we have that F (X) is true but G(X) is false. But what we would
in fact want to test if whether it is possible for a theorem of L of the form F (H)
to be true in M while G(H) is false. But it is conceivable that no formula H for
which F (H) is a theorem of L ever takes the truth value v in M. The questions
now are: Do such effects ever happen? Do they happen in “interesting” logics? Is
it decidable, given a set of rules, whether such things happen?
5.3.10. Definition An m-valued logic M1 is better than M2, M1  M2, iff
Taut(M1) ⊂ Taut(M2).
5.3.11. Theorem Let two m-valued logics M1, M2 be given. It is decidable
whether M1  M2.
Proof. It suffices to show the decidability of the following property: There is a
formula A, s.t. (*) M2 |= A but M1 6|= A.
We show this by giving an upper bound on the depth of a minimal formula A
satisfying the above property. Since the set of formulas of L is enumerable, bounded
search will produce such a formula iff it exists. Note that the property (*) is
decidable by enumerating all assignments.
Let A be a formula that satisfies (*), i.e., there is a valuation I s.t. I 6|=M1A.
W.l.o.g. we can assume that A contains at most m different variables: if it contained
more, some of them must be evaluated to the same truth value in the counterex-
ample I for M1 6|= A. Unifying these variables leaves (*) intact.
Let B = {B1, B2, . . .} be the set of all subformulas of A. Every formula Bj
defines an m-valued truth function f(Bj) of m variables where the values of the
variables which actually occur in Bj determine the value of f(Bj) via the matrix
of M2. On the other hand, every Bj evaluates to a single truth value t(Bj) in the
countermodel I.
Consider the formula A′ constructed from A as follows: Let Bi be a subformula
of A and Bj be a proper subformula of Bi (and hence, a proper subformula of A).
If f(Bi) = f(Bj) and t(Bi) = t(Bj), replace Bi in A with Bj . A′ is shorter than A,
and it still satisfies (*). By iterating this construction until no two subformulas have
the desired property we obtain a formula A∗. This procedure terminates, since A′
is shorter than A; it preserves (*), since A′ remains a tautology under M2 (we
replace subformulas behaving in exactly the same way under all valuations) and the
countermodel I is also a countermodel for A′.
The depth of A∗ is bounded above by mm
m+1−1. This is seen as follows: If the
depth of A∗ is d, then there is a sequence A∗ = B′0, B
′
1, . . . , B
′
d of subformulas of
A∗ where B′k is an immediate subformula of B
′
k−1. Every such B
′
k defines a truth
function f(B′k) of m variables in M2 and a truth valued t(B
′
k) in M1 via I. There
are mm
m
m-ary truth functions of m truth values. The number of distinct truth
function-truth value pairs then is mm
m+1. If d ≥ mmm+1, then two of the B′k, say
B′i and B
′
j where B
′
j is a subformula of B
′
i define the same truth function and the
same truth value. But then B′i could be replaced by B
′
j , contradicting the way A
∗
is defined.
5.3.12. Corollary It is decidable if two m-valued logics define the same set of
tautologies. The non-strict relation  between m-valued logics is decidable.
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Proof. Taut(M1) = Taut(M2) iff neither M1  M2 nor M2  M1. M1  M2
iff M1  M2 or Taut(M1) = Taut(M2).
Let ' be the equivalence relation on m-valued logics defined by: M1 ' M2 iff
Taut(M1) = Taut(M2), and let MVLm be the set of all m-valued logics over L.
By Mm we denote the set of all sets Taut(M) of tautologies of m-valued logics M .
The partial order 〈Mm,⊆〉 is isomorphic to 〈MVLm/ ',〉.
5.3.13. Proposition 〈Mm,〉 is a finite complete partial order.
Proof. The set of m-valued logics MVLm is obviously finite, since there are at
most mn1mn2 · · ·mnc different m-valued matrices for C.  is a partial order on
MVLm/ ' with the smallest element ⊥ := Frm(L) and the largest element > := ∅.
The “best” logic is the one without theorems, generated by a matrix where no
connective takes a designated truth value anywhere. The “worst” logic is the one
where every formula of L is a tautology, it is generated by a matrix where every
connective takes a designated truth value everywhere.
In every complete partial order over a finite set, there exist lub and glb for every
two elements of the set. Hence, 〈M,4,5,⊥,>〉 is a finite complete lattice, where
4 is the lub in , and 5 is the glb in . Since  is decidable and M can be
automatically generated the functions 4 and 5 are computable.
5.3.14. Proposition The optimal (i.e., minimal under ⊆)m-valued sound approx-
imations of a logic L are computable.
Proof. Consider the set A(L) of m-valued sound approximations of L. Since A(L)
is finite and partially ordered by , A(L) contains minimal elements. The relation
 is decidable, hence the minimal sound approximations can be computed.
5.3.15. Remark Of course, the best approximation one could wish for is a many-
valued logic M whose tautologies coincide with the theorems of L. L then provides
an axiomatization of M. This of course is not always possible, at least for finite-
valued logics. Lindenbaum has shown that any logic (in our sense, given by a set
of rules and with substitution) can be characterized by an infinite-valued logic,
see  Lukasiewicz and Tarski [1930]. For a discussion of related questions see
also Rescher [1969], § 24. Note that Rescher’s notions of captures and adequate
correspond to our singular approximation and sound approximation, respectively.
5.4 Sequential Approximations
In the previous section we have shown that it is always possible to obtain the best
sound m-valued approximation of a given logic, but there is no way to tell how
good these approximations are. For all we know, the best approximations for a
given logic L might only be those M having Frm(L) as their sets of tautologies,
even though Thm(L) ⊂ Frm(L). It is hardly appropriate, then to call M an ap-
proximation of L, since it is far from being “close” to L. But how can we measure
this “closeness” of many-valued logics to arbitrary logics? Clearly, a sensible mea-
sure is not easily defined by considering single many-valued logics. It is certainly
more promising to take a step back and look at collections, say infinite sequences
of many-valued logics.
5.4.1. Definition Let a logic L be given and let A = 〈M1,M2,M3, . . . ,Mj , . . .〉
(j ∈ ω) be a sequence of many-valued logics s.t.
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(1) Mi  Mj iff i ≥ j, and
(2) Mi is a singular approximation of L.
A is called a sequential approximation of L iff Thm(L) =
⋂
j∈ω Taut(Mj). We say
L is approximable, if there is such a sequential approximation for L.
5.4.2. Example Consider the sequence G = 〈G2,G3,G4, . . .〉 of Go¨del logics and
intuitionistic propositional logic H. Taut(Gi) ⊃ Thm(H), since Gi is a sound
approximation of H. Furthermore, Gi+1  Gi. This has been pointed out by
Go¨del [1932], for a detailed proof see Gottwald [1989], Satz 3.4.1. However, it
is not a sequential approximation of H: The formula (A ⊃ B) ∧ (B ⊃ A), while
not a theorem of H, is a tautology of all Gi. In fact,
⋂
j≥2 Taut(Gi) is the set
of tautologies of the infinite-valued Go¨del logic Gℵ, which is axiomatized by the
rules of H plus the above formula. This has been shown in Dummett [1959]
(see also Gottwald [1989], § 3.4). Hence, G is a sequential approximation of
Gℵ = H + (A ⊃ B) ∧ (B ⊃ A).
Jas´kowski [1963] gave a sequential approximation of H. For this see also
Rose [1958], Surma [1973], as well as Surma et al. [1975]. That H is approximable
is also a consequence of Theorem 5.4.14, with the proof adapted to Kripke seman-
tics for intuitionistic propositional logic, since H has the fmp (see Gabbay [1981],
Ch. 4, Theorem 4(a)).
The notion of approximabilty is of interest in itself, but moreover it tells us
something about the quality of singular approximations: As has been pointed out
above, there is no way to guarantee that we can come as close to a given logic with
our singular approximation as we want to (if we only allow sufficiently many truth
values). However, if L is approximable, then every formula false in L will also be
falsified in a singular approximation of L with sufficiently many truth values.
The natural question to ask is: Which logics are approximable? Here we can
give a negative answer for undecidable logics, and a positive answer for (a class of)
logics with the finite model property.
5.4.3. Proposition Let L be an undecidable propositional logic. Then L is not
approximable.
Proof. Since L is given by an axiom system, its set of theorems is r.e. Conse-
quently, its set of non-theorems cannot be r.e. If L were approximable, there were
a sequence A = 〈M1,M2,M3, . . .〉 s.t.
⋂
j≥2 Taut(Mj) = Thm(L). If N is a non-
theorem of L, then there would be an index i s.t. N is false in Mi. But this would
yield a semi-decision procedure for non-theorems of L: Try for each j whether N is
false in Mj . If N is a non-theorem, this will be established at j = i, if not, we may
go on forever. This contradicts the fact that the non-theorems are not r.e.
5.4.4. Example This shows that a result similar to that of Jas´kowski [1963] can-
not be obtained for full propositional linear logic. This logic is undecidable, as has
been shown by Lincoln et al. [1990] (see also Troelstra [1992], Ch. 20).
For the positive result, note that a basic fact about sequential approximations
is that every non-theorem of L is falsified in some Mi. Compare this to the finite
model property of modal logics, which says that every non-theorem A of a modal
logic L is falsified in some finite Kripke model. These countermodels can be coded
into many-valued logics which are singular approximations of L but which also
falsify A, too. By a product construction, this gives a singular approximation of L.
The following definitions are taken from Chellas [1980].
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5.4.5. Definition A modal logic L has as its language L the usual propositional
connectives plus two unary modal operators: 2 (necessary) and 3 (possible). A
Kripke model for L is a triple 〈W,R,P 〉, where
(1) W is any set: the set of worlds,
(2) R ⊆W 2 is a binary relation on W : the accessibility relation,
(3) P is a mapping from the propositional variables to subsets of W .
A modal logic L is characterized by a class of Kripke models for L.
This is called the standard semantics for modal logics (see Chellas [1980],
Ch. 3). The semantics of formulas in standard models is defined as follows:
5.4.6. Definition Let L be a modal logic, KL be its characterizing class of Kripke
models. Let K = 〈W,R,P 〉 ∈ KL be a Kripke model and A be a modal formula.
If α ∈W is a possible world, then we say A is true in α, α |=L A, iff the following
holds:
(1) A is a variable: α ∈ P (X)
(2) A ≡ ¬B: not α |=L B
(3) A ≡ B ∧ C: α |=L B and α |=L C
(4) A ≡ B ∨ C: α |=L B or α |=L C
(5) A ≡ 2B: for all β ∈W s.t. α R β it holds that β |=L B
(6) A ≡ 3B: there is a β ∈W s.t. α R β and β |=L B
We say A is true in K, K |=L A, iff for all α ∈ W we have α |=L A. A is valid in
L, L |= A, iff A is true in every Kripke model K ∈ KL. By Taut(L) we denote the
set of all formulas valid in L.
5.4.7. Example The modal logic S5 is characterized by the class of universal mod-
els, i.e., Kripke models where R = W 2. It can be shown that it is also characterized
by the class of models where R is an equivalence relation (see Chellas [1980],
Theorem 3.13).
Modal logics as considered in the literature are also propositional logics in the
sense of Definition 5.2.4, i.e., they can be axiomatized by a finite set of rules. If this
is the case, then the valid formulas of La.k.a. theorems are r.e.
5.4.8. Example The modal logic S5 is axiomatized by the following axioms (see
Chellas [1980], § 1.2):
T 2A ⊃ A
5 3A ⊃ 23A
K 2(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (2A ⊃ 2B)
Df3 3A ≡ ¬2¬A
in addition to the usual axioms for classical propositional logic, and the following
rules (in usual notation):
A
2A
RN
A A ⊃ B
B
MP
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A common method for proving that a modal logic is decidable is connected with
the so-called finite model property:
5.4.9. Definition Let L be a modal logic characterized by K. L has the finite
model property (fmp) iff for every A s.t. L 6|= A, there is a finite Kripke model
K = 〈W,R,P 〉 ∈ K (i.e., W is finite), s.t. K 6|=L A.
We would like to exploit the fmp of a modal logic L to construct a sequential
approximation of L. First, we define a product operator on many-valued logics:
5.4.10. Definition Let M and M′ be m and m′-valued logics, respectively. Then
M×M′ is the mm′-valued logic where V (M×M′) = V (M)×V (M′), V +(M×M′) =
V +(M) × V (M′), and truth functions are defined component-wise. I.e., if 2 is an
n-ary connective, then
2˜M×M′(w1, . . . , wn) = 〈2˜M, 2˜M′〉.
For convenience, we define the following: Let I and I′ be valuations of M and M′,
respectively. I×I′ is the valuation of M×M′ defined by: (I×I′)(X) = 〈I(X), I′(X)〉.
If I× is a valuation of M×M′, then the valuations pi1I× and pi2I× of M and M′,
respectively, are defined by pi1I×(X) = v and pi2I×(X) = v′ iff I×(X) = 〈v, v′〉.
5.4.11. Lemma Taut(M×M′) = Taut(M) ∩ Taut(M′)
Proof. Let A be a tautology of M × M′ and I and I′ be valuations of M and
M′, respectively. Since I × I′ |=M×M′ A, we have I |=M A and I′ |=M′ A by the
definition of ×. Conversely, let A be a tautology of both M and M′, and let I×
be a valuation of M × M′. Since pi2I× |=M A and pi2I× |=M′ A, it follows that
I× |=M×M′ A.
The definition and lemma are easily generalized to the case of finite products∏
i Mi by induction.
5.4.12. Definition Let K = 〈W,R,P 〉 be a finite Kripke model. We define the
many-valued logic MK as follows:
(1) V (MK) = {0, 1}W , the set of 0-1-sequences with indices from W .
(2) V +(MK) = {1}W , the singleton of the sequence constantly equal to 1.
(3) ¬˜MK , ∨˜MK , ∧˜MK , ⊃˜MK are defined componentwise from the classical truth
functions
(4) 2˜MK is defined as follows:
2˜MK (〈wα〉α∈W )β =
{ 1 if for all γ s.t. β R γ, wγ = 1
0 otherwise
(5) 3˜MK is defined as follows:
3˜MK (〈wα〉α∈W )β =
{ 1 if there is a γ s.t. β R γ and wγ = 1
0 otherwise
Furthermore, IK is the valuation defined by IK(X)α = 1 iff α ∈ P (X) and = 0
otherwise.
5.4.13. Lemma Let L and K be as in Definition 5.4.12. Then the following hold:
(1) Every valid formula of L is a tautology of MK .
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(2) If K 6|=L A then IK 6|=MK A.
Proof. Let B be a modal formula, and K ′ = 〈W,R,P ′〉. We prove by induction
that valIK′ (B)α = 1 iff K′ |=L B:
B is a variable: P ′(B) = W iff IK(B)α = 1 for all α ∈W by definition of IK .
B ≡ ¬C: By the definition of ¬˜MK , valIK (B)α = 1 iff valIK (C)α = 0. By
induction hypothesis, this is the case iff α 6|=L C. This in turn is equivalent to
α |=K B. Similarly if B is of the form C ∧D, C ∨D, and C ⊃ D.
B ≡ 2C: valIK (B)α = 1 iff for all β with α R β we have valIK (C)β = 1. By
induction hypothesis this is equivalent to β |=L C. But by the definition of 2 this
obtains iff α |=L B. Similarly for 3.
(1) Every valuation I of MK defines a function PI via PI(X) = {α | I(X)α = 1}.
Obviously, I = IPI . If L |= B, then 〈W,R,PI〉 |=L B. By the preceding argument
then valI(B)α = 1 for all α ∈W . Hence, B takes the designated value under every
valuation.
(2) A is not true in K. This is the case only if there is a world α at which it is
not true. Consequently, valIK (A)α = 0 and A takes a non-designated truth value
under IK .
5.4.14. Theorem Let L be a modal logic with the fmp, and 〈A1, A2, . . .〉 an
enumeration of its non-theorems. A sequential approximation of L is given by
〈M1,M2, . . .〉 where M1 = MK1 , and Mi+1 = Mi ×MKi+1 where Ki is the small-
est finite model s.t. Ki 6|=L Ai
Proof. (1) Taut(Mi) ⊇ Taut(L): By inducton on i: For i = 1 this is
Lemma 5.4.13 (1). For i > 1 the statement follows from Lemma 5.4.11, since
Taut(Mi−1) ⊇ Taut(L) by induction hypothesis, and Taut(MKi) ⊇ Taut(L) again
by Lemma 5.4.13 (1).
(2) Mi  Mi+1 from A ∩B ⊆ A and Lemma 5.4.11.
(3) Taut(L) =
⋂
i≥1 Taut(Mi). The ⊆-direction follows immediately from (1).
Furthermore, by Lemma 5.4.13 (2), no non-tautology of L can be a member of all
Taut(Mi), whence ⊇ holds.
5.4.15. Remark Note that Theorem 5.4.14 does not hold in general if L is not
finitely axiomatizable. This follows from Proposition 5.4.3 and the existence of
an undecidable recursively axiomatizable modal logic which has the fmp (see
Urquhart [1981]). Note also the condition in Theorem 5.4.14 that there is an
enumeration of the non-theorems of L. Since finitely axiomatizable logics with the
fmp are decidable (Harrop [1958]), there always is such an enumeration for the
logics we consider.
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